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Abstract 
This thesis examines factors that influence the propensity to, and the utility of, 
conscious processing during a complex motor skill. Prevalent theories of skill 
acquisition and automaticity view expert performance as best executed in the 
absence of conscious movement control. There is substantial evidence to 
support this claim for simple tasks but a lack of research for complex skills is 
apparent. In this thesis the role of conscious processing (reinvestment) is 
examined in relation to the full golf swing in baseline and anxiety conditions. 
The early experiments in the thesis examine the effects of limiting conscious 
processing through a temporal restriction. Mixed performance results were 
evident throughout, with no support being afforded to the complete 
automaticity of a complex skill.  
Later experiments investigated individualistic elements of personality and 
cognitive ‘make up,’ that may affect the control structures of the golf swing. In 
a divergence to the reinvestment literature, our results indicate that conscious 
processing during task performance affects individuals differently, with 
mediating factors of processing style and working memory capacity. A high 
‘verbaliser’ group deteriorated while ‘visualisers’ showed improvement during 
restricted conscious processing trials. Additionally, a positive correlation was 
indicated between working memory capacity and task performance during the 
temporally restricted trials. 
Overall, the results imply a positive role for conscious control in the golf 
swing. It is therefore suggested that a multifarious account of reinvestment 
would be more appropriate if it is to be applied to complex skill.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Introduction to Thesis 
Golf coaching has a cultural history of being highly explicit in the nature of its 
delivery. Given the potential complexity of the game this can easily lead to a 
situation of cognitive overload during practice and a debilitating reliance on 
conscious control (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Wulf, 2013) during 
performance situations. The term ‘paralysis by analysis’ is one that is ever 
familiar to golfers and coaches alike. Of recent years there has been an 
overreaction to this pattern with researchers and sports psychologists offering 
the much used blanket advice of ‘don’t think about your swing’.  
Dr Bob Rotella is golf’s most prominent sports psychologist, famously helping 
Padraig Harrington to three major victories inside of 18 months. A key part of 
the Rotella doctrine repeated in his books (Rotella, 1995), is that he 
encourages golfers to focus their attention on the target and resist any 
temptation to think about their swing mechanics. In golf psychology, it is 
largely considered that swing thoughts are a primary source of distraction and 
will hamper the player’s performance. ”You cannot hit a golf ball consistently if 
you think about swing mechanics” (Rotella, 1995, pg 40).  
Experientially, it would seem that moments of optimum performance do occur 
with a complete lack of technical thought. This is backed up by a multitude of 
anecdotal observations: When asked what he thinks about when batting, Yogi 
Berra, the baseball icon replied, “Think? How can you think and play at the 
same time (Beilock, 2011, pg 224)?”  It is unlikely, however, that this common 
observation means that the reverse causality is also true.  
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Additionally, golf is taught and learned in an extremely explicit manner 
(Bennett et al., 2009, Rousseau, 2010, 2011), which leads to the build up of 
procedural knowledge (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a). To then expect the 
performer to execute the golf swing in the absence of conscious control is a 
far-reaching request that without considerable training or an effective 
intervention is unlikely to ensue.  
The theoretical underpinnings of automaticity need further research if we are 
to offer a more robust performance model. This thesis lends evidence based 
research to this widely held position and considers the efficacy of renouncing 
conscious control in performance of a complex motor skill. We also test a 
potential intervention that could be incorporated into a golfer’s pre-
performance routine in the aim of reducing conscious control of the 
movement. 
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Aims of the Dissertation 
General Aims 
The main aim of this study is to add insights into the effect of reinvestment by 
elite level golfers executing the full swing. In doing so, the efficacy of popular 
automaticity theories will be examined in relation to a highly complex motor 
skill. A further aim is to increase understanding of the individual factors that 
may affect the propensity for and the utility of conscious processing in the golf 
swing. 
 
Specific Aims 
1. To examine whether reducing conscious control improves performance 
in experts. 
2. To test an intervention that limits conscious processing during task 
performance, in the aim of alleviating choking under pressure. 
3. To further understand the effects of conscious control during pressure 
and non-pressure conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW OF CONSCIOUS PROCESSING DURING A COMPLEX 
MOTOR SKILL 
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Introduction 
During the process of skill acquisition, the learner is thought to progress from 
an early cognitive stage toward a more automatic mode of movement control 
that is typically displayed by expert performers (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2000, 
Fitts and Posner, 1967). Automaticity has been defined in the literature as 
‘fast, stimulus-driven and characterised by a lack of intention, attention and 
awareness’ (Saling and Phillips, 2007 p. 2). The result being that automatic 
movement control is effortless (Logan, 2002), free from working memory input 
and thus, not limited by capacity (Pashler, 1994, Pashler and Johnston, 
1998). Logan’s ‘instance theory’ (Logan, 1988, 2002) defines automaticity as 
behavior that is guided by direct memory retrieval. In this model, automaticity 
is developed as novice performers become less reliant on previously 
established ‘algorithms’ and trust the movement control to memory based 
processing that has the benefit of being faster and more robust than executive 
control. ‘Consistent mapping’ (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) suggests that this 
process of atomization only occurs when a consistent task requires a 
consistent response. Skill transfer is directly correlated with the similarity of 
task with any task perturbations requiring the re-assignment of executive 
control.  
Automaticity has been characterized (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999, Bargh et 
al., 1996) as being fast effortless control that requires little or no technical 
attention. Similarly, Singer et al. (1993) describes the phenomenon as the 
freeing up of limited conscious capacity that results in physical actions that 
appear to require little or no thought. 
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Often viewed in the literature as the opposite of automaticity, is executive 
control or conscious processing, which is reliant on working memory input and 
categorizes acts that individuals are aware of, that are intentioned, require 
effort and are controllable (Logan and Cowan, 1984) 
 
The Full Golf Swing 
Golf is a self paced sport (Singer, 1988) making the exponent more 
susceptible to the performance effects of over thinking (Cotterill et al., 2010). 
Most of what we know about conscious processing in relation to golf has 
come from extrapolating studies on putting (Beilock and Gray, 2012, Masters 
et al., 1993a, Mullen and Hardy, 2010, Toner and Moran, 2011) which 
provides a conveniently controllable environment. However, putting does not 
share the same mechanical complexity and demands as the full golf swing. A 
number of uniquely challenging aspects of which have been highlighted and 
include; the velocity of the club making it difficult to apply closed loop theories 
of motor control, the sequential coordination requirements of numerous sub-
movements, the different clubs used and the high degree of accuracy required 
in a “sensorimotor control task during which a movement has to be aligned 
according to an external goal” (Jäncke et al., 2009, p.1). 
Most pertinent to this study though, is that the full golf swing is typically taught 
and learnt in a highly explicit manner (for example see Bennett et al., 2009) 
making it an epitomical task to conduct our study into conscious control during 
a complex motor skill.  
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Motor Learning Overview 
High level motor performance is distinguished by the economy of both 
movement and thought. Throughout the acquisition and development 
processes of a motor skill, certain key patterns emerge. From a physical 
standpoint, the movement pattern augments over time and practice, to deliver 
enhanced output. Degrees of freedom (DOF) that were previously restrained 
as a necessity to basic control, are later given back to the movement in a 
coherent coordinated structure (Jordan, 1990) that allows for greater 
efficiency and power. At this advanced stage, a greater number of DOF are 
linked with increased ‘good variability’ (Wu and Latash, 2014) within the 
movement. This is an essential part of the process that serves to self-organize 
(Kelso, 1997, Williams et al., 1999) and provide a higher level of output 
consistency over a broad range of environmental and task restraints. While 
the movement structure is becoming more refined, so too are the cognitive 
processes controlling the pattern which become far less resource dependent 
(Hatfield and Hillman, 2001).  At the expert end of performance, cognitive load 
is greatly reduced from the earlier stages of learning. 
Popular ‘information processing’ theories (Anderson, 1982, Anderson, 1995, 
Fitts and Posner, 1967) see the performer progressing through 3 discrete 
phases that identify a reduction in conscious control. The initial ‘cognitive’ 
stage involves a lot of hypothesis testing (Poletiek, 2013) that has a highly 
verbal-cognitive mode. By the time the learner is in stage 2, ‘fixation’, the 
corrections are much more subtle and the cognitive demand is reduced. After 
considerable time and repetition the learner would reach the ‘autonomous 
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stage’ in which the movement is largely controlled in the absence of working 
memory and thus utilizing a more unconscious process.  
 
Expert-Induced Amnesia 
 
In alignment with the atomization of a skill, experts often report a lack of 
memory in relation to the mechanics of the movement and find it difficult to 
articulate ‘how’ a skill was performed. ‘As we get better at performing a skill, 
our conscious memory for how we do it gets worse and worse.’ (Beilock, 
2011, p. 16). This ‘expert-induced amnesia’ occurs as procedural memory 
plays a larger role in skill execution reducing the role of step by step retrieval 
of episodic memory (Beilock, 2011). Since procedural memory is implicit and 
out of conscious awareness the performer would then find it difficult to 
remember the explicit account of how the skill was executed. This 
phenomenon is often taken as a key indicator that when a skill is highly 
developed it requires little or no conscious input. This was the interpretation of 
putting studies (Beilock et al., 2002) that involved novice and experience 
golfers in normal and novel task conditions. 
This position is criticised by Sutton (2015) in his Mesh account of automaticity, 
in which he highlights what is claimed to be’ weaknesses within the extant skill 
research.’ To this point, Sutton illuminates the usual and non-challenging 
nature of the putting task that led to expert-induced amnesia studies (Beilock 
et al., 2002). In this study, golfers hit 70 identical putts from the same location 
on a flat surface creating a situation where ‘information for control has no 
future relevance’ (Sutton, 2015, p. 26).  
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In the novel task where golfers used a ‘funny putter’ (Beilock et al., 2002) 
experts reported an increase in episodic memory pointing to cognitive and 
attentional involvement during task execution. On this basis, the ‘Mesh’ 
account of expert-induced amnesia is therefore based around the novelty of 
the task with ‘usual’ and repetitive tasks being likely to induce reduced 
memory. However, once the task becomes more challenging then enhanced 
memory retrieval is likely. Some aspects of movement control may remain out 
of awareness but there will be a clear retrieval of memory relating to ‘higher 
order control’. From this perspective a task may be highly familiar but if it has 
any degree of novel constraint then complete automaticity is unlikely to ensue. 
 
The Development of Expert Skill  
Where traditional motor learning models see automaticity as the pinnacle of 
motor performance, Ericsson (Ericsson, 1998, 2006b) views the third and 
automatic stage as being a performance asymptote and in contrast, describes 
expert performance has having significant cognitive input. 
In his own model (Ericsson, 2006a, Ericsson, 2007) of ‘experience and 
deliberate practice’ (Ericsson, 2006a, Williams and Ericsson, 2005), Ericsson 
makes the distinction between ‘expert’ and ‘everyday’ tasks. For everyday 
tasks Ericsson’s 3 stages are consistent with that of Fitts and Posner (1967), 
suggesting that the goal in learning an everyday task is to get to an 
autonomous stage as quickly as possible in order to carry out the task with 
minimal effort. This represents the lower level of skill acquisition. To gain a 
higher level of expertise the learner must be continually developing higher 
order cognitive skills and incorporate increasingly complex representations 
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that serve to further enhance the skill. Significantly, Ericsson sees 
automaticity as an undesirable state that reduces conscious control of an 
action, subsequently making development and alterations of the skill difficult. 
If at any point the learner/expert settles at an autonomous stage then he is 
seen to be in a state of ‘arrested development (Ericsson, 1998). For Ericsson, 
the learner is on a constant progression of adjacent states that have physical 
and cognitive properties that support each other. When a jump to the higher 
state is achieved through deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993a) it may be 
down to a physiological change or a cognitive improvement in monitoring 
and/or mediating the action through ever changing internal representations. 
The challenge with the ‘experience and deliberate practice’ stance is that 
while it gives a credible account of skill development, it is somewhat 
ambiguous as to whether elite performance is best achieved with online 
conscious control or not.  
This ground is however, deeply assimilated within the literature on ‘flow 
states’. The presence of which, is associated with peak performance. 
(Jackson and Roberts, 1992). Flow has been defined as “a state of 
consciousness where one becomes totally absorbed in what one is doing, to 
the exclusion of other thoughts and emotions. A harmonious experience 
where mind and body are working together effortlessly, leaving the person 
feeling that something special has just occurred” (Jackson and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999, p. 5). 
 Within their seminal work in the area Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi (1999) 
describe the experience of flow as having nine dimensions: challenge-skills 
balance, action-awareness merging, clear goals, unambiguous feedback, 
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concentration on the task at hand, sense of control, loss of self-
consciousness, transformation of time and an autotelic experience. 
Although not explicitly cited as a dimension of flow, automaticity is often 
closely associated to the experience (Koehn et al., 2013b, Swann et al., 
2012). This is typified by a study of elite golfers (Swann et al., 2015)  where 
automaticity was reported as being part of the flow experience and is linked to 
the flow dimension of action-awareness merging (Jackson and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). An over-emphasis given to the presence of 
automaticity within flow experience has been criticized as ‘representative of 
many theorists and practitioners who privilege one aspect or feature of the 
phenomenology of flow as if it captured the entire phenomenon (Sutton et al., 
2011, p. 78). Furthermore, within their 9 dimensions of flow, Jackson and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999, p. 105) suggested that self-awareness was an 
important dimension of this experience as it allows performers to process 
‘information about the fine nuances of our involvement in the activity’ (Toner 
et al., 2015). Once again we are left with phenomenological accounts that   
relate automaticity to optimal performance but no direct casual links. 
 
Conscious Control 
Until recently, the general consensus in the literature has been with the self -
focus accounts of conscious control. That is to say that the focus of attention 
on one’s movement/technique during performance to either control (Masters 
et al., 1993b) or even just monitor (Beilock and Carr, 2001) the movement will 
cause a breakdown in performance due to an ‘unpacking’ of the unconscious 
processing and a reversion back to a more primitive and conscious form of 
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control. Early self-focus theories (Allport, 1980, Kahneman, 1973, Logan, 
1985, Schmidt, 2003) have been brought together by Masters and Maxwell 
(2004, 1993b) under the term ‘reinvestment’ which they latterly defined as the 
“manipulation of conscious explicit, rule based knowledge by working memory 
to control the mechanics of one’s movement during motor output” (p208, 
Masters and Maxwell, 2004) This concept is at the heart the Conscious 
Processing Hypothesis (CPH, Masters et al., 1993b) which follows that the 
reinvestment of declarative knowledge serves to reverse the learning process 
and break down the proceduralised movements into smaller chunks where 
they no longer operate with the same level of efficiency. Reinvestment is said 
to be most likely when the performer is under pressure and most prevalent in 
expert performers due to the amount of explicit knowledge that has built up 
over time and practice. (Discussed in detail in chapter 4). 
 
Attentional Focus 
Conscious processing has been linked with theories of attention (Schmidt and 
Lee, 2013) which is central to concentration and has been and defined as 
“what we are aware of at any given moment” (Schmidt and Lee, 2013, p.98).  
The prevalent research into the effects of the loci of attentional focus (Wulf, 
2007, Wulf, 2013, Wulf et al., 2015) make the distinction between focusing 
one’s attention on the movement (internal focus), and focusing on the effect/ 
intended outcome of the movement (external focus). This differentiation forms 
the basis behind the ‘Constrained Action Hypothesis’ (CAH, Wulf et al., 1999, 
Wulf et al., 2001, Wulf et al., 2000) which views a clear distinction in cognitive 
load, learning and performance effects between the two attentional loci. The 
 18 
CAH is greatly in favour of an external focus of attention that accordingly,  
“allows unconscious, fast, and reflexive processes to control the movement” 
(Wulf, 2007, p.113). In contrast, internal focus is thought to disrupt the 
automatic control processes and cause skill breakdown in a similar vein as 
the reinvestment theory.  
The theoretical background behind the hypothesis is associated with the way 
motor actions are coded in long-term memory (Land et al., 2014). External 
focus is thought to create a closer connection between action and effect 
(Cappuccio, 2015). This has been linked to ‘Common Coding Theory’ (Prinz, 
1990, cited in Peh, 2010) in which performance is best served when 
perception and action are coded in the same medium. External focus has also 
been associated with more advanced/elaborate formations of task related 
internal representations (Bläsing et al., 2009) that are akin to skilled 
performers. That is, an external focus facilitates the formation of an expert like 
organized hierarchy of skill representations that convey associations between 
an action and its effect (Schack, 2004).  
The CAH has been given credence from research involving a multitude of 
tasks (Chow et al., 2014, Maddox et al., 1999a, McKay and Wulf, 2012, Wulf 
et al., 2007) including a number of experiments in golf related movements (An 
et al., 2013, Perkins-Ceccato et al., 2003, Poolton et al., 2006, Wulf et al., 
1999, Wulf and Su, 2007). The golf related studies have been largely 
supportive of the CAH, although, Perkins-Ceccato et al. (2003) found the 
effects to be skill dependent. Contrary to the CAH, in a golf pitching task, low-
skill participants performed better in the internal focus condition.  A separate 
study using golf pitch shots (Bell and Hardy, 2009b) introduced a further 
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distinction to the attentional focus literature by splitting external focus into 
external distil focus (the flight and direction of the ball) and external loci focus 
(position of the clubface throughout the swing). Even with this further 
dimension, the results from this study (Bell and Hardy, 2009a) and a similar 
three dimension attentional loci set up in dart throwing (McKay and Wulf, 
2012), both supported the more target orientated distil external focus. 
The central claim of the CAH is that external focus promotes automaticity 
within the movement control structure. While this is supported by a number of 
studies (Kal et al., 2013, Wulf et al., 2001) Oliveira et al. (2013) set out to 
specifically test this aspect of the hypothesis with a golf putting task that 
involved both learning and performance trials. From the perspective of 
learning under external focus, the evidence did not support the ‘automation 
hypothesis’ with participants showing no greater level of automaticity in 
retention trials. It was also noted that internal focus proved to be most 
beneficial in a straightforward learning/retention set up. External focus was 
however preferable for performance once the skill has been learned. 
Critics of the attentional focus literature (Peh et al., 2010) claim the paradigm 
to be overly dichotic to be universally applicable, citing task constraints and 
skill level as mediating factors. The participant’s familiarity of attention loci is 
also brought into question with a study that found the optimal attentional focus 
(internal or external) to be the one that the participant normally adopts 
(Maurer and Munzert, 2013) with no bias for either an internal or external 
focus. 
A naturalistic investigation of golfer’s attentional foci support this view with 
claims that “the foci of expert golfers is more diverse and more specific than 
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the kinds of foci examined in the literature” (Bernier et al., 2011, p.336). A 
framework is suggested that further categorises attentional focus into content 
and modality. 
With the CAH being heavily connected to theories of automaticity, this study 
will add valuable insight to this field by bringing new data to the areas of 
reinvestment propensity and the utility of autonomous control for a complex 
skill. 
 
Working Memory  
Conscious control of the golf swing is believed to be handled in working 
memory (WM, Baddeley, 2007) which is tasked with the control of attention 
while also being able to store and process information. The popular multi-
component account of WM outlined by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) comprises 
four discrete aspects that either process different information types or have 
strategic involvement in the system (Discussed in detail in chapter 8). It is 
thought that WM has a limited capacity that restricts the amount of declarative 
knowledge that can be stored and processed at any one time (Alloway et al., 
2005). This is highly relevant to the current thesis since the capacity of one’s 
WM may affect the way we learn (Buszard, 2014) and how we subsequently 
control or monitor our skilled movement patterns (Mullen and Hardy, 2000b, 
Mullen et al., 2005). WM capacity is also thought to be a key determinate in 
the ability to perform under pressure (Beilock and Carr, 2005, Beilock and 
DeCaro, 2007). In this scenario, it is hypothesized that individuals with high 
WM capacity are too reliant on processing information declaratively and use 
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complicated strategies where a more instinctive approach would be more 
suited to the task (see chapter 8). 
Opposing the capacity models of WM, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) offered 
their theory of ‘Long Term Working Memory’ (LT-WM) in which WM is only 
limited for simple unskilled tasks. In the LT-WM model, expert performers are 
able to access information held in long-term memory through skilled 
processing of retrieval cues in what they term ‘short-term working memory.’ In 
chapter 8 of this thesis we examine the relationship between conscious 
processing and WM and extrapolate to the co-existence of both WM and LT-
WM constructs. 
 
Implicit Learning  
With evidence to support the reinvestment theory ever increasing, it has been 
the intention of some researchers to evaluate the learning process with a view 
to lessen the propensity for reinvestment during performance (Liao and 
Masters, 2001, Masters et al., 2008, Reber, 1993). The underlying 
hypotheses being that, a reduction in declarative knowledge build up through 
the learning stages would lower the propensity of reinvestment under 
pressure. This direction of thought has led to a considerable body of studies in 
the area of ‘implicit learning’ (Lam et al., 2010a, Liao and Masters, 2001, 
Masters and Maxwell, 2004, Rendell et al., 2011), which has been described 
as “increases in performance that are not accompanied by an ability to 
consciously reflect on (or verbally communicate) about the movement 
dynamics associated with performance” (Lam et al., 2010a, p.1543). In 
contrast, explicit learners have made a conscious effort to learn and are 
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aware of the “underlying mechanisms and processes of increases in 
performance”(Lam et al., 2010a, p.1544). 
The reduction in declarative knowledge build-up during the learning stages 
has been shown to increase resilience under pressure for relatively simple 
motor skills. Criticized (Winter et al., 2014) for its outright performance, speed 
of learning, practical application and relevance for a complex task, this 
position is unlikely to find its way into applied settings. However, a derivative 
of implicit learning is analogy learning, where a number of sub-components of 
a technique can be consolidated in one over-arching representation/metaphor 
that relates to a familiar movement to the learner (Liao and Masters, 2001). 
On account of its information rich but low cognitive load qualities, in both skill 
acquisition and performance, analogy learning has been shown to overcome 
some of the reported issues associated with pure implicit learning, while also 
being more robust under pressure than explicit learning conditions (Lam et al., 
2009, Liao and Masters, 2001, Maxwell et al., 2000). It must be noted that the 
retention trials typically involve a forced explicit condition that is not 
necessarily representative of an applied setting (Koedijker et al., 2011). 
Other studies have found analogy learning to plateau after only 1400 trials 
which represents relatively little practice (Koedijker et al., 2007). The 
explanation made by Koedijker et al. (2007) is that the learning isn’t as deep 
or detailed as the explicit instructions. In accord with this position, it would 
appear that, due to its low cognitive loading, analogy learning can be very 
effective for quick retention testing as occurs in research but is unlikely to 
represent deeper understanding of complex movements as is required over 
time in elite performers (Ericsson et al., 2007). Therefore, if we are to accept 
 23 
that declarative knowledge build up in motor learning and especially golf, is 
unavoidable, then finding ways to limit any negative effect and regulate 
conscious control during task performance would seem to be the central 
challenge. With an exhaustive amount of information available across media 
platforms (Bennett et al., 2009, Pelz and Frank, 2000) and an ever 
enthusiastic coaching community, it is unlikely that golfers can carry out a 
sufficient volume of purposeful practice (Ericsson, 2006a, Ericsson et al., 
1993b, Ericsson et al., 2007) without acquiring a large degree of declarative 
knowledge. It is therefore our aim to better understand the effects of 
reinvestment under pressure at an elite level, where a vast declarative 
knowledge build up is assumed.  
 
The Dual Task Paradigm 
The favoured method of research in automaticity (Wulf et al., 2001) is the dual 
task paradigm. The process of reinvestment involves the use of WM, which 
retrieves the declarative knowledge and holds it in temporary storage during 
shot execution. By adding a dual task, such as random letter generation 
(Baddeley, 1966), the use of WM is diverted. If the attentional demand of the 
primary task is high then the results of the dual task would suffer. Once the 
participant can perform the primary task automatically then attention can be 
shared effectively between the tasks. Therefore, a good score on both the 
primary and secondary tasks would indicate a high level of automaticity. 
However, the dual task paradigm is criticized (Allport, 1980, Sanders, 2001) 
on a number of levels (see chapter 4) and presents difficulties in real world 
application (Jackson et al., 2006, Winter et al., 2014) .  
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In an aim to circumvent the methodological and real world application issues 
with these interventions, we are controlling conscious processing using a 
temporal restriction intervention that has been shown (Beilock et al., 2004a, 
Beilock et al., 2008, Beilock et al., 2004b, Bell et al., 2013) to successfully 
reduce reinvestment and improve task performance in golf putting. 
 
Measuring conscious processing 
The neurobiological approach to measuring conscious control is to collate 
measures of brain activity using mainly electroencephalography (EEG) or 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). EEG works by recording 
electrical activity from the scalp to detect activity inside the brain (Cooke, 
2013, Harmon-Jones and Peterson, 2009). This provides indications of 
asymmetries in hemispheric and regional cortical activations (Cooke, 2013, 
Hatfield et al., 2004, Milton et al., 2007).  One of the measures taken with 
EEG is spectral power, which is the frequency of the waveforms. Sport related 
studies generally focus on the Alpha band (8-12 Hz) which is understood to 
be an indication of information processing in movement preparation (Cooke, 
2013). It is widely accepted that there is an inverse relationship between 
cortical activity and alpha power (Pfurtscheller, 1992), with an increase in 
alpha power indicating a decrease in brain activity in that region and vice 
versa. A number of alpha power studies (Kerick et al., 2004, Kerick et al., 
2001) have been carried out on marksmen during the final few seconds 
before pulling the trigger. These studies consistently point towards decreased 
verbal analytical activation in the few seconds prior to pulling the trigger. 
However, this does not seem to be the case for all motor tasks and not so for 
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golf. In the four seconds before hitting a putt Babiloni et al. (2008) reported a 
decrease in alpha power at sites directly over the pre-motor and motor cortex, 
suggesting more recourses being allocated to the programming of movement 
parameters such as the strength and line of the putt (Cooke, 2013, Cooke et 
al., 2014). This trend proved to be even stronger on successful putts than on 
missed putts.  
This neurobiological evidence stands in stark contrast to the traditional views 
on automaticity (Fitts and Posner, 1967, Hatfield and Hillman, 2001) but has 
been corroborated by related follow up studies (Babiloni et al., 2008, Cooke et 
al., 2014) that measured the alpha power of golfers performance having 
missed the previous putt. In accord with the reinvestment theory, this study 
also showed that elite level golfers are more likely to be subject to increased 
conscious control under pressure.  
A common limitation to the ‘spectral’ studies is that while they offer an insight 
into the amount of cortical activity, ‘alpha power’ does not show how the 
resources are being allocated (Cooke et al., 2014). On this theme, a possible 
explanation for the ‘non-automaticity’ results, is that decreased alpha power 
could be related to focus on external cues (Cooke, 2013, Cooper et al., 2003) 
and not necessarily conscious control. 
A more qualitative approach to EEG scanning is to measure alpha coherence 
in the preparatory time leading up to shot execution 
(Baumeister et al., 2008a, Gaudreau et al., 2010, Milton et al., 2007, Thorpe, 
2010).  
High EEG coherence implies a level of communication between regions of the 
cerebral cortex which has been viewed as a marker of verbal cognitive 
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involvement during learning (Zhu et al., 2010). Low coherence levels are 
indicative of regional autonomy (Reiterer et al., 2005, Weiss and Mueller, 
2003) and less verbal cognitive input. Specifically, conscious control of a 
movement is measured by the coherence between left temporal region, 
associated with verbal-analytical and language processes (Kerick et al., 2001, 
Springer and Deutsch, 1985) and frontal midline region which is connected is 
the promoter area of the cortex and is linked to the planning of motor tasks 
(Miller and Cummings, 2007, Stuss and Knight, 2013, Zhu et al., 2011). 
Once again and consistent with Fitts and Posner’s (1967) model, a study into 
expert and novice marksmen found lower coherence in expert marksmen than 
their novice counter parts. This was reported as evidence that the experts 
were less engaged in verbal-cognitive processes (Deeny et al., 2009). It is 
arguable that although infinitely challenging in its own right, rifle shooting has 
less moving parts to sequentially co-ordinate and is less explicitly learned 
than the golf swing. We should therefore, be cautious of conscious processing 
data taken from other fields. 
Coherence studies in golf support the ‘reinvestment’ view with high co-
activation levels reported for novice golfers that also score highly on the 
reinvestment scale (Zhu et al., 2011). The same study also reported reduced 
coherence for golfers that learned to putt in an errorless, implicit condition.  
In spectral analysis researchers also measure theta band (4-8Hz) power in 
the fontal midline area, which is linked to focused attention (Gevins et al., 
1997, Smith et al., 1999, Zhu et al., 2010). In studies on golfers (Baumeister 
et al., 2008a) and marksmen (Haufler et al., 2000) it was reported that 
experts, over their novice counterparts, showed increased levels of frontal 
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midline theta power. This has previously been associated (Smith et al., 1999) 
with a concentrated focus of attention visiomotor and sensorimotor tasks 
(Baumeister et al., 2008b) and is vital for the input of central executive 
functions like decision making and reinvestment.  
The golf study (Baumeister et al., 2008a) also reported a disparity in Alpha 1 
and Alpha 2 power between expert and novice groups. These two factors 
were taken to indicate that novices process task irrelevant stimuli while the 
experts channel their cognitive activity more efficiently. This outcome 
suggests that experts may not necessarily be involved in less cognitive input, 
but are just more discreet in their cognitive process with an attentional focus 
of mainly task relevant stimuli.  
Neuroscience has given us great insights into brain activity during motor skill 
acquisition and performance. The prominent theories to emanate from EEG 
testing are that expert golfers activate more cortical resources prior to hitting a 
putt and engage in more external information processing than novices 
(Cooke, 2013, Cooke et al., 2014, Cooke et al., 2011, Moore et al., 2012). 
Indicated by decreased theta power in the seconds prior to putting, it is 
thought that experts allocate more resources than novices to achieve 
heighted attentional focus. 
What EEG can’t measure with scalp electrodes is activity deeper in the brain 
(Davidson, 2004). This is problematic in our study since areas such as the 
basal ganglia and limbic structures that are thought to be central in the control 
of attention and working memory (Milton et al., 2007, Ravizza and Ivry, 2001). 
Both cortical and sub-cortical areas are accessible by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) but it is impractical to perform a complex motor skill 
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while inside an fMRI scanner. That said, some studies (Bernardi et al., 2013, 
Milton et al., 2007, Ross et al., 2003) have found ways to take fMRI 
measurements on fairly simple motor tasks or through novel experimental 
design such as movement imagery (Ross et al., 2003). In a study of novice 
and expert golfers, Milton et al. (2007) found the experts to be more able to 
direct a quietly focused attention to the task whereas the novices where pre-
occupied by task irrelevant stimuli. This was consistent with (Bernardi et al., 
2013) and (Ross et al., 2003) studies that reported qualitative and quantitative 
differences in expert processing. 
EEG and fMRI have given us great insights into brain activity during task 
performance but it remains difficult to understand how the activity is allocated. 
What we can start to hypothesize is that there are differences in processing 
efficiency between expert and novice performers. A likely factor in this effect 
is brain plasticity (Dayan and Cohen, 2011) where neuronal circuits discreetly 
related to task performance, grow stronger and disproportionately to the 
population at large. This is best explained by the adage that ‘neurons that fire 
together, wire together’ (Keefe, 2003, pg 171) to create more efficient 
processing in domain specific tasks. This has been shown in musicians (Han 
et al., 2009) and typists (Cannonieri et al., 2007) where higher grey matter 
volume was reported in brain areas related to the task. 
This has also been shown to be the case in golfers (Jäncke et al., 2009) 
where a difference in grey matter was reported and related to the amount of 
practice. It was also suggested that anatomical changes in a golfer’s brain 
seem to occur in the first 800-3000 hours practice but then reach an 
asymptote with further practice hours not affecting brain architecture. 
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Overall, the evidence provided by the neuroscience literature proposes that 
experts have different brain architecture that aids in processing efficiency 
during task planning and performance. Without an understanding of how 
these resources are allocated, there is no evidence to suggest that experts 
should or should not consciously attend to their movement during task 
performance.  
For evidence of this sort, researchers have turned to ‘think aloud’ (Schack, 
2012, Toner and Moran, 2011) protocols which produce feedback of a more 
qualitative nature. Simply put, participants are stopped mid-trials and asked to 
recall all task related thought while in preparation and shot execution. The 
data are then categorized, in the case of Toner and Moran (2011), into the 
broad themes of attentional focus: external, internal, environmental and 
rhythm/timing. This thesis is concerned with more quantitative data but in 
future research the think aloud protocol may prove a useful addition. 
 
Effects of Anxiety on Performance 
The study of how anxiety affects performance has received much interest in 
the literature. Not least on the topic of ‘choking’ (see Hill et al., 2010 for 
review) under pressure, defined as “performing below one’s and others’ 
expectations in consideration of previously demonstrated ability” (Carson and 
Collins, 2015, p. 1). Studies relating to motor skill execution have shown 
anxiety to lead to numerous and varied effects that include; visual gaze 
patterns/fixation periods (Nieuwenhuys et al., 2008), movement variability 
(Collins et al., 2001, Pijpers et al., 2005), attention, (Masters, 1992) heart rate 
and grip force (Cooke et al., 2011). Although all these effects do not 
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necessarily lead to a negative correlation with performance (Eysenck et al., 
2007b). It has been reported (Cooke et al., 2011) that mild anxiety can 
enhance performance before realizing a drop off as anxiety raises to higher 
levels. 
Perceptual motor accounts of the anxiety-performance relationship have been 
centered around the contrasting views of ‘self focus’ (Beilock and Carr, 2001, 
Masters and Maxwell, 2008a) and ‘distraction’ (Eysenck et al., 2007b, Mullen 
and Hardy, 2000a) theories (see chapter 4). Of late, attempts have been 
made to look beyond this debate in search of a more ‘integrated’ 
understanding of the effects of anxiety on perceptual motor control (Carson 
and Collins, 2015, Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans, 2012, Nieuwenhuys et al., 
2008). In view of this, Carson and Collins (2015) criticise the extant literature 
as being overly focused on emotional and cognitive issues at the expense of 
‘motoric’ considerations. To reconcile this, Carson and Collins (2015) propose 
a further dimension of the anxiety-performance relationship as being the level 
of ‘skill establishment that could act to negate the debilitating effects of 
anxiety. Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans (2012) make a broader criticism of the 
dichotic debate (distraction vs self focus) as only pertaining to the attentional 
effects of anxiety during the execution phase, when influences at an earlier 
stage may have already jeopardised the performance. If perception is affected 
by anxiety (Nieuwenhuys et al., 2008), which then results in the selection of a  
sub optimal, then the attentional issues at execution become somewhat 
incidental.  
In this study we evaluate the effects of anxiety on attention, by way of 
conscious movement control, and its effects on full golf shot performance. 
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The Current Thesis 
It appears that conscious processing and in particular, the amount one thinks 
about ‘how’ a task is executed, plays a major role in sporting performance. 
That said the exact role and value of conscious control in elite performers is 
unconfirmed.  There is a need to further understand the individualistic factors 
that may affect the application of self-focus theories to complex motor skills. 
This thesis aims to explore these issues in a series of related studies that may 
go some way to helping identify best practice for performance interventions 
for optimal focus.
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Introduction 
Throughout this thesis common methods are used and adjusted accordingly 
to fit the requirements of each experiment. So as not to repeat the same 
methods section in each chapter, the common procedure, instruments and 
data analysis are outlined in this chapter. Any adjustments of which are 
highlighted in each experimental chapter. 
 
General Procedure 
Testing took place on the driving range at Wycombe Heights Golf Centre and 
in a controlled practice room at Edgbaston Golf Club. In each experiment the 
participants hit a total of 28 full swing shots with a 5 iron. This club was 
chosen on the basis that there is no ambiguity in regard to the requirement of 
a ‘full’ swing. The 5 iron places a premium on both distance and accuracy and 
was considered to give sufficient performance variability to provide meaningful 
data.  
Participants were given 10 minutes to warm up in their own manner in which 
the opportunity to freely hit shots was provided. During the trials, participants 
hit 7 shots with a 5 iron in each condition. Both baseline and anxiety 
conditions were repeated pre and post intervention (Figure 3.1). Measures of 
performance anxiety (Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2R) and conscious 
processing (adjusted Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale) were 
administered immediately after each trial. 
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Trial 1base Trial 2anx Trial 3baseI Trial 4anxI 
 
 
Baseline Condition (base)  
Baseline performance was measured with players being instructed to hit the 
ball their normal distance and as accurately as possible to a virtual target 
taken as the centre line.   
 
Anxiety Condition (anx) 
A scoring regime was developed via two mini pilots (n = 6) using the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2, Martens et al., 1990) to 
measure the change in anxiety between the normal and self-conscious 
condition. Anxiety was measured on the basis that increases in anxiety 
through competition pressure have been linked to increased self-
consciousness and therefore a rise in conscious processing (Masters and 
Maxwell, 2008a). The primary measure used from the CSAI-2 was the 
cognitive anxiety value. Participants completed the CSAI-2 after both base 
line and anxiety trials with a significant disparity between the two indicating 
that the design was inducing the required state anxiety.  
Baseline	   Anxiety	   Baseline	  with	  Intervention	   Anxiety	  with	  Intervention	  
Figure 3.1 Experimental Conditions 
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Participants took part in a format designed to induce anxiety during shot 
performance. The results were displayed on site in view of all competitors. 
Participants paid £6.00 into a prize fund with £3.00 being used as a stake for 
each competition, which coincided with the anxiety trials.  
The competition scenario required the participants to hit toward a virtual target 
to be displayed with a large diagram on site (Figure 3.2).  
The target is a virtual fairway that starts at 100 yards and is 10 yards either 
side of the centre point. A secondary scoring zone (semi-rough) is a further 5 
yards out but parallel to the fairway on both sides. Any ball that lands further 
than 15 yards from the centre point will be in scoring zone 3 (rough). 
 
              
 
 
 
  
Rough 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi- 
Rough 
 
 
 
 
Fairway 
 
 
 
Semi-
Rough 
 
 
 
 
Rough 
 
 
 
 
Balls 1-3 +1 Par -1 Par +1 
Balls 4-6 +2 +1 Par +1 +2 
Ball 7 +3 +2 -2 +2 +3 
 
>15yards 
left of 
target 
10-15 
yards 
left of 
target 
0-10 Yards left or 
right of centre 
target (flag) 
10-15 
yards 
right of 
target 
> 15yards 
right of 
target 
Figure 3.2. Target and scoring system for anxiety condition. 
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For the first 3 balls the participants score -1 if the ball landed in the fairway, 
par for the semi rough and a ball landing outside the target will be counted as 
a bogey (+1). The scoring for the second 3 balls changes so that the fairway 
zone is now par, the semi rough is +1 and outside the target is +2. The final 
ball represents an ‘all or nothing’ scenario with the score of -2 being awarded 
for the fairway, +2 for the semi rough and +3 for the rough. This change in 
scoring occurs to increase the pressure and subsequent conscious 
processing in the second half of each trial. Scoring was set so that a final 
score of par for each anxiety trial resulted in the return of their £3.00 stake. A 
final score below par and the participants double their money. However, if a 
participant finished over par then they would lose their money. Monetary 
prizes were immediately redistributed at the end of the data collection and the 
£6.00 stake was returned to all participants regardless of score. 
 
Intervention 
During the 2 ‘post intervention’ trials participants were required to conform to 
a temporal restriction. Throughout these trials time afforded to the test 
participants during the execution stage of their Pre Performance Routine 
(PPR) was limited to 5 seconds. A 3 second restriction has previously been 
implemented for a study on putting (Beilock et al., 2004a) but it is felt that 5 
seconds is more appropriate for this study. The rationale being that 5 seconds 
is restrictive enough to limit conscious processing but allowed sufficient time 
for the greater degree of preparation required in the full swing. Within this time 
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frame, participants were required to walk towards the ball from the starting 
position a few steps back, set their address position and then initiate the 
swing.   
The instructions were to use their normal preparation prior to the shot but then 
execute the shot within the time allowance given.  
The time allocation was measured from commencement of their approach to 
the ball until they began their swing. The beginning of the swing was defined 
as the moment the club was swung away from the ball. Any shot that did not 
fall in the prescribed time limit was discounted and replayed.  The participants 
were briefed on the intervention with emphasis being made to be continuous 
in their movement. A further 10 minutes free practice time was given for the 
participants to familiarize themselves with the restriction and be able to gauge 
how best to use the 5 seconds. During this time, feedback was provided only 
on the length of time taken on each practice trial.  
 
Equipment 
Participants used with their own 5 iron, conforming with the Royal and Ancient 
rules of golf (R&A, 2012). The balls for all trials were ‘grade 1 range balls’ and 
consistent in their flight characteristics. 
Shot accuracy was measured using a Foresight Sports GC2 Launch Monitor 
which was aligned according to the user manual with the target taken as the 
‘centre line.’  
Capture Range 
Ball Speed: 2.0 - 200.0+ mph. Distance: 8 inches - 500+ yds.  
Launch Angle: 70.0 degrees 
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Accuracy Tolerance 
Vertical Launch Angle: +/- 0.2 degrees. Ball Speed: +/- 0.5 mph. Back 
Spin: +/- 50.0 rpm.v. Side Spin: +/- 50.0 rpm. Azimuth: +/- 1.0 degrees. 
 
Instruments 
Having used the CSAI-2 (Martens et al., 1990) in our pilot and initial research 
(see Chapter 4), it was subsequently decided that the updated CSAI-2R (Cox 
et al., 2003) would be an improved measure of anxiety and was administered 
immediately after each of the 4 trials. This is a revised, 17 item version of the 
original CSAI-2 and is widely considered a reliable indicator of performance 
pressure in sport (Fernandes et al., 2013, Jones and Uphill, 2004, Lundqvist, 
2006, Lundqvist et al., 2011, Mellalieu et al., 2003) . The CSAI-2R consists of 
3-subscales, measuring self-confidence (5 items), somatic anxiety (7 items) 
and cognitive anxiety (5 items). Participants are asked to indicate, “how you 
felt only at the time when you were hitting shots in the trial.”  Values for each 
item are marketed on a 4-point likert scale ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very 
much so.’  
The items for each subscale are summed to give a score for each component 
of performance anxiety. An example for cognitive anxiety is “I was concerned 
about losing.” Somatic anxiety statements petered more to the physical 
effects of anxiety, “I felt my stomach sinking.” The self-confidence subscale is 
measured with questions such as “I was confident of coming through under 
pressure.”  
The alteration made (Cox et al., 2003) to the original CSAI-2 was the addition 
of a 7 point bipolar direction scale (Jones et al., 1994). This required the 
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participant to mark on a likert scale how they perceived the effect of their 
answer to each CSAI-2R question with 3 being neutral, -3 = very debilitative 
and +3 = very facilitative.  
Conscious Processing 
State reinvestment was measured using an adapted, 6 item version of the 
Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS, Cooke et al., 2011, Orrell et 
al., 2009). The MSRS includes questions on 2 dimensions of reinvestment; 
Movement Self-consciousness and Conscious Motor Processing. The 
adapted version used in this study contained items only relating to Conscious 
Motor Processing and included questions such as; ‘I thought about my swing 
as I hit the ball’ and “I reflected on my technique a great deal”. Participants 
reported a score on a 5 point likert scale ranging from 1 = never and 5 = 
Always. The item scores was summed and the mean value determined the 
participant’s state reinvestment. 
 
Data Analysis 
All data was tested for approximation to the normal distribution using a single 
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. CSAI-2R subscales were assessed for 
reliability using Cronbach alpha calculations. A Cronbach alpha of >0.7 was 
deemed to show internal reliability of a subscale (Nunnally, 1962).  
The intensity scores of the CSAI-2R subscales were calculated by comparing 
each pair of baseline and anxiety scores. The traditional method of analysis 
for the CSAI-2R is to measure the direction and intensity scales separately by 
simply summing all scores of each subscale. Issues have been highlighted 
(Lundqvist et al., 2011) with the interpretation of these results on the basis 
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that facilitative scores have in the main, been attributed to low intensity 
scores. This indicates that the participant is reporting a facilitative effect of low 
anxiety and not the anxiety itself. Therefore, the combined intensity/direction 
method (Lundqvist, 2006, Lundqvist et al., 2011) was used by splitting high 
(>2) and low (≤ 2) intensity scores before measuring the direction for both. 
Reinvestment effects were calculated using multiple comparisons across the 
4 trails. 
For the analysis of the performance data, it was felt that simply aggregating 
the 7 balls would result in too much noise from the inherent variability of full 
golf shots. For this reason the accuracy value of the 7th ball of each trail was 
used, as this was the deemed to be the shot with the most pressure. 
In order to best test the effect of the intervention, performance in the baseline 
trials was calculated by comparing the each participant’s trial 1base and trial 
3baseI scores. The same procedure was followed to compare the anxiety 
scores. Trial 2anx and trial 4anxI were compared. To test for effect of 
intervention on resilience to pressure, the difference between (alpha) trial 1base 
and trial 2anx was calculated and compared to the alpha of trial 3baseI and 4anxI. 
A positive value in the alpha comparisons indicates an improvement in the 
post trials. 
All comparisons were carried out using mixed factorial, repeated measures 
ANOVAs where the overall type I error rate for each analysis was set at α = 
.05. Where Mauchly’s test was violated, degrees of freedom were corrected 
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. Any post-hoc multiple 
comparisons were adjusted for using Bonferroni.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF COERCED AUTOMATICITY AMONGST ELITE 
LEVEL GOLFERS 
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Abstract 
It is understood that motor skills are best performed in the absence of the 
reinvestment of explicit rules that would have previously built up during the 
learning phases (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a). Strongly linked to 
reinvestment theories are the effects of anxiety, which stimulate the desire to 
consciously control one’s actions, leading to a “choking” scenario. In the 
current study, data were collected from 26 highly skilled level golfers 
(Handicap <4.4 Mage = 25) hitting full shots with a 5 iron in both base and 
anxiety trials. The experimental group were placed under a temporal 
restriction intervention with the aim of limiting cognitive input and encouraging 
automaticity during both conditions. The aim of the experiment was to gauge 
the effects of conscious control under pressure in a complex motor skill.  
The results demonstrated a wide disparity in individual performance gains but 
no significant differential between groups. This study raises further questions 
into the efficacy of complete automaticity as an optimal performance paradigm 
for complex motor skills. These results also question the transferability of 
results from putting studies (Beilock et al., 2008) into full swing. Further 
research is suggested to better understand the utility of conscious processing 
in relation to a complex motor skill and the effect of temporal restrictions.  
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Introduction 
On the way to becoming elite performers, professional golfers have all 
dedicated a substantial number of hours to purposeful practice (Ericsson et 
al., 1993b) enabling them to progress through several stages of learning as 
highlighted in the skill acquisition literature (Anderson, 1992, Fitts and Posner, 
1967, Gordon and Burch, 1975). In these models the learner progresses 
through stages of competence acquiring a build up of explicit knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge has been defined as ‘facts and rules that we are 
specifically aware of and therefore able to articulate” (Masters, 1992, p. 343). 
Ultimately the skill progresses to a level where the conscious reinvestment of 
explicit knowledge is no longer necessary. Through the phase models of skill 
acquisition the learner is gradually amassing and piecing together fragments 
of declarative knowledge formulating new and constantly evolving 
hypotheses. Throughout this introspection, information is held in working 
memory (Baddeley, 2007) until such time that there have been enough 
successful trials for the movement pattern to be stored in long-term memory. 
Working memory (see Chapter 8) is made up of a central executive and 
functions as an interim storage of information for short-term purposes until the 
information is actioned (Williams and Hodges, 2004). Once the movement 
pattern has been successfully transferred to long-term memory then the need 
for working memory input is negated. This level of unconscious control has 
been described as “automatic processing that is controlled largely by 
procedural knowledge that cannot be verbalized” (Mullen et al., 2007, P. 141) 
and is typically perceived as automaticity (Gorman, 2008). 
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Whilst the role of working memory enables the learner to build a schema 
through the early learning stages, it has long since been hypothesized that at 
the more advanced stages of skill acquisition, such input is not desirable. The 
involvement of working memory to use the previously useful declarative 
knowledge will result in the de ‘automatisation’ of the skill and be detrimental 
to performance (Baumeister, 1984, Beilock and Carr, 2001). Leading theorists 
in this area (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a) have attempted to bring together 
‘conscious control’ theories and unify them together under the label of 
‘reinvestment’ which they (2004 ,p.208) defined as ‘Manipulation of conscious, 
explicit, rule based knowledge, by working memory, to control the mechanics 
of one’s movements during motor output’. Masters (1992) explains the 
debilitating effects of this process as a reversal of the way that Anderson 
(1952) outlines the process of skill acquisition. A movement sequence is 
compiled of a number of sub movements that are integrated and able to run 
as one uninterrupted pattern. Once reinvestment occurs, the pattern is broken 
back down into its component parts akin to the earlier stages of learning. 
“Once broken down, each unit must be activated and run separately, which 
slows performance and, each transition between units, creates an opportunity 
for error that was not present in the integrated control structure” (paraphrased 
by Beilock and Carr, 2001, p. 715). Masters’ own Conscious Processing 
Hypothesis, (CPH, Masters, 1992) contends that any effort to consciously 
control a movement pattern will lead to the aforementioned disruption. A 
similar and well documented self-focus theory is the Explicit Monitoring 
Hypothesis (EPH. Beilock and Carr, 2001) which takes the concept even 
further by suggesting that not only conscious control but indeed the mere 
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online monitoring of one’s movement is enough to cause the pattern to break 
down.  An alternative view of ‘conscious processing’ also promotes the 
capitulation of cognitive input, but from a different perspective than the 
‘reinvestment’ effect. The ‘attentional resource’ viewpoint highlights the added 
demands placed on working memory.   
The Attentional Threshold Hypothesis (ATH. Mullen and Hardy, 2000b) 
contends that anxiety caused by performance related pressure consumes a 
portion of working memory. The reinvestment of declarative knowledge takes 
up another ‘chunk’ of attention and a performance drop off occurs when the 
attention threshold is depleted. Although both self-focus and attentional 
resource theories have had parallel support (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992, 
Eysenck et al., 2007b, L. Beilock, 2002), few studies have been able to 
juxtapose the two standpoints (Mullen and Hardy, 2000b, Mullen et al., 2005, 
Wilson et al., 2007). One such study (Gucciardi and Dimmock, 2008) did set 
out to do just that by prompting condition groups to attend to task relevant 
(arms, weight and acceleration) or task irrelevant cues (three colours). A 
performance drop in only the task relevant group was witnessed lending 
support for CPH.  
A further investigation contrasting self-focus with capacity theories (Wilson et 
al., 2007) involved the Processing Efficiency Theory (PET. Eysenck and 
Calvo, 1992) which is an attentional resource model that contends that in 
addition to placing demands on working memory, the effects of anxiety also 
have a motivational value that increases effort directed to the task that can 
totally negate the debilitative effects of cognitive loading (Eysenck and Calvo, 
1992). PET is focused on the efficiency of processing by contrasting the 
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performance with the cognitive effort. Therefore, in a dual task set up it would 
be predicted that the primary task performance would stay robust by recruiting 
extra resources. This would be evident in a drop off in the secondary task 
performance, thus indicating diminished processing efficiency. Using a dual 
task driving set up, such an effect was recorded by Wilson (2007) lending 
support for the PET model.  The debate between the ‘conscious processing’ 
and ‘capacity’ theories has a long way to go before being conclusive but one 
thing they all have in common is that they all promote the performer to 
relinquish online cognitive input. This is easier said than done, especially 
when the skill had been learned explicitly (Masters, 1992). 
Ericsson (2003, 2007) argues that for expert performers, automaticity induces 
a state of arrested development. Furthermore, to continue developing, experts 
need to resist automatic processing and be aware of their movements enough 
to be able to continually refine and adapt technique (Carson and Collins, 
2011, Carson et al., 2013). 
When an athlete sets about a change of technique for long-term gain, 
reinvestment and its related effects are almost inevitable. There are 
suggested methods to avoid the heavy use of working memory in this process 
(see Chapter 2) (Koedijker et al., 2011, Masters and Maxwell, 2004) but 
typically, heavy reinvestment is required (Jenkins, 2007). As a result, a drop 
down to an earlier and heavily self-conscious stage of learning is witnessed. 
This in turn, results in a loss of form until enough trials have taken place to 
enable the re-atomization of the movement pattern. 
Another well documented reinvestment scenario occurs when an athlete is 
feeling the effects of performance related pressure (Masters and Maxwell, 
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2008b). It is hypothesized that performance anxiety increases the athlete’s 
level of self consciousness which leads to an inward focus of attention that 
involves the performer attending to or monitoring their movements (Hill et al., 
2010). As a result, the hypothesized detrimental effects occur and the 
performer is heading for a ‘choke’. Choking has been defined as  ‘performing 
more poorly than expected, given one’s skill level, in situations where 
performance pressure is at a maximum (Beilock and Gray, 2007). 
Reinvestment in the form of both ‘self focus’ and ‘attentional resource’ 
theories dominate the choking literature (Gimmig et al., 2006, Hill et al., 2010).  
For their differences (Gucciardi and Dimmock, 2008), all the above theories 
promote automatic processing during task performance and share a few of 
the same methodological and theoretical issues (see Chapter 2) that we seek 
to overcome in this study with the use of a temporal restriction as a means to 
limit conscious processing.  
Temporal restrictions have previously been utilized in this line of research with 
one such case (Beilock et al., 2004a), comparing results of novice and expert 
golfers in a putting task under an accuracy condition (no time restriction) and 
a speeded condition (3 second restriction). The novice group performed 
worse in the speeded condition while the expert groups score improved in this 
condition. It was hypothesized that the novice golfers were still reliant on 
working memory and didn’t have time to access declarative knowledge. The 
assumed reduction in conscious processing is what enabled the expert group 
to improve as their movements were fully proceduralized. In a later 
experiment utilizing a golf putting task (Beilock and Gonso, 2008), a 
distinction between preparation and execution phases was drawn with both 
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conditions being temporally restricted. Once more, the sample included both 
experts and novices. The results were consistent with the earlier experiment 
(Beilock et al., 2004a) with the experts improving in the speeded trials for both 
preparation and execution phases. Meanwhile, the novices demonstrated 
performance decrements under the temporal restriction. The hypothesis that 
novices benefit from online cognitive input while experts perform better in the 
absence of conscious control was once again given credence.  
In a study involving table tennis forehand shots (Koedijker et al., 2011), 
accuracy of novice and beginners under time restriction was assessed.  The 
set up involved an automatic serving machine set at 30 balls per minute 
(30/min) and then 40/min. While the novice group showed an increased 
margin of error under the speeded condition the expert group reported no 
significant difference. This compounded the similar results (Beilock et al., 
2004a, Beilock and Lyons, 2008) reported on both shot preparation and 
execution.  
A persistent methodological restraint (see Chapter 2) in the existing literature 
is the testing of comparatively simple or contrived motor skills (Winter et al., 
2014). From a golfer’s perspective there is a heavy bias of studies carried out 
on putting (Beilock et al., 2004a, Beilock and Gonso, 2008, Masters, 1992, 
Toner and Moran, 2011). It is convenient and not without validity to study 
putting but the extrapolation of results into the complex skill of full swing is 
tenuous. Putting is highly demanding on perceptual skill, no more so than 
when tasked with calculating the optimal relationship between line and speed 
across steep slopes (Pelz and Frank, 2000). In this scenario the golfer is 
challenged with making fine adjustments to movement parameters. However, 
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this scenario is not reflective of how putting is used in the research setting 
where repeated straight putts are commonplace (Beilock et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the mechanical complexity of the full swing is considerably 
greater than that of putting (see Bennett et al., 2009 for example) leading to a 
potential differential of cognitive control mechanisms. 
It has been suggested (Masters et al., 1993b) that there lies a positive 
relationship between task complexity and the debilitating effects of 
reinvestment (see Chapter 2). However, the complexity of the full golf swing 
coupled with the vast amount of explicit knowledge an expert has absorbed 
may point toward an alternative schema that involves some degree of 
conscious control and internal focus. Along the lines of recent criticisms (Peh 
et al., 2010) of the attentional focus research, the dichotic nature of the 
studies in this field may belie an optimum attention strategy that utilizes a mix 
of external/internal focus and the appropriate use of working memory (Bernier 
et al., 2011).   
Objections aside, the overwhelming majority of research in the field of 
reinvestment points towards its mal-effects for expert performers. Taking this 
into consideration with the congruent results above and from similar studies 
involving temporal restrictions (Beilock et al., 2004a), our predictions for this 
study are in line with the CPH. We hypothesize that the temporal restriction 
used in this study will limit the capacity of the performer to engage in 
conscious movement control with the resultant improvement in performance. 
This could in turn lead to the development of practical interventions for an 
applied setting. 
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The lack of manipulation check for conscious control is recognized as a 
limitation of this study and is addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
26 trainee PGA golf professionals hcp < 4.4 participated in the study. 
Recruitment was from 90 first year PGA trainees attending a residential 
course. The participants were selected randomly from the 38 responses to a 
recruitment email sent to all 90 professionals outlining the study and 
requesting participation. The participants were randomly allocated to either 
control (n=13) or experimental groups (n=13). Before the study all participants 
gave written informed consent (Appendix 1) and the study was approved by 
the Local Research Ethics committee. 
 
Measures and Apparatus 
All shots were struck with the participant’s own 5 iron conforming with the 
Royal and Ancient rules of golf (R&A, 2012). The balls for all trials were ‘grade 
1 range balls’ and consistent in their flight characteristics. Shot accuracy and 
distance were measured using a TrackMan Pro milli-wave doppler radar 
launch monitor. 
TrackMan Pro Range and Accuracy Tolerance: 
• Ball carry range: 3-400 yards 
• Vertical launch angle: +/- 0.2 degrees 
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• Ball speed: +/- 0.1 mph 
• Ball accuracy (carry) +/- 0.5% 
• Sidespin Rate: +/- 15 rpm 
  
 
The radar was calibrated according to the user manual with the target taken 
as the ‘centre line. 
 
Procedure 
All testing took place on the driving range of the PGA National Headquarters.  
A mixed repeated measures design with a between subjects factor of group 
(experimental, control) and within subjects factors of time (pre, post) and 
condition (baseline and anxiety) was carried out. The procedure followed that 
laid out in the general methods section (chapter 3) with the omission of a 
direction scale relating to the CSAI-2R and the aMSRS questionnaire.  
 
Data Analysis 
All data were tested for approximation to the normal distribution using a single 
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. CSAI-2R subscales were assessed for 
reliability using Cronbach alpha calculations. A Cronbach alpha of >0.7 was 
deemed to show internal reliability of a subscale (Nunnally, 1962).  Calculated 
Cronbach alphas showed that all subscales of the CASI-2R were internally 
reliable somatic anxiety (α = 0.87) cognitive anxiety (α = 0.81) and self-
confidence (α = 0.92). Participant subscale scores were calculated by 
multiplying a participant’s mean score for each subscale by 10.  Any effects of 
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condition and group on subscale scores during pre-intervention testing were 
explored using repeated measures MANOVAs.  
The effects of the intervention on performance via shot distance and 
accuracy,  were analysed using a Mixed ANOVA with a repeated factors of 
intervention (pre, post) and test (normal, self-conscious) and a between-
groups factor of group (control, experimental). The overall type I error rate for 
each analysis was set at α = .05. Post-hoc tests for all analyses were carried, 
where appropriate, using the Holm-Bonferroni correction to adjust the level of 
α for multiple comparisons.  Huynh-Feldt corrections for lack of sphericity 
were used where appropriate. All data and reported as mean ± standard 
deviation unless otherwise stated. 
Distinct from the general procedure, this study looked at both shot distance 
and accuracy by taking the mean value of each 7 ball trial. 
 
Results 
There was a significant effect of test on the subscale scores of the CSAI-2R 
questionnaire (Wilk’s λ = 0.40, F3 = 4.69, p = .01), with scores increasing 
significantly in both the somatic (F1 = 4.48, p =0.045) and cognitive anxiety (F1 
= 14.53, p=0.001, ANOVA) subscales in the post intervention anxiety 
condition (table 1) compared with the baseline condition. There were no 
changes in the self-confidence subscale (F1 = 2.70, p=0.11) between the pre 
and post anxiety conditions. The change in the somatic and cognitive 
subscale scores was similar between groups with no interaction effect found 
for group (Wilk’s λ = 0.87, F3 = 1.05, p=0.39).  
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                       Pre Post 
Group Somatic Cognitive Self-
Confidence 
Somatic Cognitive Self-
Confidence 
Experimental 13.3 ± 3.2 16.0 ± 4.8 28.3 ± 5.0 15.6 ± 5.1 19.4 ± 5.2 28.3 ± 5.7 
Control 13.6 ± 2.9 16.7±5.7 27.5 ± 5.5 15.4 ± 4.5 20.2 ± 4.5 24.8 ± 5.4 
ALL 13.4 ± 3.0* 16.3 ± 5.2$ 27.9 ± 5.2 15.5 ± 4.7* 19.8 ± 4.8$ 26.6 ± 5.7 
Table 4.1. CSAI-2R mean subscale scores in the pre and post intervention anxiety 
conditions. *,$ indicate significant difference between pair. Data are mean ± standard 
deviation 
 
 
There was a significant effect of test on shot accuracy (Wilk’s λ = 0.60, F2 = 
7.79, p=0.003) this was shown to be the result of the ball being hit less 
distance after the intervention in both groups and conditions (F1 = 14.50, 
p=0.001, ANOVA, table 2) with no changes in accuracy (F1 = 1.26, p=0.27). 
 
 
 Distance (yds) Accuracy (yds off target line) 
Group Pre 
Baseline 
Post 
Baseline 
Pre 
Anxiety 
Post 
Anxiety 
Pre 
Baseline 
Post 
Baseline 
Pre 
Anxiety 
Post 
Anxiety 
Experimental 167 ±13 161 ± 11 166 ± 13 161 ± 15 11 ± 4 10 ± 4 10 ± 5 9 ± 3 
Control 168 ± 14 163 ± 13 164 ± 14 163 ± 12 10 ± 6 11 ± 3 12 ± 4 9 ± 3 
ALL 168 ± 13 162 ± 12 165 ± 13 162 ± 13 10 ± 5 11 ± 4 11 ± 4 9 ± 3 
Table 4.2. Mean shot distance and accuracy measurements for each condition pre and post 
intervention. Accuracy is given as yards off the central target line.  Data are mean ± standard 
deviation. 
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No main effects were found on either distance or accuracy for the repeated 
factor condition (Wilk’s λ = 0.86, F2 = 1.91, p=0.17). Nor were there any first 
or second order interaction effects in any combination between test, condition  
and group. Scatter plots (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) showing individual differences 
in accuracy and distance indicate a disparity of intervention effect within the 
test group and the positioning of outliers within the sample. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The difference in accuracy between pre and post anxiety trials. Negative values 
indicate less yards offline in the post trial. Shows a disparity of intervention effect within the 
test group and a trend of improved accuracy.  
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Figure 4.2. The difference in distance between pre and post anxiety trials. Negative values 
indicate less distance in the post trial. Shows the presence of two outliers within what is 
otherwise a null effect of intervention. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the performance effects of an 
intervention designed to promote automaticity within the execution of the full 
golf swing, under baseline and pressure conditions. With previous work in this 
area being heavily biased towards putting trials and reliant on the dual task 
paradigm that has been widely criticized for its ecological validity (Baddeley, 
1996, Christensen et al., 2015, Winter et al., 2014), this study aimed to 
address these issues. The unique aspects of this study are the complexity of 
the task by means of the full swing and a temporal restriction as the method to 
encourage autonomous performance. The main findings of the study show 
that even though the test group was placed under a strict and unfamiliar time 
restraint their performance, as a whole, remained stable in comparison to the 
control group. This rejects our earlier hypothesis that, in accord with the CPH, 
predicted the test group to perform better with limited reinvestment. These 
results tentatively raise questions about the efficacy of reinvestment theory in 
relation to complex skills.  
A methodological limitation of this study is recognized by way of a lack of 
manipulation check relating to conscious control. It is possible that the null 
effect in the current study is attributed to the ineffectiveness of the intervention 
to reduce conscious movement control. It is recommended that future 
experiments of this nature circumvent this issue by means of a measure of 
state reinvestment to be administered on every trial. 
Another factor that could have influenced the null effect was the potentially 
jarring nature of the temporal restriction on many of the sample. The 
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intervention would have limited their previous cognitive strategy (swing 
thoughts, timing cues, holistic swing cues), which some participants may have 
found distracting and potentially stressful. The purpose and essence of the 
intervention was to limit the reinvestment and cognitive load during task 
performance. However, if a number of the sample still attempted to use their 
normal cognitive strategy under the time restraint then the intervention would 
have been very uncomfortable in a manner that would not necessarily have 
been reported in the CSAI-2R. The intervention relies on a level of confidence 
in the their skill establishment and in the process of automaticity (Carson and 
Collins, 2015). Without which, they would be unlikely to relinquish conscious 
control of their golf swing. For some, this confidence may have been 
immediately gleamed from the brief practice trial while others may need a lot 
longer. It is felt that if the jarring nature of our set up is reduced then the time 
restraint may well be as effective as in previous studies on putting (Beilock et 
al., 2004a).  Future study in this area should look to overcome this effect with 
a long-term learning and transfer period to incorporate the time restricted 
intervention. 
Other key factors leading to a null effect could be individual differences within 
the sample (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) that may be attributed to the disparity of 
intervention effect and the presence of outliers. The propensity for 
reinvestment could well be linked to personality factors (Masters et al., 1993b) 
and as such be prone to individual differences. Masters (1993) compiled a 
questionnaire that could act as a tool to predict reinvestment in individuals. 
This ‘reinvestment scale’ questionnaire was put together using previously 
tested measures that included a ‘self- consciousness’ scale’ (Fenigstein et al., 
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1975a) and the ‘Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent et al., 1982). 
The personality factors represented in the reinvestment scale may be a strong 
determinant in reinvestment but are by no means exhaustive. Working 
Memory Capacity (WMC) (see Chapter 8) has also been hypothesized as a 
factor in determining propensity for conscious processing (Buszard, 2014). 
The early hypothesis, is that in tasks that invoke a high demand on working 
memory it is individuals with a larger working memory capacity that possess a 
higher propensity to choke (Beilock and Carr, 2005, Buszard et al., 2013, 
Gimmig et al., 2006). The difference in working memory capacity of the 
participants in the current study may have led to an individual disparity in 
results that caused the null effect. Later in this thesis (Chapter 7) and along 
this individualistic approach, we also test for a number of dimensions of 
learning style against propensity to and utility of reinvestment. 
A key methodological restraint in this study was the lack of a measure of state 
reinvestment for each of the trials. We have assumed, as with previous 
studies (Beilock et al., 2004b, Beilock and Gonso, 2008), that a shorter time 
afforded for shot execution means limited reinvestment. Although instinctive, 
we cannot say for sure that this was the case and that our intervention was 
effective to this aim. Not sufficiently reducing conscious processing remains a 
possible reason behind the null effect. Before looking further into the 
individual factors pertaining to reinvestment, a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between time and conscious processing is required. Chapter 5 
looks at the reinvestment and performance effects of 3 different temporal 
corridors. Furthermore, subsequent experiments in this thesis (Chapters 5-8) 
have an adjusted procedure that includes a measure of conscious processing 
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immediately after each block of trials. This is taken from the ‘Conscious Motor 
Processing’ (CMP) dimension of the movement specific reinvestment scale 
(MSRS, Orrell et al., 2009) and is adapted to suit the task (Cooke et al., 2011) 
(Chapter 3). 
A broader limitation of this and study is the lack of information available on the 
starting differential of the sample. Individual differences would allow for further 
analysis and potentially highlight key features of reinvestment and resilience 
to pressure. As with the majority of studies in this field, no measurements 
were taken with the aim of categorizing types of conscious processing. The 
dichotic nature of automaticity research has previously been criticized (Furley 
and Memmert, 2010, Winter et al., 2014). If an optimal cognitive strategy is to 
be proposed then more work is needed to understand the qualitative elements 
of reinvestment (Furley and Memmert, 2010), particularly in light of the 
multiple resource (Sanders, 2001) and crosstalk (McLeod, 1977) and 
cognitive load (de Jong, 2010) theories. The introduction of a questionnaire 
may be able to draw out the value and nature of reinvestment more 
accurately. Subscales of content (result, technique or state awareness) sense 
(visual, auditory, kinesthetic, auditory digital), or level of abstraction could be 
more useful in identifying an optimum cognitive strategy (Bernier et al., 2011, 
Jenkins, 2007). 
Whilst there is a lot of prior research on the effects of pressure upon 
performance in golf, the majority of this work has been carried out on putting 
(Beilock et al., 2004a, Jackson et al., 2006, Jackson and Willson, 1999, 
Masters, 1992, Masters et al., 1993b, Mullen et al., 2005) with some 
additional studies looking at chipping (Wulf et al., 1999). The closest of these 
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putting studies to the present set up was carried out by Beilock (2004a). A 
time constraint of 3 seconds was used during the test condition. In this case 
the results were positive in favor of the temporally restricted group. It should 
be noted that there was no anxiety set up and no baseline measure that 
allowed the participants to use their own cognitive strategy. Instead, the test 
condition was measured against a forced technical focus set up that required 
the participant to say “straight” at impact. This of course could have had a 
cognitive loading or distraction effect. That said, the main disparity between 
this and the present study remains the comparatively simple nature of putting. 
With the task being as technically simple as the putting stroke, one could 
argue that the role of working memory is practically redundant and therefore 
its over use easily leads to the negative reinvestment effect. However, 
Masters (2008) believes that the more complex skills will show a greater 
propensity to for disruption, “reinvestment is more disruptive to complex tasks 
with many components that must be coordinated, than simple tasks that are 
easily proceduralised” (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, p.174). If this statement 
is to be true then results on reinvestment in full swing tests should be even 
more substantial than for the numerous studies on putting. If this is not the 
case then the reinvestment paradigm for complex skills may need to be re-
addressed. It is possible that a skill as complex as the full golf swing may 
benefit from the contribution of working memory (see Chapter 8).  
In summary, the anxiety condition in this study did cause a significant level of 
cognitive anxiety but our hypothesis was disproven as the intervention did not 
positively affect performance in either shot accuracy or distance. 
We can imply from this that the application of the reinvestment model may be 
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more complicated when considering complex motor skills than in comparison 
to relatively simple skills such as putting.  
 
Conclusion 
This study examined the performance effects of a temporal restriction aimed 
at reducing conscious processing during the execution of the full golf swing. 
Although there was a null effect of performance measures in both distance 
and accuracy, the individual effect differential suggests that there are 
additional factors that need to be considered. 
Future research is needed using a longer transfer time between learning the 
intervention and being tested. Also, additional research is necessary from an 
individualistic perspective, taking into account differences within the sample 
prior to the study.  Differences of working memory capacity, personality and 
learning styles would bring forth further understanding to the field.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF TEMPORAL RESTRICTIONS ON CONSCIOUS 
PROCESSING AND FULL GOLF SWING PERFORMANCE 
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Abstract 
It is generally agreed that during the execution phase of a complex motor skill 
optimum performance is best achieved with a high level of automaticity.  
The purposes of the present study were to firstly, explore the relationship 
between the duration of the execution phase of a full golf swing and the level 
of automaticity experienced by the golfer in pressure and non-pressure 
conditions. Performance was also measured by way of shot accuracy.  
Highly skilled golfers (n=13) (<5 handicap) hit 5 iron full swing shots within 3 
different temporal restraints for both baseline and anxiety conditions. There 
was a significant result of time on reinvestment in both the baseline, F(2, 24)  
= 13.31, p = <.001, and anxiety, F(2, 24)  = 5.27, p = .013, conditions. 
However, despite affecting reinvestment levels, performance remained stable 
over all 3 temporal restrictions.  
This study raises further questions in to the design of Pre Performance 
Routines to best enhance performance and increase resilience to pressure. 
We also raise questions about the Conscious Processing Hypothesis 
(Masters and Maxwell, 2004) in relation to a highly complex motor skill. 
Further research is suggested to explore the link between time, reinvestment 
and performance. Furthermore, lack of research is highlighted in these areas 
from both a qualitative and an individual / personality perspective.  
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Introduction 
At the elite level of competitive sport where margins between success and 
failure are fine, it has long been understood that psychological attributes play 
an increasingly important role (Hill et al., 2010).  This study is focused on the 
full swing execution in golf, which is an entirely self-paced skill and thus 
allows the performer ample preparation and execution time. Self-paced skills 
have been defined as having characteristics that include a relatively stable 
environment, the situation is predictable, and there is little concern for rapid 
perceptual adjustments (Singer, 1988). 
In these environments the action is entirely instigated by the performer, 
placing a weight of significance on mindfulness (Gardner and Moore, 2004): 
the ‘ability to attend to a task without distraction’ (Mrazek et al., 2013, p.776),  
and flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997) which has been defined as ‘a deeply 
rewarding and optimal experience characterised by intense focus on a 
specific activity to the point of becoming totally absorbed in it, and the 
exclusion of all other thoughts and emotions’ (Swann et al., 2012, p.3). 
Paradoxically, it appears to be the self-paced skills that present the toughest 
challenge in cognitive readiness by affording the temporal freedom for the 
mind to wander from a resolute task focus (Singer, 1988). Theories of ‘speed, 
accuracy trade off,’ (Glazebrook et al., 2015, MacKay, 1982, Schmidt and 
Lee, 2013) would predict that extra time in self-paced skills would be 
advantageous in allowing the performer to fully consider their movements. In 
fact, it could be that the indistinct time constraints allow for the performer to 
engage in debilitating cognitive strategies that involve task irrelevant thoughts 
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and behaviors (Boutcher, 1990) or procedural ‘rules’ that can interfere with a 
well learnt unconscious process (Masters and Maxwell, 2008b). This notion of 
‘over thinking’ is supported by the automaticity literature where it is widely 
agreed that optimum performance occurs in the absence of the working 
memory input (Beilock and Carr, 2001, Chell, 2005, Eysenck et al., 2007b, L. 
Beilock, 2002). In bringing earlier self-focus theories together Masters and 
Maxwell (2008a, 1992, 2004) fashioned the term ‘reinvestment’ to describe 
the input of declarative knowledge via working memory during skill execution. 
Their Conscious Processing Hypothesis (CPH, Masters and Maxwell, 2004) 
remains the prominent theory in the field and describes heavy working 
memory input during skill execution, as a means to deconstruct an otherwise 
deeply learnt procedural process. During skill acquisition multiple movements 
become proceduralised and run as one uninterrupted pattern. As the 
performer reinvests explicit knowledge through working memory input the skill 
gets broken back down into its component parts, which slows down 
functionality and creates gaps where errors occur.  
Other, more qualitative studies of task focus (Carson and Collins, 2014, 
MacPherson et al., 2008, MacPherson et al., 2009, Mullen and Hardy, 2010, 
Nicholls and Polman, 2008, Winter et al., 2014) also discourage detailed 
focus on one’s movements during skill execution. In particular, these studies 
highlight the distinction between focus on part skill and a more beneficial 
holistic movement focus. The Constrained Action Hypothesis (CAH, Wulf, 
2007) makes a clear distinction between internal and external focus. Internal 
focus is the focus on one’s movements during task execution while a 
preferred external focus directs attention towards either the target or the 
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environmental effects of one’s actions (e.g. ball trajectory) and thus leaves the 
mechanics of the movement to an unconscious process. The CAH suggests 
that internal focus breaks down the natural processes of a movement 
production in a similar way to the reinvestment literature. 
The undesirable effects of actively controlling or even just monitoring (Beilock 
et al., 2004a, Jackson et al., 2006, Masters and Maxwell, 2008a) one’s 
movements during task execution are at the heart of the dominant 
mechanistic views in choking under pressure (Hill et al., 2010). If this is such 
then the development of Pre Performance Routines (PPR’s) that act to 
facilitate automaticity during the execution stage is a much needed research 
direction. 
It is widely regarded that the few seconds prior to action in self-paced skills 
can be crucial to the performance outcome (Boutcher, 1990, Glazebrook et 
al., 2015, Spiegel et al., 2012). As such, the use of PPR’s is commonplace as 
a framework to channel attention and focus by way of cognitive and 
behavioral cues (Cotterill, 2010).  PPR’S have been defined as a sequence of 
task relevant thoughts and actions an athlete systematically engages in 
before performance of a sport skill (Moran, 1996). There is a considerable 
body of research in this area with a large focus on temporal considerations 
(Kingston et al., 2001, Lonsdale and Tam, 2008). Early studies focused on the 
duration of routines and pointed towards a positive correlation between PPR 
duration and the level of expertise. (Boutcher, 1990, Boutcher and Crews, 
1987). Counter theories proposed that shorter routines with fewer behavioral 
components would provide a more optimum preparation (Southard et al., 
1989) by way of less reinvestment. Critically, observational studies of real life 
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performances in football penalties (Jordet et al., 2009), NBA basketball free 
throws (Lonsdale and Tam, 2008) and in world cup rugby kicker’s PPR’s 
(Jackson, 2003) found there to be no significant difference in duration 
between the best and worst performers.  
Parallel studies in the area have focused on the consistency of PPR’s with the 
suggestion that the more consistent the routine is then the more consistent 
the performer’s cognitive strategy and state of readiness (Wrisberg and Pein, 
1992) would be. Studies in golf (Boutcher and Crews, 1987, Crews and 
Boutcher, 1986) did initially support this stance with a reported positive 
correlation between the skill level of the golfer and the consistency of PPR 
behaviors and duration but thus far no causal link has been established. In 
fact, Cotterill (2010, p.141) has made the point that the consistency of PPR 
duration observed in elite players may be “merely a function of time spent 
practicing”. 
Other studies of PPR temporal consistency found no causal link (Kingston et 
al., 2001, Southard and Miracle, 1993). In line with this view it is suggested 
(Holder et al., 2003, Jackson, 2003, Jackson and Baker, 2001, Lonsdale and 
Tam, 2008) that the duration of a PPR is relative to the difficulty of the task 
and individualistic factors. During the Jackson (2003) study it was observed 
that rugby players would take longer over a goal kick in proportion to the 
distance and acuteness of angle from the posts. This variability of difficulty is 
seen a lot in golf where a tee shot can be a relatively simple shot that can be 
easily reconstructed in practice and may not take a lot of extrinsic 
consideration. Meanwhile an approach shot played from a side hill stance with 
a strong crosswind presents an environmental predisposition for further 
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calculation.  
While much of the early PPR literature concerned itself with the temporal 
factors there is now more support (Holder et al., 2003, Mack, 2001, Mesagno 
and Mullane-Grant, 2010) for a view that favours the qualitative significance of 
the behavioral elements of the routine than the time taken or even behavioral 
consistency (Czech et al., 2004).  
While a lot of the early PPR literature make no distinction between different 
stages of a routine, in Murphy’s (1994) four step performance management 
model the readying and execution of the skill are separated within the PPR by 
way of a ‘preparation’ and ‘performance’ stage. The PPR is further segmented 
in a separate ‘five step model for self paced actives’ (Singer, 2000, Singer, 
2002). In this model, readying, imaging, focusing attention, executing and 
evaluating all form discrete parts of the PPR that are significant distinctions in 
the context of this study. Golfers may share the similar preparation phase 
requirements as other sports but during shot execution the absence of a run 
up and the demand for correct orientation creates ample opportunity for online 
explicit monitoring and distraction.  
Where the PPR literature is consistent, is in offering a fundamental message 
that the purpose of a PPR is to facilitate optimal focus and automaticity 
(Boutcher and Rotella, 1987, Cotterill, 2010). Studies that have distinguished 
between preparation and execution phases (Fischer, 1997, Holroyd et al., 
2005, Koedijker et al., 2011, Lam et al., 2010b, Singer, 2000) also share the 
consensus that for elite players it is the preparation that is more cognitively 
demanding than the execution stage. The suggestion is that, in line with the 
CPH and CAH; online monitoring during execution is not necessarily required 
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or even desirable.  
If this is such then the development of PPR’s that act to facilitate automaticity 
during the execution stage is a much needed research direction. Currently 
considered interventions to promote automaticity during this phase, include 
the use of cue words/ meta swing thoughts (MacPherson et al., 2008, Mullen 
and Hardy, 2010), rhythmical cues (MacPherson et al., 2009), external focus 
and like this study, temporal restrictions (Beilock et al., 2004a, Mesagno et al., 
2009, Wulf et al., 2000, Wulf and Su, 2007). 
Cue words have been used to discourage a ‘part-movement’ focus that 
suffers from the effects of conscious processing outlined in the reinvestment 
literature (MacPherson et al., 2008). A more ‘holistic focus’ that represents the 
whole movement has been shown to counter the negative affects of explicit 
monitoring while conveying key information about the intended movement.  
(Winter et al., 2014). To this end, the holistic focus can incorporate individual 
sub-units of the movement into one global representation that facilitates 
smooth and automatic movement execution (Mullen and Hardy, 2010). While 
this method would seem to have applied efficacy, in relation to the study of 
automaticity, it has been argued that holistic focus strategies still represent a 
level conscious processing (Moran, 2014, Toner et al., 2015, Toner and 
Moran, 2011). 
Predominantly, research settings induce automaticity by the way of a dual 
task (L. Beilock, 2002, Land and Tenenbaum, 2012, Masters, 1992, Mullen et 
al., 2007). This set up serves to cognitively load the participant with a 
secondary task leaving little or no working memory capacity for the primary 
task. Not without its drawbacks (Baddeley, 1996, Gabbett and Abernethy, 
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2012), the dual task paradigm does have a distracting effect on the performer 
but would prove an impractical intervention during a sport setting.  
Within research there have been studies that use temporal restrictions to limit 
cognitive reinvestment (Beilock et al., 2004a, Beilock et al., 2008). During 
these studies elite golfers performed better in a simple putting task under a 
temporal constraint than in regular conditions. The surprising results pointed 
towards the reinvestment paradigm in that the golfers had less time to ‘over 
think’ the action and disturb the unconscious processing associated with elite 
level skill execution. Predominantly, these studies use putting as the ‘complex’ 
motor skill but we should be cautious in extrapolating the findings into the full 
golf swing, which carries a considerably greater mechanistic complexity. 
There are two aims of this study. Firstly, to observe any relationship between 
time taken in the execution phase and the levels of automaticity. If we can 
establish a link between these factors then we will be closer to a paradigm 
from which to design effective PPR’s. In an observation and interview-based 
study of elite golfer’s existing PPR’s, it was reported that a largely individual 
approach to PPR’s is currently prevalent. A prominent theme that was found 
however, is that the golfers interviewed agreed that a key function of the PPR 
is to control the allocation of attentional resources and, as a result, 
“manipulate and control attentional focus” (Cotterill, 2010, p. 62). The results 
of this study could lead to temporal factors involved in this aim. Our 
hypothesis is that there will be a linear relationship between time and 
reinvestment up to a certain threshold. Thereafter, reinvestment will level out 
as the performer feels that they have readied themselves.  
The second aim of this study is to analyze task performance in relation to 
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duration of the execution phase and level of automaticity. If we do achieve 
high levels of automaticity amongst our elite golfers we would need to 
corroborate that this does in fact aid in performance as the automaticity and 
PPR literature would point to. This result would also allow for a more valid 
transfer of results from previous conscious control studies in putting. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
13 golfers handicap (<6) participated in the study. Recruitment was from 
golfers studying at two universities in the United Kingdom. During the study, 
participants hit full swing golf shots within 3 different temporal parameters. 
Before the study all participants gave written informed consent and the study 
was approved by the Local Research Ethics committee. 
 
Procedure 
Participants hit 42 full swing shots with their own 5 iron conforming with the 
Royal and Ancient rules of golf (R&A, 2012) down an open air golf driving 
range. The balls for all trials were ‘grade 1 range balls’ and consistent in their 
flight characteristics. Shot accuracy and distance were measured using a 
milli-wave doppler radar launch monitor (Track Man Pro™, TrackMan A/S, 
Denmark).  The radar was calibrated according to the user manual with the 
target taken as the ‘centre line.’ Testing took place on the driving ranges of 
the PGA National Academy at the Belfry and Wycombe Heights Golf Centre. 
Participants were given 10 minutes to warm up in their own manner in which 
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the opportunity to freely hit shots was provided. Participants hit 7 shots with a 
5 Iron in each condition. Both baseline and anxiety conditions were repeated 
in each of the 3 time corridors. The time corridors were selected in random 
order (Figure 1). Measures of performance anxiety (Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory-2R) and conscious processing (adjusted Movement Specific 
Reinvestment Scale) were administered immediately after each trial (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
    Time Corridor 1       Time Corridor 2  Time Corridor 3 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental Conditions 
  
 
Baseline Conditions (base) 
Baseline performance was measured with players being instructed to hit the 
ball as accurately to a target as possible and to their normal 5 iron distance. 
Anxiety Conditions (anx) 
Participants took part in a competition format designed to induce anxiety 
during shot performance. The results of the competition were displayed on 
site in view of all competitors. The competition scenario is outlined in the 
general procedure (Chapter 3) with the only exception being that the £6.00 
Baseline	   Baseline	   Baseline	  
Anxiety Anxiety Anxiety 
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stake was split into 3 x £2.00 denominations to be pledged against each 
anxiety trial. 
 
Instruments 
All instruments are as per the general procedures outlines in Chapter 3. 
Intervention 
Time afforded to the test participants during the execution stage of their PPR 
was manipulated to within 3 parameters. The instructions were to use their 
normal preparation prior to the shot but then execute the shot within the time 
allowance given. 
 
Time Corridor 1   < 5 seconds (TC1) 
Time Corridor 2   6-10 seconds (TC2) 
Time Corridor 3   >10 seconds (TC3) 
 
The time allocation was measured from commencement of their approach to 
the ball until they began their swing. The beginning of the swing was defined 
as the moment the club was swung away from the ball. Any shot that did not 
fall in the prescribed time limit was discounted and replayed. 
During the initial baseline trial a customary time period was established for 
each player, which fulfilled one of the parameter conditions. Having completed 
both a baseline and anxiety trial in this time corridor they were then randomly 
assigned the other two temporal parameters. 
Data was recorded for all participants under baseline and anxiety condition for 
each of the three temporal restrictions. 
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Data Analysis 
Data was analyzed as per the general procedure (chapter 3). A comparison 
was calculated between the 3 time corridors in both baseline and anxiety 
trials. To test the gross effect of the intervention on the participant’s 
robustness to anxiety, ∆ scores were calculated by subtracting the anxiety 
score from the baseline score in each time corridor. 
All comparisons were carried out using mixed factorial ANOVAs where the 
overall type I error rate for each analysis was set at α = .05.  Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections for lack of sphericity were used where appropriate. Any 
post-hoc multiple comparisons were adjusted for using Bonferroni. All data 
and reported as mean ± standard deviation unless otherwise stated. 
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Results  
CSAI-2R Reliability 
Calculated Cronbach alphas showed that all subscales of the CASI-2R were 
internally reliable; somatic anxiety (α = 0.75 ) cognitive anxiety (α = 0.88) and 
self-confidence (α = 0.82). All aMSRS (reinvestment) alphas also show high 
internal reliability. 
 
 
Block  1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
Cognitive 
Anxiety 
.77 .82 .87 .78 .83 .85 .88 
Somatic 
Anxiety 
.72 .76 .64 .82 .71 .75 .75 
Self 
Confidence 
.81 .69 .83 .87 .83 .87 .82 
Reinvestment .73 .76 .90 .87 .93 .67 .83 
 
Table 5.1. Cronbach’s α values across all 6 trials. The original Cronbach’s α value for the 
somatic scale in trial 1 was 0.59. Through subsequent analysis of the item total statistics, item 
15 was removed to give an improved Cronbach’s α value of 0.72. 
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CSAI-2R Subscales 
 
Cognitive Anxiety 
Pair 1TC1 showed no significant effect, F(1,11) = 0.14, p = .71, but there was a 
significant effect for cognitive anxiety between the baseline and anxiety 
conditions in pair 2TC2 F(1, 11)  = 5.56, p = .03 and pair 3TC3, F(1, 11)  = 4.66, 
p = .05 
 
 
 TC 1    TC 2    TC3 
 Base Anx Base Anx Base Anx 
Intensity 2.3 ± .74 2.29 ± .67 1.45 ± .56 2.22 ± .82 1.57 ± .55 2.02 ± .69 
Direction -.54 ± 1.32 -.14 ± 1.29 1.17 ± 1.34 .25 ±  1.79 1.09 ± 1.22 .07 ± 1.43 
 
Table 5.2. CSAI-2R mean scores for cognitive anxiety in the pre and post intervention 
anxiety conditions. Data are mean ± standard deviation. 
. 
 
 
Somatic Anxiety 
There was no significant effect of somatic anxiety on any of the 3 
comparisons. Pair 1, F(1, 11)  = 0.66, p = .8, pair 2, F(1, 11)  = 5.76, p = .09 
or pair 3, F(1, 11)  = 1.99, p = .19.  
 
 Pair 1 Pair 2    Pair 3 
 Base Anx Base Anx Base Anx 
Intensity 1.67 ± .62 1.64 ± .45 1.33 ± .50 1.6 ± .50 1.29 ± .30 1.60 ± .55 
Direction -.54 ± 1.31 -.14 ± 1.29 1.17 ± 1.34 .25 ± 1.79 1.09 ± 1.22 .76 ± 1.43 
Table 5.3. CSAI-2R mean scores for somatic anxiety in the pre and post intervention 
anxiety conditions. Data are mean ± standard deviation. 
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Self Confidence 
There was no significant effect of self confidence on any of the 3 comparisons. Pair 
1, F(1, 11)  = 0.7, p = .42, pair 2, F(1, 11)  = 0.67, p = .43 or pair 3, F(1, 11)  = 3.98, p 
= .54.  
 
 Pair 1 Pair 2    Pair 3 
 Base Anx Base Anx Base Anx 
Intensity .92 ± .52 3.03 ± .64 2.95 ± .86  2.69 ± .95 2.8 ± .86 2.7 ± .81 
Direction 1.42 ± .99 1.57 ± .94 1.57 ±1.45 1.14 ± 1.56 1.52 ± 1.41 .52 ± 1.72 
Table 5.4. CSAI-2R mean scores for self confidence in the pre and post intervention anxiety 
conditions. Data are mean ± standard deviation. 
 
 
CSAI-2R Direction 
The Lundqvist et al. (2011) method for handling direction data shows a 
clear direction scale disparity for high and low intensity scores. The high 
intensity scorers all have a reported debilitative effect with low intensity 
scores all reporting the effect, or lack of, to be facilitative.  
 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Condition Base Anx Base Anx Base Anx 
High Intensity -1.23 ± 1.08 -.57 ± 1.2 -.70 ± .14 -.69 ± 1.3 -.40 ± NA -.80 ± .55 
Low Intensity 0.37 ± 1.06 .6 ± 1.3 1.36 ± 1.09 2 ± .66 1.42 ± 1.00 1.3 ± 1.00 
Cognitive  
Sig. .027 .139 .28 .002 .113 .001 
High Intensity .24 ± .64 -.48 ± .36 .07 ± 1.31 -1.14 ± .20 1.43 ± 1.12 -.71 ± .40 
Low Intensity 1.13 ± 1.18 1.29 ± 1.30 1.52 ± 1.03 1.01 ± 1.23 N.A 1.27 ± 1.31 Somatic 
Sig. .252 .049 .107 .038 N.A .067 
Table 5.5. CSAI-2R merged intensity and direction scale mean scores. Data are mean ± 
standard deviation. 
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Reinvestment 
There was a significant result of time on reinvestment in both the baseline, F(2, 
24)  = 13.31, p = <.001, and anxiety, F(2, 24)  = 5.27, p = .013, conditions. 
Thus, there is significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  
Follow up tests on the baseline trials indicated that pairwise differences were 
significant in comparisons from condition 1 (< 5 s) to condition 2 (6 – 10 s), p = 
<001 and between condition 1 and condition 3 (> 10 s), p = .001. The pairwise 
comparison between condition 2 and 3 was not significant, p = .40. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Error Bars: 95% CI. The effect of time taken in shot execution on reinvestment 
under baseline and anxiety conditions. The < 5 seconds condition has significantly less 
reinvestment than the other 2 conditions. 
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Follow up tests on the anxiety trials indicated that pairwise differences were 
significant in comparisons from time condition 1 to condition 2, 
 p = 009 and between condition 1 and condition 3, p = .006. The pairwise 
comparison between conditions 2 and 3 was not significant,  
p = .88. This suggests that reinvestment is reduced when time is restricted 
below 6 seconds but does not increase above that threshold  (Figure 5.2). 
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Performance  
The accuracy scores indicate no main effects in either baseline, F(2, 22)  = 
.69, p = .512, or anxiety, F(2, 22)  = .039, p = .962, conditions for the repeated 
factor of time. Further pairwise comparisons across all conditions did reveal a 
significant effect in time corridor 3 between the baseline and anxiety accuracy 
scores p = .016. There were no first or second order interaction effects in any 
combination between test, condition and group. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Error Bars: 95% CI. The effect of time corridors on shot accuracy measured in 
yards carry from the centre line. Time corridor 3 (>10 seconds) shows a significant 
improvement in accuracy during the anxiety condition over baseline performance. 
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Performance Deltas 
The delta scores reported no main effect F(2, 22)  = 2.39, p = .115. Nor were 
there any first or second order interactions despite a sharp increase in delta 3 
compared with delta 1, p = 0.86 and delta 2, p = 0.97. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Error Bars: 95% CI. The difference between baseline and anxiety scores in the 
3 time corridors. Delta 3 (>10 seconds) shows a sharp improvement during the anxiety trial 
but there are no significant comparisons 
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Discussion  
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of time taken during the 
execution of the full golf swing. Measured against the 3 temporal restrictions, in 
anxiety and baseline conditions, were the levels conscious processing via the 
MSRS questionnaire and performance by means of shot accuracy. 
Unique to this study was the use of multiple time corridor conditions. Previous 
studies that have used temporal restrictions (Beilock et al., 2004a, Koedijker et 
al., 2011) have taken a more dichotic approach assuming a linear relationship 
between time and reinvestment. The complex nature of the task is also 
relatively unique given that previous studies have been criticized for using 
‘simple or overly contrived tasks (Winter et al., 2014, p. 104). Little is known 
about reinvestment in relation to complex motor skills that has not been 
extrapolated from studies on less technically demanding skills such as golf 
putting (Beilock and Carr, 2001, Maxwell et al., 2006). When the task is as 
complex as the full golf swing, a different understanding of the reinvestment 
paradigm may be necessary. 
The main findings indicate that time taken during shot execution does have an 
effect on reinvestment but the pattern is not linear. Reinvestment was 
significantly reduced below a certain threshold, as shown in TC1. However, 
above that threshold reinvestment remained stable between the mid and 
upper time conditions of this study (TC2 & TC3). This supported our earlier 
hypothesis although the non-linear aspect represents a new insight. The 
performance effects across the 3 time corridors were not as expected with no 
main effect but an improvement in TC3anx over TC3base was reported.  
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On the basis that TC1 showed significantly less reinvestment than the other 
time conditions, the CPH (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a) would predict 
significant performance gains in this condition. Not only was this not shown 
but the improvement during the anxiety condition of TC3 leads us to reject our 
performance hypothesis and with it, cast doubts about the CPH (and related 
self-focus theories) in relation to highly complex motor skills.  
 
Time 
The non-linear effect of time on reinvestment suggests that in the few 
seconds while readying themselves and executing the shot, the golfers 
engage in a somewhat habitual cognitive strategy (Bläsing et al., 2009, Land 
et al., 2014). We cannot be sure of the qualitative nature of these cognitions 
but could surmise form the results they involve some amount of conscious 
processing. When there is not sufficient time to fully engage in this process 
then reinvestment is reduced, leaving a more unconscious level of movement 
control. Otherwise, the golfers take the required time to complete this process 
and then initiate the swing. When forced to take longer, as in TC3, the players 
did not engage in more reinvestment but merely waited to begin their 
cognitive strategy. There may have been other additional cognition such as 
performance anxiety but this did not manifest itself in additional reinvestment. 
These results explain more about the relationship between time and 
reinvestment but the wider efficacy of temporal restrictions, as a means to 
limit reinvestment, needs further consideration.  
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Performance 
Given that the reinvestment was severely limited during the shorter time 
corridor, the major theories (Beilock and Carr, 2001, Eysenck and Calvo, 
1992, Masters, 1992, Wulf, 2007) pertaining to automaticity and attentional 
focus would predict superior performance in this condition. This was not the 
case as no effect of temporal restriction on performance was reported. 
We postulate that this null effect could imply that a skill as complex as the full 
golf swing requires a certain level of technical focus for optimal performance 
(Bernier et al., 2011, Toner and Moran, 2014). However, if this were the case 
then we may have expected to see a performance drop off at TC1 when 
reinvestment was severely restricted. This was not reported. In fact, the only 
significant performance result was the improvement in TC3anx on TC3base.  
Notably, in TC3 there was a marginal drop in reinvestment during the anxiety 
condition, which could be attributed to the improvement in performance.  
However, other studies of a similar nature (Buszard, 2014, Cooke et al., 2011) 
reported heightened performance during pressure trials and no link between 
pressure and conscious processing (Cooke et al., 2011).  Therefore we 
cannot adopt this interpretation of the result in TC3. It is also considered that 
the difference between the baseline and anxiety performance in TC3 was 
mainly down to the TC3base  getting worse rather than the anxiety scores 
improving with more time afforded to cognition. The authors surmise that the 
deterioration of TC3base is due to a drop in arousal (Kerr, 2014) while waiting 
to begin their normal cognitive pattern. During the anxiety condition, 
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participants would have experienced enough arousal to maintain focus 
enough to perform in a way that was consistent with the other time conditions. 
The non-significant change in the performance factors, suggests that either 
the intervention had minimal effect across the group or alternatively, the 
spread was too large to deem significant. The data from the members of the 
group that improved with the intervention, could have been negated by others 
that got worse as result of less reinvestment (see chapter 4). This leads us to 
consider other more individualistic factors. 
It may be the case that when it comes to complex skill execution, some 
individuals perform at their best with a certain level of conscious processing, 
thus, making the objective to condense swing based cognition down to the 
key meta themes (Mullen and Hardy, 2010). This would place the optimal 
performance paradigm not on complete automaticity but more along the lines 
of flow and mindfulness frameworks where the player is fully task oriented 
allowing their focus to fall solely on the relevant stimuli (Gardner and Moore, 
2004, 2012).  
 
When considering an action as complex as the full golf swing, it is sagacious 
to take into account the cyclical pattern of the player within the stages of 
learning framework (Anderson, 1982, Anson et al., 2005, Ericsson, 2003, 
Ericsson et al., 2007, Fitts and Posner, 1967). Due to the complexity of the 
skill, a golfer’s full swing technique is constantly under scrutiny and continually 
evolving (Carson et al., 2013). According to the 3 phase model of Fitts and 
Posner (1967) each conscious adjustment would take the player somewhat 
back to stage 1 which is highly cognitive in nature. Through repetition and 
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purposeful practice (Ericsson et al., 2007)  the player moves gradually back to 
stage 3 which is indicative of a largely automatic control of the movement. To 
force a player at the cognitive stage of this process into a temporal restriction 
and automatic mode of control could realize a performance drop off. Likewise, 
we would expect for players at the autonomous stage of the cycle to be fairly 
comfortable with the letting go of conscious control. This is consistent with a 
recent addition to the automaticity literature (Carson and Collins, 2015) in 
which the ‘motoric influence’ of ‘skill establishment’ is proposed as a key 
mediator in the anxiety-performance relationship. As a proposed addition to 
the 3 dimensional model by Cheng et al. (2009), skill establishment is 
described as the ‘level and consistency of movement automaticity together 
with a performer’s confidence in this specific process’ (Carson and Collins, 
2015, p. 1). In line with our view on ‘stages of learning’ above, highly 
developed skill establishment is seen as potentially negating any debilitative 
effects of anxiety. Within this framework Carson and Collins (2015) expand 
the idea to suggest that in light of the skill establishment concept, conscious 
control may not always lead to a negative effect on performance. 
With this in mind, we recognize a limitation of this study being the lack of 
understanding of each participant’s baseline level of skill establishment. 
Kinematic measurements of movement variability at the start of the study 
would have allowed us to control for this dimension of the anxiety-
performance relationship.  
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Limitations 
Further to the limitation above, there are a number of restrictive elements to 
this study that could be resolved in future research. Notably, the natural 
variability of reinvestment effect within the group may currently be creating too 
much noise to gain a tangible outcome. To alleviate this issue future studies 
need to take a more individualistic approach to automaticity by considering 
some of the key personality traits that may affect reinvestment levels.  
Masters (1993b) reinvestment scale (RS) is considered a reliable measure of 
trait reinvestment and would provide an understanding of personal trends 
before the study begins. It is suggested that those golfers with high RS scores 
would gain more from the intervention than those with naturally lower 
reinvestment levels. 
Along the individualistic approach, other key considerations are the learning 
styles (Honey and Mumford, 1992, Sadler-Smith, 2001, Swailes and Senior, 
1999) and modality preference (Massa and Mayer, 2006, Mayer and Massa, 
2003, Silver et al., 2000) within the sample (see Chapter 7).  
When researching the effect of reinvestment on performance, future studies 
also need to consider the individual’s ability to hold and process information in 
temporary storage. The role of working memory capacity (WMC) (Baddeley, 
2007) within sport has been long overlooked (Furley and Memmert, 2010) and 
nowhere is it more applicable than in motor learning and reinvestment (see 
Chapter 8). 
A salient drawback of this study was the non-significant change in cognitive 
anxiety during TC1 baseline and anxiety trials. In fact, table 2 shows this not 
to be a lack of anxiety at TC1anx as this was actually the highest mean score 
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of all trials. What the table highlights is that the > 5 second temporal restriction 
may have caused a large amount of cognitive anxiety even in the baseline 
trials. This high level of anxiety could have prevented the golfers performing 
better in the TC1 trials. Future research of this nature needs to take into 
account the potential jarring nature of the temporal restriction. Having 
reinvestment limited so drastically would have proved distracting for many of 
the sample. If the player was attempting to run their normal cognitive strategy 
in shorter temporal condition then they would find the situation somewhat 
hurried leading to heightened anxiety levels. Where we might see the positive 
affect of almost complete automaticity is when the player trusts in themselves 
and in the process of disengaging in their previously habitual swing related 
cognition. Follow up work is required that tackles this limitation of the current 
design. A two-stage set up is suggested with a gap of 6 weeks between pre 
and post conditions. In this time the participants will be required to hit a 
number of balls per week to familiarize themselves with hitting within the 
temporal restriction. This extended learning period will also gain the reported 
benefits of sleep and multiple ‘incubation periods’ (Fischer et al., 2002, Sheth 
et al., 2008, Stickgold and Walker, 2007, Walker, 2005, Walker et al., 2002a). 
 
A key methodological aspect of this study was the novel way in which the 
directional anxiety scores of the CSAI-2R were handled. Using the Lundqvist 
et al. (2011) model of combined intensity (high and low) and directions scales, 
it is clear that that the traditional method of analysis is ineffective. In the 
cognitive anxiety scale where this study has its effect, all the high intensity 
groups reported a debilitating effect with the low intensity groups being all 
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facilitative. This casts doubts over the direction perception approach to 
anxiety (Mellalieu et al., 2006, Mellalieu et al., 2003, Robazza et al., 2008) 
which suggests that the player’s level of self-confidence can cause symptoms 
of anxiety to be perceived as being facilitative. In this study, the participants 
seemed to only report ‘lack of anxiety’ as facilitative.  
 
Conclusion 
The current work examined the relationship between time and reinvestment 
and consequently its effect on performance. Severely restricting time 
significantly limits reinvestment but allowing more time does not have the 
opposite effect. This provides us with a reliable method for testing in future 
reinvestment studies without having to use the more contentious dual task set 
up. Away from the research environment, the short temporal restriction, as in 
this study, could have some more practical uses. As part of a purposeful 
practice design, restricting reinvestment in this way could speed up the 
player’s graduation back to autonomous stage 3 after a swing change. The 
temporal restriction could also be used in designing Pre Performance 
Routines and be adjusted to fit the player’s optimal level of reinvestment 
dependent on the personality and learning stage factors mentioned above. 
We also examined the performance effect of time and reinvestment. To this 
end the results were far less conclusive with accuracy levels remaining stable 
throughout the temporal restriction and anxiety conditions. The fact that 
performance didn’t drop off during the shorter temporal restriction must pose 
questions of its own but so far the data in this study largely rejects our 
hypothesis and the applicability of the CPH to complex motor skills. Further 
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study of a more individualistic and qualitative nature is recommended. In 
particular, relating reinvestment to personality factors including learning 
styles, learning modality preference and working memory capacity. This study 
is to be repeated with adjusted design elements that account for individual 
factors (Chapters 7 & 8) and with the addition of a learning phase (Chapter 6)
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CHAPTER 6 
ACCOMMODATION TO LIMITED CONSCIOUS PROCESSING 
DURING THE GOLF SWING 
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Abstract 
Optimum performance of a complex motor skill assumes a high level of 
automaticity.  Reinvestment of declarative knowledge during the execution 
phase of the skill has been shown to degrade performance by way of 
disrupting high level unconscious processing.  
In Chapter 5 it was indicated that temporal restrictions can enhance levels of 
automaticity and potentially affect performance. The purpose of the present 
study was to assess the effects of a long-term learning period in which 
participants practice under temporal restriction. 
Highly skilled golfers (n=25) (<6 handicap) hit 5 iron full swing shots under 
baseline and anxiety conditions in both pre and post trials with a 6 week 
learning period in between. 
The results indicated that the temporal restriction was successful in 
limiting reinvestment levels in both pre F(3,69) = 4.12, p =.01 and post 
intervention test F(3,69) = 3.02, p = .035 scores. No performance effect 
was observed F(1,17) = .705, p =.41.  
This study raises further questions on the role of conscious processing in 
complex motor skills. Further cognitive reinvestment research is suggested 
utilizing complex tasks and in applied settings. Furthermore, a lack of 
research is highlighted in this area from an individualistic perspective.  
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Introduction 
 
There are convergent theories that represent a growing consensus in motor 
learning literature towards a desirable state of unconscious processing during 
the execution of a complex motor skill (see Chapters 2 and 4). Further 
validation of this position is derived from studies into ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1997, Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2009) which is viewed as an optimal 
performance state (Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1999) and is characterised 
by effortless and automatic performance during highly demanding situations 
and tasks (Koehn et al., 2013a). It is largely believed that externally paced 
continuous sports facilitate access to flow state more readily than discreet 
self-paced sports like golf. (Boutcher, 1990, Koehn et al., 2013a, Singer, 
1988).  
Given the motor complexity of the full golf swing and the self-paced nature of 
the sport it is highly relevant to further understand the nature of automaticity in 
view of working toward an optimal performance paradigm which at this point is 
largely anecdotal (Rotella, 1995)   
A clear omission in literature is a longitudinal study that allows for a period of 
learning / adjustment to interventions aimed at facilitating autonomous 
performance. Previous studies of automaticity have been criticized for using 
‘contrived or overly simple tasks’ (Winter et al., 2014, p. 104) (see Chapter 2). 
In this study we highlight further issues with forced restrictions of conscious 
processing. 
If the performer has a deeply habitual (Lally and Gardner, 2013, Seger and 
Spiering, 2011) cognitive strategy that is engaged during shot execution then 
any means of prevention or limitation in this process could lead to a 
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significantly abrasive effect where the performer tries in vein to run the 
habitual pattern with insufficient time. The subsequent anxiety created would 
be enough to inhibit any level of flow state or mindfulness (Aherne et al., 
2011, Gardner and Moore, 2004) and could lead to performance decrements. 
This would be particularly true if, as is likely in golf, the full swing has been 
learnt in a highly explicit manor (Masters and Maxwell, 2004, Rendell et al., 
2011). In this case, the golfer may be relying on a heavy working memory 
input during movement planning (Moreau, 2013) and shot execution. Having 
the executive control severely limited may well prove too sudden a change 
resulting in a drop of performance for some individuals, as linked to the group 
null performance effects in Chapters 4 and 5. This study sought to overcome 
some of these methodological issues by a design that allowed for a 6 week 
learning period in which participants practice under the temporal restriction as 
used in chapters 4 and 5 (see Chapter 3). 
 
Learning Period 
Within the motor learning literature there is wide criticism of experimental 
designs when testing for skill retention (Walker et al., 2002b, Walker et al., 
2003b). Typically, the learning and transfer tests are very close to together 
allowing for little embedding of the new pattern. The Power Law (Newell and 
Rosenbloom, 1981, Stratton et al., 2007) of practice suggests that time and 
quantity of trials are key to improving motor skill. Whilst we are not looking at 
change in a movement pattern in this experiment, we are asking the 
participants to adapt to a novel task constraint (Davids, 2010) and potentially 
a different type of processing during shot execution (Ericsson, 2006a, 
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Ericsson et al., 2007). As such, a learning period has been incorporated to 
allow for key motor learning concepts of consolidation (Siengsukon and Boyd, 
2009) and sleep (Fischer et al., 2002, Stickgold and Walker, 2007, Walker, 
2005, Walker et al., 2002a, Walker et al., 2003b, Walker and Stickgold, 2004, 
Walker and Stickgold, 2006) to facilitate the customisation of novel task 
constraints.  
A key concept relating to repetitive practice is that motor skills continue to 
improve after the performer has stopped practicing. (Fischer et al., 2002). This 
period of ‘offline’ improvement has been attributed to the process of memory 
consolidation in which recently formed memory traces are converted into 
more stable representations in long-term memory (Deliens et al., 2013). In 
relation to motor skill learning, this phenomenon would describe how an 
internal model of skill representation ‘becomes strengthened and increasingly 
resistant to behavioral interference’ (Fischer et al., 2002, p. 11987). Studies 
have shown consolidation to occur during sleep (Walker et al., 2003a) with  
retesting 24 hours after initial learning indicating improvements in both speed 
and accuracy of a sequential finger tapping task (Fischer et al., 2002, Walker 
et al., 2002b). More recent studies have challenged this position by proposing 
that motor skill may not actually continue to improve during sleep periods but 
are enhanced to become more robust (Cellini and McDevitt, 2015, 
Nettersheim et al., 2015). The literature is not yet conclusive on the exact role 
of sleep in motor skill development but it does seem clear that sleep facilitates 
positive brain plasticity (Dayan and Cohen, 2011) that results in ‘offline’ 
improvements. 
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Self-Organization 
Dynamical Systems Theory (Newell, 1986) describes the development of   
movement patterns as a reaction to a confluence of constraints that are 
placed upon the system. These constraints range from a spectrum of 
organismic (physical dimensions, cognitive make up, intentions etc.), 
environmental (wind, acoustics, ground conditions etc.) and task (rules, 
equipment etc.) (Glazier, 2011) factors. Through the process of ‘self-
organization’ the multitude of parts within a system (DOF) spontaneously 
adjust and adapt to each other in relation to the intended outcome. After 
sufficient trials ‘attractors’ are created where the newly organized pattern 
operates in a stable and functional manner.   
In accordance to the change in the movement pattern, the cognitive control 
structure of the movement (Ericsson, 2006a) would also evolve as influenced 
by the constraints in which the pattern is learned and performed. Through the 
process of self-organization we would expect to see an adaptation to the new 
task constraint, the performer could potentially accommodate (Akella, 2010, 
Bergsteiner and Avery, 2014) new control strategies. 
It is from this ‘Constraints Led’ (Davids et al., 2008) perspective that we may 
expect to see a change in the level of conscious control of the golf swing,  
facilitated by practice under the temporal restriction intervention.  If consistent 
with the CPH (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Masters, 1992) and implicit 
learning theories (Mullen et al., 2007, Rendell et al., 2011), the golfers will 
then perform better under pressure. We hypothesize that firstly; the test group 
will display lower levels of conscious processing in the post trials. 
Consequently, we also hypothesize that this group will show an improvement 
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in their performance under pressure during the post-intervention trials.  
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Methods 
Participants 
25 golfers handicap (<6) participated in the study. Recruitment was from 
golfers studying at two universities in the United Kingdom. The participants 
were randomly allocated to either control (n=12) or test groups (n=13).  
The procedure outlined in the general methods (chapter 3) was repeated for 
both pre and post intervention trials. Participants hit a total of 56 full swing 
shots with their own 5 iron, conforming with the Royal and Ancient rules of 
golf (R&A, 2012). There were 3 parts to the experimental design, made up of 
2 test sessions separated by a 6-week learning period.   
 
Trial 1base Trial 2anx Trial 3baseI Trial 4anxI 
 
      
 
Trial 5base Trial 6anx Trial 7baseI Trial 8anxI 
Figure 6.1. Experimental Conditions 
 
6	  Week	  Learning	  Period	  
Baseline	   Anxiety	   Baseline	  with	  Intervention	   Anxiety	  with	  Intervention	  
Baseline	   Anxiety	   Baseline	  with	  Intervention	   Anxiety	  with	  Intervention	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Procedure 
There were 6 weeks of practice time between the pre and post data 
collections. In this time all participants were instructed to practice with a 5 iron 
for 10 minutes in duration at a frequency of twice per week. This was to be in 
addition to their normal patterns of play and off course practice. In this period 
the test group practiced under the 5 second restriction while the control group 
were instructed to practice acting out their normal PPR.  Regular email 
reminders were sent to during this period and compliance was assured before 
post-test commencement. 
Instruments 
The instruments used were as described in the general procedure (Chapter 3) 
Data Analysis 
The CSAI-2R and aMSRS scores were processed as outlined in the general 
procedure section (Chapter 3). In order to best test the performance effect of 
the 6 week learning period and reduce any effect of individual ‘on the day’ 
variance, performance in the baseline trials was calculated by comparing the 
change between each participant’s trial 1base and trial 3baseI scores. A 
comparison was then carried out between the pre and post-test score 
differential. The same procedure was followed to compare the anxiety scores. 
The change between trial 2anx and trail 4anxI were compared across pre and 
post-test blocks. 
All comparisons were carried out using mixed factorial ANOVAs where the 
overall type I error rate for each analysis was set at α = .05. Where Mauchly’s 
test was violated, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
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Geisser estimates of sphericity. Any post-hoc multiple comparisons were 
adjusted for using Bonferroni 
 
Results 
Questionnaire Reliability 
Calculated Cronbach’s alphas showed that all subscales of the aMSRS (α = 
0.89) and the CASI-2R were internally reliable; somatic anxiety (α = 0.82), 
cognitive anxiety (α = 0.80) and self-confidence (α = 0.92).  
 
 
Trial  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Overall 
Cognitive 
Anxiety 
.68 .86 .83 .84 .80 .76 .83 .81 .80 
Somatic 
Anxiety 
.73 .76 .83 .73 .71 .78 .84 .87 .82 
Self 
Confidence 
.73 .83 .88 .80 .79 .82 .85 .89 .92 
Reinvestment .80 .86 .86 .89 .90 .93 .94 .94 .89 
 
Table 6.1. Cronbach’s alpha scores for the CSAI-2R and aMSRS across the 8 trials. 
 
 
 
 
 101 
CSAI-2R Subscales 
Cognitive Anxiety 
There was a significant effect of the test on the cognitive anxiety subscale on 
for all 4 pairs of trails. Pair 1, F(1, 26) = 9.60, p = .005,  pair 2,  F(1, 26) = 
17.67, p = < .001, pair 3, F(1, 23) = 7.83, p = .010 and pair 4 F(1, 23) = 11.45, 
p = .003. 
 
Somatic Anxiety 
There was a significant effect of the somatic anxiety subscale on test for pair 
1, F(1, 26) = 7.63, p = .010, pair 2, F(1, 26) = 13.80, p = < .001, pair 3,  
F(1, 23) = 5,09, p = .034, and pair 4, F(1, 23) = 13.8, p = .001. 
 
Self Confidence 
There was no significant effect of the self-confidence subscale on test for pair 
1, F(1, 26) = .30, p = .863, pair 2, F(1, 26) = .83 p = .372, or pair 3, F(1, 23) = 
3.03, p = .095. There was a significant effect on pair 4, F(1, 23) = 5.67, p = 
.026. 
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CSAI-2R Direction 
Table 6.2 shows a significant difference between high and low intensity 
in all trials with the high intensity scores all reporting a debilitative effect. 
This validates the effect of the intensity scores. 
 
 
 
Mean Scores for CSAI-2R Direction and Intensity Scale   
  
Pre Trials Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3   Trial 4 
Condition Base Anx Base Anx 
High Intensity -.64 ± .75 -.67 ± 1.62 -.60 ± 1.88 -.67 ± 1.57* 
Cognitive  
Low Intensity .37 ± 1.26 .19 ± 1.11 .92 ± 1.85 .73 ± 1.20S 
High Intensity -.89 ± 0.62* -.98 ± .61* -2.00 N/A -.74 ± .63* 
Somatic 
Low Intensity .67 ±  1.27S .25 ± 1.24S .52 ±.1.26 .64 ± 1.37S 
 
 
 
Condition Base Anx Base Anx 
High Intensity .67 ± 2.31 -.38 ± 1.60 2.10 ± 1.27 -.07 ± 1.70 
Cognitive  
Low Intensity .58 ± 1.39 .21 ± 1.23 .49 ± 1.56 .35 ± 1.19 
High Intensity -.57  N/A -.48 ± .44 -.29 ± 0.00 -1.36 ± 1.52 
Somatic 
Low Intensity .53 ±  1.42 .23 ± 1.37 .72 ±.1.51 .65 ± 1.42 
 
Table 6.2. CSAI-2R direction scale mean scores in the pre and post intervention trials. 
*,$ indicates significant difference between pairs. Data are mean ± standard deviation. 
                 Post Trials Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 Trial 8              
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Reinvestment 
When analysed in their baseline/anxiety pairs, there was a significant 
main effect of trial on reinvestment scores for both pre  
F(3,69) = 4.12, p =.01 and post F(3,69) = 3.02, p = .035 scores. 
 
Pre-Test Comparisons 
Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant interaction effect between 
test and intervention group for reinvestment between pre-trials 1base 
(baseline) and 3baseI (baseline with intervention) (p <.001). The difference 
between trials 1 (baseline) and 2anx (anxiety without intervention) was non-
significant (p = 1.000) as was the difference between trials 2 (anxiety 
without intervention) and 4anxI (anxiety with intervention) (p = .065) albeit 
marginal. The control group remained stable with no significant 
differences reported. 
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Post-Test Comparisons 
The post-test comparisons also revealed a significant group interaction 
effect for reinvestment between post-trials 2anx and 3baseI (p = .008) and 
trials 2anx and 4anxI (p = .020). The difference between trials 1base and 2anx 
(p = 1.000), 1base and 3baseI (p = .413) and 1base and 4anxI (p = .773). 
showed non-significant change.  
The control group remained stable with no significant differences 
detected. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Error Bars: 95% CI.  Reinvestment scores by group during pre-trials. Shows 
significant reduction in reinvestment during temporal restriction trials. 
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Figure 6.3. Error Bars: 95% CI. Reinvestment scores by group during post-trials.            
Shows significant reduction in reinvestment during temporal restriction trials. 
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Performance  
No main effect was found for the repeated factor condition F(1,17) = 
.705, p =.41. Performance during the anxiety trials was calculated in the 
same manor. This time, by comparing the differences between anxiety 
trials in pre (blocks 2 and 4) and post (blocks 6 and 8). No main effect 
was found for the repeated factor condition F(1,22) = .161, p =.692 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Error Bars: 95% CI. Mean difference in yards offline between baseline trials in 
pre and post-test trials. A positive score indicates less accuracy under temporal restriction.  
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Figure 6.5. Error Bars: 95% CI. Mean difference in yards offline between anxiety trials in 
pre and post-test trials. A positive score indicates less accuracy under temporal restriction.  
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of a learning period in which 
participants practiced under a temporal restriction proven to limit conscious 
processing during shot execution. Central to the study was how the golfers 
reacted to this practice time in terms of both propensity for cognitive processing 
and performance measured by shot accuracy. 
Reinvestment was measured with the use the aMSRS questionnaire (see 
Chapter 3) and performance was measured as shot accuracy of a full swing 
with a 5 iron. 
There were a number of unique aspects to this study: the motor complexity of 
the full golf swing (Winter et al., 2014), the length of the learning period and the 
temporal restriction (Beilock et al., 2004b, Koedijker et al., 2011) all represent 
novel and challenging research facets.   
The main findings support our first hypothesis by indicating a link between the 
temporal restriction and reduced state reinvestment. The reduced levels of 
reinvestment had no effect on performance in shot accuracy either from trial to 
trial or in pre and post learning period contrasts. This rejects our second 
hypothesis that the golfers would adapt to the intervention and perform better 
under pressure as a result of reduced reinvestment. This result also raises 
further questions around the efficacy of the CPH (Masters, 1992) and EMH 
(Beilock and Carr, 2001) theories in relation to complex motor skills. 
The results from the CSAI-2R intensity scales indicate that the study 
successfully created the desired anxiety manipulation, although, this is not 
reflected in the performance results. The reaction to anxiety over the 8 trials 
was mixed with many of the sample actually improving in shot accuracy under 
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anxiety conditions. This would be in line with the direction perception approach 
to anxiety (Mellalieu et al., 2006, Mellalieu et al., 2003, Robazza et al., 2008) 
which suggests that the player’s level of self-confidence can cause symptoms 
of anxiety to be perceived as being facilitative.  
However, the traditional methods of analyzing the data from this scale have 
been found to be ineffective (Lundqvist et al., 2011) casting doubt over the 
direction perception approach. The results of the directions scale in this study 
are in line with this position. For both the cognitive and somatic scales there 
was a high level of correlation between intensity levels and a perceived 
debilitative effect of anxiety 
Despite reporting anxiety as being debilitative the performance results in 
anxiety conditions were still varied indicating that many of the sample were 
able to perform in the presence of anxiety. This factor could be apportioned 
toward the null effect of the performance scores. With a large variance in 
performance relative to anxiety, inherent in the sample; it would be difficult to 
show any effect of the intervention. We suggest that future research may 
overcome this issue by taking a multiple case study approach with an extended 
baseline. 
Although anxiety levels were successfully manipulated, the state reinvestment 
results show no meaningful change in reinvestment between base and anxiety 
conditions. This result questions a central pillar to the CPH,  that under 
pressure there is greater propensity for reinvestment. It should be stated that, 
Masters et al. (1993a) does recognize individual trait factors as measured in 
the reinvestment scale questionnaire (Masters et al., 1993a). This instrument is 
recognised as an accurate predictor of one’s propensity to reinvest and centres 
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largely on the trait of self-consciousness. Given this individualistic nature of 
reinvestment, it may be that not enough of our sample were high enough trait 
reinvestors to significantly affect the data under anxiety conditions. 
Alternatively, a higher level of cognitive anxiety may be required to see an 
overall effect on reinvestment, 
The reinvestment data did show a significant reduction in swing related 
cognition during shot execution on the trials where the temporal restriction was 
in place. This however, was not affected by the learning period with similar 
levels of reinvestment being reported in pre and post trials. This negates any 
argument for a learning effect where the golfers may have become more 
accustomed to the restriction in such a way as to cognitively restructure, thus 
creating enough cognitive resource to focus more on their technique. Nor do 
the reinvestment results support any notion that the test participants may have 
become adept enough in their practice under the restriction that they switched 
to a reduced level of reinvestment in their normal pre performance routine. 
The lack of effect upon shot accuracy indicates that this method of forcing 
autonomous control on the group did not encourage automaticity in a way that 
is conducive to optimal movement control. Even given the 6-week learning 
period, the results show no significant improvement across the sample. This 
implies that practicing under restricted reinvestment conditions does not lead 
to improved performance in such conditions. Nor does it induce a more 
autonomous level of movement control. The performance results also raise 
further questions about the relationship between automaticity and complex 
skill performance (Ericsson, 2007, Toner and Moran, 2014).  
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Before reflecting further on this point, it is recognised that it could be the 
method of inducing automaticity that is the limiting factor in this design. The 
organic formation of automaticity via thousands of hours of practice (Ericsson 
et al., 1993b) may still require a certain level of focus on external cues (Toner 
et al., 2015), that may be prohibited by the temporal restriction (see chapter 9).  
It is also conceded that the 6-week learning period could have been ineffective 
due to either a lack of compliance in which case, the use of a practice diary is 
suggested for future studies of this nature. Alternatively, the amount of 
practice under the temporal restriction may not have been sufficient within the 
framework of the participant’s regular golf activities. 
In looking at this outcome from the perspective of Fitt’s stage theory of motor 
learning (Fitts and Posner, 1967), the results would imply that a low number of 
our sample were not at an entirely autonomous stage of leaning (Ericsson, 
2006b, Fitts and Posner, 1967) otherwise, we would have seen a more robust 
performance under the temporal restriction. This is consistent with case 
studies of professional golfers (Bernier et al., 2011) that found the vast 
majority to be employing cognitive cues to help control the swing. In line with 
this view, a recent paper (Carson and Collins, 2015) proposes a further 
‘motoric’ element of the anxiety-performance relation to be ‘skill establishment’ 
defined as the level of automaticity of movement and trust in the process.  
Without knowing the participant’s stage of development (skill establishment) at 
the start of the study, it is difficult to predict/measure their reaction to a 
reduction in conscious control in a way that would beget an applied 
intervention. Future research could utilize a measure of movement variability 
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by way of three dimensional ‘local co-ordinate systems’ (Carson and Collins, 
2014) to garner a baseline level of this ‘motoric’ concept. 
Unlike simpler tasks (Masters, 1992), the full golf swing may actually benefit 
from some level of executive control. This may not be true for all elite golfers 
but most likely for some. As previously mentioned, an individualistic approach 
to the subject is not an entirely novel concept; Masters et al. (1993a). In 
addition to the self-consciousness, other individual trait factors may well have 
been an influence on this study by affecting each golfer’s ecological fit with the 
forced cognitive restriction. The individual’s learning style (Kollöffel, 2012, 
Pashler et al., 2008) may play a noteworthy role in how they best direct their 
attention during performance. If the cognitive style is more or less analytical in 
nature (Mumford and Honey, 1992) then the optimal level of executive control 
may be affected. Equally, given that verbal processing is understood to be 
more resource intensive (Antonietti and Giorgetti, 1998, Clark and Paivio, 
1991, Kirby et al., 1988, Paivio, 1971, Richardson, 1977) than kinesthetic or 
visual modes, then a differential of the verbaliser/visualiser scale (Antonietti 
and Giorgetti, 1998, Richardson, 1977) could have affected the performance 
results within a forced autonomous state.  
The capacity to hold information in temporary storage (Buszard et al., 2013) 
offers a further area that needs to be explored. In this study, the individual 
working memory capacity (WMC) may have been a fundamental variable that 
influenced the interaction between low reinvestment levels and performance. 
High levels of storage and processing power may simply mean a greater 
aptitude and reliance on some level of executive control. 
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When considering individual variance effects on task performance, a 
substantial omission in this and similar papers is the measure of the starting 
point in terms of automaticity. According to the ‘stages of learning’ model (Fitts 
and Posner, 1967), the use of ‘elite’ level golfers should guarantee an 
autonomous level of performance but this is not necessarily so. In the case of 
‘expert’ performers automaticity is often rebuffed by a constant process of 
refining and enhancing physical and cognitive processes in the development of 
higher order skills (Ericsson et al., 2007). If a golfer is in a 
transitional/developmental stage, then according to Fitts and Posner’s (1967) 
own model, they will require some level of executive control and a forced 
automaticity condition would see a drop in performance. 
The current study had other methodological challenges that need to be met on 
future research. Notably, the practice during the learning time needed tighter 
scrutiny with potential use of self-report practice diaries and qualitative 
questionnaires being required at each practice session.  
 
Conclusion 
The current study examined the effect of an automaticity intervention over a 6 
week learning to period. There was a significant reduction in reinvestment 
levels during the intervention trials but there was no reported effect of the 
learning period on reinvestment. Nor was there any group wise effect on 
performance. While this supports our first hypothesis, it rejects our 
performance hypothesis and brings into question the efficacy of reinvestment 
theory and CPH in relation to complex motor skills.  
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It is recommended (Winter et al., 2014) that further studies into the nature of 
automaticity are to be carried out on complex skills, in applied settings and with 
a more individualistic approach.  
The temporal restriction continues to be a valid research intervention and may 
prove to be a useful coaching tool for those performers that are reinvesting 
over their optimal level but for now, at least, we have to say that a blanket 
approach to automaticity is not valid. The question may be more of ‘what’ to 
think than ‘how much’ to think (Bernier et al., 2011, Mullen and Hardy, 2010).  
This is an increasing viewpoint within the literature (Carson and Collins, 2014) 
with distinctions being made between ‘part skill’ and ‘holistic’ (MacPherson et 
al., 2008) focus and positive effects of temporal cues (MacPherson et al., 
2009) being reported (see chapter 9).  
From a broader perspective, the results of this study, in relation to the novel 
complexity of the skill, lead us to question the efficacy of automaticity 
interventions in general. Automaticity appears to be present at moments of 
heightened performance (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, Jackson and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999) but this doesn’t meant that forcing this state upon a 
performer will necessarily lead to the reverse causation. The nature of 
automaticity would seem to be more complex (Geeves et al., 2013, Toner and 
Moran, 2014) than this with possible extraneous factors including learning 
styles, trait reinvestment, modal preference, working memory capacity and 
stage of learning with numerous interactions of task restraints and 
environmental stimuli. With this in mind, future research needs to be less 
dichotic in nature and should take a more individualistic view of automaticity 
for expert performers.
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CHAPTER 7  
AUTOMATICITY OF THE GOLF SWING: ONE SIZE MAY NOT FIT 
ALL. 
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Abstract 
We examined the full swing performance of highly skilled golfers (n=23) under 
baseline and anxiety conditions. Reinvestment theory predicts that when a 
performer thinks about their technique during shot execution it interferes with 
the more efficient unconscious processes and as a result, performance 
suffers. In this study we aimed to highlight individual trait factors that may 
influence this paradigm. In a repeat of an earlier design (see Chapter 3), in 
which conscious monitoring was severely restricted, we also examine any 
correlations of performance and state reinvestment with the personality traits 
of ‘broad learning style’ and ‘visual/verbal learning style’.  
State reinvestment failed to show significant correlations with any of the 
learning style subscales. 
The verbaliser group improved shot accuracy during the pre-intervention 
anxiety trial r = .65, p = .006, and showed a negative correlation coefficient 
with performance when pre and post intervention anxiety conditions were 
compared r = -.65, p = .006.  
There was also a significant main effect of intervention between the 
verbaliser/visualiser groups performance on pre and post anxiety trials, 
F(1,14) =  8.4, p <.012. This led us to surmise a diverse processing type 
that contributes towards a differential in reinvestment effect. 
This study raises further questions in to the design of Pre Performance 
Routines and encourages a less dichotic approach to automaticity research in 
the future. 
 
 117 
Introduction  
Of recent years the prevailing postulation in the field of automaticity research 
has taken the view that expert performance is best executed in the absence of 
conscious control. This conception is based on evidence taken from studies 
(Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Winter et al., 2014, Wulf, 2007) of simple skills 
or of a contrived nature (Winter et al., 2014). A clear limitation within the 
literature is the lack of research into complex skills and individual factors 
affecting automaticity. With the aim of creating an optimum performance 
paradigm there seems to be ‘a one size fits all’ approach (Peh et al., 2010) 
that would suggest that all performers are better off discarding conscious 
control of their movements or at the very least, adopting an external focus of 
attention during motor skill execution (Wulf, 2007, Wulf, 2013). This was not 
found to be the case in the experimental Chapters 4-6. In our initial 
experiment (Chapter 4), participants were required to hit full golf shots under 
pressure and non-pressure conditions, combined with a temporal restriction 
manipulation to limit reinvestment. Under the forced ‘low reinvestment’ 
conditions the group analysis was insignificant but what was noteworthy, was 
the disparity of individual responses to the condition. 
During the low reinvestment conditions some golfers greatly improved while 
the performance of others was either not affected or in some cases 
diminished. It would be easy to view individual differences as error variance 
as is often the case in sports psychology research (Furley and Memmert, 
2010). In this case though, we pointed towards individual and personality 
differences that may contribute towards a paradigm that recognizes a 
differential in optimal levels of conscious processing between individuals. In 
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this chapter we consider the notion that if personality differences affect our 
cognitive skills and (Roberts et al., 2013) decision making (Bell et al., 2013) 
then it could also be the case that the cognitive input during motor control is 
also dependent on individual trait factors. The set up outlined in the general 
methods (Chapter 3) is repeated with the addition of key personality 
measures. 
 
Personality in Relation to Reinvestment  
An emerging aspect within the literature is the personal differences and trait 
disposition to performing under an automatic processing paradigm. In 
Masters’ ‘reinvestment’ (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Masters et al., 1993b) 
model (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Masters et al., 1993b) he sees the 
propensity to reinvest in online conscious control as being affected by a 
number of situational factors and significantly, by individual personality 
differences. Masters (1993) viewed the likelihood to reinvest linked to an 
inward focus of attention and compiled the ‘reinvestment scale’ (RS) in an aim 
to predict those participants that are most likely to revert to online conscious 
control of movement when under pressure. The 20 item scale was in the 
main, compiled of questions taken from the existing ‘Self Consciousness 
Scale’ (Fenigstein et al., 1975b) and the Emotional Control Questionnaire 
(Roger and Nesshoever, 1987). A single point was also taken from the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent et al., 1982). The study 
demonstrated a positive correlation between a high score on the RS and 
obvious performance decrements under pressure in a golf putting task. 
Masters (1993) also demonstrated a positive link between high reinvestment 
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scores and those participants that were most likely to choke as reported by 
their coach. The RS was given further credence with similar experiments that 
followed (Chell et al., 2003, Jackson et al., 2006, Maxwell et al., 2006).  
The scale has since been revisited (Masters et al., 2005) with the creation of a 
movement specific version. Other variations of the RS include questionnaires 
that predict decision making efficacy of sportsmen under pressure situations 
(Kinrade et al., 2010) and reinvestment in stroke victims (Kleynen et al., 
2013).  
Learning Style 
With reinvestment considered to be affected by personality, we are examining 
personality factors that do not feature in the RS scale but may change the 
nature and efficacy of reinvestment between participants. A key area of 
consideration is the individual’s cognitive patterns while learning, which may 
then influence their cognitive strategies during task performance (Buszard, 
2014, ch. 4). There is a vast amount of literature on ‘learning styles’ (Cassidy, 
2004, Clarke et al., 2010, Coffield et al., 2004a, Honey and Mumford, 1992, 
Howe et al., 2011, Kolb, 2005, Kolb, 1984) that suggests that one utilizes 
habitual cognitive patterns while learning; to an extent that we could class 
them as trait dispositions (Grigorenko and Sternberg, 1995, Zhang and 
Sternberg, 2002).  
Throughout the learning styles literature the terms ‘cognitive style’ and 
‘learning style’ are used interchangeably but more accurately, they have 
distinct meanings. A cognitive style has been defined as ‘a person’s typical or 
habitual mode of problem solving, thinking, perceiving and remembering’ 
(Allport, 1937) (cited in Cassidy, 2004, p.420), while a learning style refers to 
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the ways in which a person utilizes their cognitive style in a learning 
environment (Riding and Cheema, 1991). In this model the learning style is a 
sub-set of cognitive style.  
In this individualistic approach, a learner would consistently adopt their 
strategy based on preferences that stem from physiological, psychological 
and sociological factors (Zhang and Sternberg, 2005, Zhang and Sternberg, 
2006). The idea of a trait strategy to learning has become hugely popular with 
the creation of many different attempts to categorize learning habits and 
patterns. In a review that was not claimed to be exhaustive, Cassidy (2004) 
cited 24 different learning style inventories and classified them according their 
underlying approach. There were 7 dimensions of which, according to Curry’s 
(1987) ‘Onion model, the two most robust are ‘information processing, which 
relates to a person’s intellectual approach of processing information; and 
‘cognitive personality’, seen as a ‘relatively permanent personality dimension’ 
(Riding and Cheema, 1991, p.195). It is partly for this reason that the 
instruments used in this study are viewed as two of the most popular and 
widely reviewed measures of learning styles (Duff and Duffy, 2002): The 
‘Learning Style Questionnaire‘ (LSQ) (Honey and Mumford, 1992) measures 
on the information processing dimension and the ‘Verbaliser/Visualiser 
Questionnaire’ (VVQ) (Richardson, 1977) relates to the cognitive personality 
categorization.  
The LSQ is based on Kolb’s ‘Experiential Learning Model’ (ELM) (Kolb, 2005, 
Kolb, 1984, Kolb et al., 2001) that proposes a 4 step cyclic model to learning 
that follows the process of concrete experience, observation and reflection, 
formation of abstract concepts and generalizations. The process returns to the 
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first stage as the testing of the implications of these concepts in new 
situations leads to further concrete experiences (Sadler-Smith, 1997). 
Optimally, the learner would go through all 4 stages with equal intensity but 
Kolb (1984) suggests that most learners will have a preference for certain 
stages and favour these parts of the strategy. Honey and Mumford (1992) 
follow the same learner preference standpoint in their model. The LSQ (1992) 
is an 80 point questionnaire that scores the learner’s preference on scales of; 
activist, theorist, pragmatist and reflector. The Activists like to be active, make 
decisions intuitively and dislike excessive structure. Theorists rely more on 
theory and logic, not trusting intuition and emotional input. Pragmatists are 
more likely to take risks and have a liking for practical methods and thinking. 
Pragmatists are unlikely to get involved in deep reflection or the theory of a 
topic. Reflectors like processes and would reflect on the deeper meaning, 
trying to understand how things work (Van Zwanenberg et al., 2000). 
Previous studies (Buszard, 2014) have shown how an individual’s cognitive 
makeup can affect how they learn, which in turn determines their propensity to 
reinvest during performance. Consistent with this line of argument, our first 
hypothesis is that the participant’s preference on this scale could affect their 
propensity for reinvestment, with the theorists and reflectors likely to be 
heavier reinvestors than pragmatists and activists. Secondly, we hypothesize 
that the groups will react differently to the restricted conscious control 
condition. We predict that the theorist and reflector groups will be familiar with 
processing declarative information via heavy input from working memory. This 
will be contrasted by the activist and pragmatist groups which will be more 
accustomed to procedural knowledge processes and less hypothesis testing 
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(Buszard, 2014, Furley and Memmert, 2010, Lewandowsky, 2011). In line with 
reinvestment theory (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a), it will be these second 2 
groups that will perform better under pressure due to a lower propensity to 
reinvest. Meanwhile, the theorist/reflector groups will be heavy reinvestors 
and therefore benefit from the intervention. 
 
Another key direction in the learning styles literature is the notion that learning 
is modality specific (Antonietti and Giorgetti, 1998, Campos et al., 2004, 
Fleming, 1995, Kirby et al., 1988, Massa and Mayer, 2006, Silver et al., 2000). 
All learning is directed through our primary senses of auditory, visual and 
kinaesthetic and individuals will develop and then rely on a preference for one 
of the modalities in a learning situation (Fleming and Mills, 2001, Fleming, 
2006). The VVQ (Richardson, 1977) is the prominent instrument in this area 
and has been the centre of a number of studies and review papers (Antonietti 
and Giorgetti, 1998, Kollöffel, 2012, Massa and Mayer, 2006, Wang, 2007). 
The scale is a 15 item self administering questionnaire that is derived from a 
previous longer version (Paivio, 1971). The ‘modal specific’ nature of the VVQ 
affords this study a further perspective in relation to automaticity and cognitive 
processing. Cognitive Load Theory’ (Chandler and Sweller, 1991, Paas et al., 
2003, Van Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005) suggests that afferent information 
is processed differently and places a separate load on working memory 
(Kirschner, 2002, Paas et al., 2004). Furthermore, if the sensory information is 
split between the two components then working memory capacity can be 
enhanced (Kirschner, 2002). 
 123 
Having a trait preference for visual or verbal information when learning motor 
skills could make a qualitative difference to how the movement pattern is 
encoded and retrieved. A significant proportion of the motor learning literature 
sees the learning process as an accumulation of representations that form our 
internal code (motor program) for movement production (Adams, 1971, 
Schmidt, 2003) 
Schema Theory (Deliens et al., 2013, Schmidt, 1975, Schmidt, 2003) in 
particular, has a highly representational component to movement production 
(Newell, 2003, Schmidt, 2003). In this model, schemas are formed through a 
process of taking prior learning information of movement outcome and internal 
representations from the environment. Through the process of ‘composition’ 
(Neves and Anderson, 1981), this information gets chunked into smaller units, 
the process of which not only serves to parameterize a general motor 
program but also deals with storage issues and contributes to the automaticity 
of a motor skill. As Schemas are made up of representations, we consider 
that a modal preference during schema formation could create a qualitative 
sensory difference in the schema (Tremblay and Proteau, 1998). In turn, this 
may lead to different performance requirements including levels of 
reinvestment and use of working memory. The use of the VVQ in this study 
could add valuable data to the effect of the modal influence on reinvestment. 
Since reinvestment is considered to be verbal processing domain (Masters 
and Maxwell, 2008a), we would expect a clear difference in reinvestment 
propensity between the groups with verbal processors scoring higher in the 
state reinvestment measures. We also consider the notion that verbal and 
visual information place different demands on working memory and therefore, 
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we would expect to see a difference in performance between the 2 groups. 
We hypothesize that verbal information weighs more than visual information 
on processing power during task performance and is therefore more 
debilitative during task performance under pressure. If this were to be the 
case then, in line with CPH, we would see the verbal group perform worse in 
the pre intervention anxiety trial and then when reinvestment is limited in the 
post anxiety trial, an improvement in performance should be evident. 
In the LSQ and the VVQ we have solid practical measures of two of the most 
prominent concepts to have come out of the learning styles literature. Neither 
scale is infallible with both receiving heavy criticism over the level of 
suggested dichotomy of the concepts and the bipolar nature of the questions 
(Cockerton et al., 1990). More theoretically, the permanence (trait) of learning 
styles in general, is an ongoing debate with objections (Coffield et al., 2004b, 
Zhang and Sternberg, 2005) that an individual’s approach to learning is more 
transient and can be adjusted according to cognitive state and the task 
requirements (Kaufman, 2000, Kaufman, 2002, Zhang and Sternberg, 2005). 
Despite its lack of validity for certain sub-sets the LSQ is considered a reliable 
measure of the 4 behavioral dimensions (Cockerton et al., 1990) used in this 
study. Meanwhile the VVQ remains the primary instrument used to measure 
the verbaliser-visualiser dimension (Mayer and Massa, 2003).  
                 
Adding the 2 personality dimensions to the previous experimental design 
(Chapter 3) will provide valuable inter personal data that has so far not been 
covered in the existing motor performance literature. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Male (n = 20) and female (n = 3) golfers of handicap less than 6 participated 
in the study. Recruitment was from golfers studying at two universities in the 
United Kingdom.  
Instruments 
Learning Style Questionnaire 
The LSQ (Honey and Mumford, 1992) is based on Kolb’s ‘Experiential 
Learning Model’ (ELM) (Kolb, 2005, Kolb, 1984, Kolb et al., 2001) that 
proposes a 4 step cyclic model to learning. In the LSQ the styles 
classifications are: activist, theorist, pragmatist and reflector. The activists like 
to be active, make decisions intuitively and dislike excessive structure. An 
example question for the activist scale is, ‘I enjoy fun loving spontaneous 
people’. Theorists would rely more on theory and logic, not trusting intuition 
and emotional input. A theorist example question is ‘I am keen to reach 
answers via a logical approach’. Pragmatists are more likely to take risks and 
have a liking for practical methods and thinking. Pragmatists are unlikely to 
get involved in deep reflection or the theory of a topic. Example question; ‘In 
meetings I put forward realistic practical ideas’. Reflectors like processes and 
would reflect on the deeper meaning, trying to understand how things work 
(Van Zwanenberg et al., 2000). An example of a question on the reflector 
scale is, ‘I prefer to stand back from the situation and consider all 
perspectives. Optimally, the learner would go through all 4 stages with equal 
intensity but most learners will have a preference for certain stages and favor 
these parts of the strategy (Kolb, 1984). The LSQ is an 80 point questionnaire 
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that requires the participant to mark whether they agree or disagree with the 
given statement for each item. This provides a score as to the learner’s 
preferences on each of the 4 dimensions.  
 
Verbaliser-Visualiser Questionnaire 
The VVQ (Richardson, 1977) is a 15 item questionnaire that measures the 
verbaliser-visualiser dimension of cognitive style. The questionnaire contains 
items such as: ‘I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words’ and ‘my 
daydreams are so vivid, I feel as though I actually experience them.’ The 15 
items were extracted from a previous questionnaire (Paivio, 1971) that 
provided evidence that people differ in their learning strategies. The VVQ 
requires a true or false answer to each item, which relates to the verbal-visual 
dimension. The results were organised to give a score on a continuum of 
visual to verbal style. This meant that some of the answers had to be reverse 
coded in order that a positive score is always a verbal value.  
Both the LSQ and VVQ questionnaires were carried out online prior to the 
collection of the performance data. 
 
 
Procedures 
During this study the general procedure outlined in Chapter 3 was followed. In 
addition to this the Learning Style Questionnaire and the Verbaliser/Visualiser 
questionnaire were administered online before any performance data was 
collected. 
 
 
 127 
Data Analysis 
The data was analysed as per the general methods section (chapter x) with 
the addition of the VVQ and LSQ questionnaires. The VVQ scoring was 
organized so that the score represents a point on a continuum from visualiser 
to verbaliser. A high score represents a verbal processing trait. The learning 
style questionnaire scores were summed giving a score for each subscale. 
The subscales of personality for the VVQ and learning styles questionnaires 
were split into high and low groups by taking 1 standard deviation spread 
across the mean (Masters et al., 1993a). Any score that was ≤ 0.5 SD below 
the mean was appointed to the low group. Scores that were ≥ 0.5 SD above 
the mean were appointed to the high group. The resulting hi/low factors were 
correlated against the performance and state reinvestment data using 
Spearman’s Rho correlation analysis for non-parametric data. 
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Results 
Questionnaire Reliability  
Calculated Cronbach’s alphas showed that all subscales of the CASI-2R; 
somatic anxiety (α = 0.76), cognitive anxiety (α = 0.76) and self-confidence (α 
= 0.82) were internally reliable. As was the aMSRS (α = 0.88), (Table 7.1). 
 
 
Block  1  2 3 4 Overall 
Cognitive 
Anxiety 
.61 .86 .72 .85 .76 
Somatic 
Anxiety 
.79 .78 .72 .74 .76 
Self 
Confidence 
.78 .84 .85 .84 .82 
Reinvestment .82 .87 .91 .91 .88 
 
Table 7.1. Cronbach’s alpha scores for the CSAI-2R and aMSRS across the 4 trials. 
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The VVQ questionnaire has been shown in the past (Richardson, 1977) to 
have excellent test-re-test reliability, r = 0.91 p = <.001. 
 
The calculated Chronbach’s alpha values for the LSQ subscales showed 
marginal reliability; theorist (α = 0.57), reflector (α = 0..58), pragmatist (α = 
0.52) with the exception of activist (α = 75). 
 
 
  Cronbach’s α 
Theorist .57 
Reflector .58 
Pragmatist .52 
Activist .75 
 
Table 7.2. Cronbach’s α scores for the Verbaliser/Visualiser and LSQ questionnaire       
subscales. The original Pragmatist Cronbach’s α value was .39. Subsequent analysis of the 
inter-item correlations led to item 35 being removed to give a Cronbach’s α of .52. 
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CSAI-2R Subscale Scores 
There was a significant main effect across the 4 trials, of the CSAI-2R 
cognitive anxiety subscale scores of F(3,72) = 6.29, p<.001, (Figure 7.1.) 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Error Bars: 95% CI. Cognitive anxiety scores across all 4 trials. Shows a desired 
and significant increase during both pre and post anxiety trials. 
 
CSAI-2R Subscales 
In line with the performance data, the CSAI-2R scores were analysed in 2 
baseline/anxiety pairs. There was a significant effect of the cognitive anxiety 
subscale on test for both pairs of trails. Pair 1 F(1, 24) = 4.95, p = .036, pair 2 
F(1, 24) = 12.69, p = .002. There was also a significant effect of the somatic 
anxiety subscale on test for both pair 1 F(1, 24) = 5.35, p = .030 and pair 2 
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F(1, 24) = 12.30, p = .002 but no significant effect was reported on the self-
confidence subscale for either pair 1 F(1, 24) = 3.19, p = .087 or pair 2  
F(1, 24) = 0.00, p = 1.000.  
 
CSAI-2R Direction 
Table 4 shows all high intensity scores reported as debilitative and all low 
intensity scores as facilitative. The difference between high and low 
intensity was significant on 3 trials of the cognitive scale. This validates 
the effect of the intensity scores. 
 
 Pre Post   
 
Table 7.3. CSAI-2R direction scale mean scores in the pre and post intervention 
anxiety conditions. *,$ indicates significant difference between pairs. Data are mean ± 
standard deviation. 
 
State Reinvestment 
Figure 7.2 shows the state reinvestment scores by condition. There was 
a significant main effect of trial on state reinvestment F(3,72) =  11.5, p 
<.001. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant effect of intervention 
Condition Base Anx Base Anx 
High Intensity -0.30 ± 0.21* -1.23 ± 0.94* -1.35 ± 0.66* -0.57 ± .098 
Cognitive 
Low Intensity 0.72 ± 1.09S 0.19 ± 1.33S 0.38 ± 1.44S 0.23 ± 1.50 
High Intensity -0.07 ± 1.31 -0.46 ± 0.61 -0.71 N/A -.055 ± 0.55 
Somatic 
Low Intensity 0.64 ± 1.09 0.59 ± 1.21 0.32 ±.1.34 0.56 ± 1.79 
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between pre and post conditions. This was evident on both baseline, (p < 
.001) and anxiety (p = .004) trials. There was no effect of anxiety 
reported between trial 1base  and trial 2anx (p = .84) or trial 3 baseI and trial 
4anxI (p =.17). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Error Bars: 95% CI. Reinvestment scores by condition. Shows significant 
reduction in reinvestment during post intervention trials. 
 
State Reinvestment Correlations 
There were no significant correlations reported between state 
reinvestment and any of the LSQ or VVQ subscales. 
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Performance 
No main effect was found for the repeated factor condition F(2.1,45.3) = 
1.6, p =.210. Performance during the anxiety trials was calculated by 
comparing the change between anxiety trials in pre and post to which no 
main effect was found F(1,22) = .392, p =.538. In testing the effect of the 
intervention on performance under pressure, the change between trial 
1base and trial 2anx was compared with the change for the post trials 3baseI 
and 4anxI. Again, no main effect was found F(1,22) = 1.48, p =.236.  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Error Bars: 95% CI. Accuracy means across the four trials. The pattern shows 
an improvement in post-baseline trials but no significant changes were detected. 
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Learning Style Questionnaire- Internal Correlation 
The results from the LSQ showed a level of internal correlation with the 
theorist and reflector subscales showing a significant relationship to one 
another r = -.84, p < .001. The reflector and activist scales also show a 
significant negative correlation to one another r = -.85, p = .001. 
Learning Style Questionnaire- Performance Correlation 
There was a significant negative relationship between the theorist 
subscale and pre-intervention change in performance between baseline 
and anxiety conditions, r = -.53, p = .034.  There was also a significant 
negative relationship between the reflector subscale and trial 4anxI 
performance, r = -.46, p = .05.  
The activist and pragmatist subscales showed no significant correlation. 
 
Verbaliser-Visualiser 
There was a significant positive relationship between the VVQ scale and 
performance in trial 2anx r = .65, p = .006 and a significant negative 
relationship between the VVQ scale and performance changes between 
the anxiety trials r = -.65, p = .006. 
There was also a significant effect of intervention between the group’s 
performance on pre and post anxiety trials, F(1,14) =  8.4, p <.012 
(Figure 7.4).  
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Figure 7.4. Error Bars: 95% CI. Accuracy means for pre and post anxiety trials. This 
indicates that the intervention is helpful to visualisers and harmful for verbalisers. 
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Discussion  
Based on previous work (Masters et al., 2005, Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, 
Masters et al., 1993a, Maxwell et al., 2006) the aim of this study was to 
examine the relationship between learning styles and the verbaliser/visualiser 
separately, against full golf swing performance and state reinvestment under 
anxiety and baseline conditions. Unique to this study was the individualistic 
approach to automaticity, the motor complexity of the full golf swing and the 
temporal restriction intervention that was designed to limit state reinvestment. 
 
The intervention was shown to be effective by reducing reinvestment in both 
baseline (p < .001) and anxiety (p = .004) pre-post comparisons. However, 
counter to the claims of the CPH, there was no significant change in state 
reinvestment between baseline and anxiety trials (see chapter 9). 
As with the previous studies in this thesis (Chapters 4-6) the group 
performance results were not affected by the intervention. It was the individual 
disparity of performance effect in our initial experiment (Chapter 4) and the null 
performance effect in experiment two (Chapter 5) that directed us to look 
closer at the personality trait correlations for individual effects of limited 
reinvestment.  
 
Learning Styles  
We initially predicted that theorists and reflectors would show results in 
accordance with reinvestment theory on the basis that these two learning 
styles are more habitually pensive (Furnham, 1992, Kappe et al., 2009) and 
would likely be the higher reinvestors. Our hypotheses were that the high 
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theorists and reflectors would show greater propensity to consciously control 
movement and as a result, would display performance decrements in the trial 
2anx and react more favorably to the intervention in trial 4anxI. The initial 
hypothesis was not corroborated as the results failed to show any link 
between any of the learning styles and levels of state reinvestment. The 
performance results only lent partial support to our 2nd hypothesis by the way 
of the negative correlation coefficients between theorists and performance 
indicating that high-level theorists performed worse in trial 2anx versus trial 
1base, r = -.53, p = .034. This would suggest that the theorist group, which is 
one of the more pensive of the learning styles (López et al., 2013), are less 
robust when anxious. According to the CPH and the second part of our 
performance hypothesis, this is caused by over reinvestment in declarative 
knowledge.  Therefore, we also predicted that there would be a positive effect 
of intervention for this and the reflector group, given that the intervention was 
shown to successfully limit state reinvestment. This was not to be the case 
and in fact, the reflector group showed a negative correlation with 
performance in trial 4anxI, r = -.46, p = .05 indicating that the high reflectors 
performed sub-optimally when reinvestment was limited. 
Furthermore, for our results to be in line with our hypotheses, the 
activist/pragmatists would have performed better that they did. These traits 
are considered to take a more practical, ‘give it a try’ approach to learning. We 
presumed from this that they will have engaged in less hypothesis testing 
(Buszard, 2014, Poletiek, 2013) and would have learned more implicitly than 
the theorist/reflectors. In keeping with the reinvestment theory, we had 
predicted that these two groups would be most resilient under pressure due to 
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the lack of explicit knowledge build up (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Masters 
and Poolton, 2012) but this was not represented in any of the anxiety trial 
performance results. 
On the face of it this null result would infer that there is no relationship 
between the subscales of the LSQ and either propensity to reinvest or 
performance in any of our conditions. Given the overall lack of correlation 
with the LSQ in this study, we have to consider the reliability of the 
measure to discriminate between the four subscales (Stellwagen, 2001). 
The internal correlation results from the LSQ showed the theorist and 
reflector subscales as being so strongly correlated to one another, r = -
.84, p < .001, that could indicate that they are measuring the same thing. 
The reflector and activist scales show a significant negative correlation to 
one another to the magnitude, r = -.85, p = .001, that could suggest that 
they are measuring either end of the same bipolar dimension.  
The internal reliability is also noteworthy with relatively low scores that 
are not dissimilar to scores reported in other studies (Kappe et al., 2009). 
We must also acknowledge the power of this study with respect to the 
level of noise in full golf shot data (See chapter 9). 
 
Verbaliser-Visualiser Dimension 
Our initial hypothesis was that reinvestment is a verbal domain and therefore 
there was likely to be a higher propensity for reinvestment in the verbal group. 
However, this was not the case as no significant correlations were identified 
between the VVQ scores and state reinvestment. Previous studies (Buszard, 
2014) have pointed towards a link between verbal short-term memory and 
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reinvestment propensity but it should be noted that the MSRS has two 
dimensions of reinvestment; conscious motor processing (CMP) which refers 
to the conscious control and monitoring of movement and movement self-
consciousness (MS-C) which is a measure of ‘concern about the impression 
given while moving’ (Buszard, 2014, p.52). In a related study of adults 
(Buszard et al., 2013), the MS-C subscale of the MSRS showed a relationship 
with reinvestment propensity but not the CMP. This study was only concerned 
with the conscious control of movement and therefore, only the CMP 
dimension was used.  
Our performance hypothesis was that the verbalisers would differ to 
visualisers in relation to the intervention. We expected verbal processing 
to have a debilitative effect on performance under pressure and 
therefore, show a performance drop off in trail 2anx and an improvement 
in the post-intervention anxiety score facilitated by the limitation on 
reinvestment. Our hypothesis was not only rejected but the opposite 
effect was evident. The verbalisers were better than visualisers in the 
trial 2anx but the visualisers had a significantly better performance in the 
anxiety conditions comparison. A possible explanation for this 
unexpected result is that visual information is in fact, more resource 
demanding under concurrent task performance. This would support the 
findings that show the visual group having a significantly better response 
to the intervention. Alternatively, the authors propose that the pre-post 
improvement of the visual group was due to visual cognition being 
unaffected by the intervention in trial 4anxI where only the verbal 
reinvestment is limited. This would leave them with less ‘noise’ and the 
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task performance governed by their more fluid and familiar visual type 
processing. This would be consistent with ‘meshing’ theories (Khanal et 
al., 2014, Pashler et al., 2008) of modality preference where one is 
encouraged to learn with and use our most dominant sense. 
In parallel to this, it is also proposed that the verbaliser’s pre-post drop in 
performance is because this group is used to reinvestment under pressure 
and find it a necessary part of their task focus. In line with the processing 
efficiency theory (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992, Eysenck et al., 2007b) the 
verbaliser group responded well to the pressure during trial 2anx due to an 
increase in attentional resources. When reinvestment was limited in trial 4anxI 
this heightened focus was interrupted resulting in the drop in performance. 
This interpretation suggests that during a complex task, verbalisers require 
some level of reinvestment. For this interpretation to be fully upheld by the 
results, a trait propensity to consciously control movement would have been 
evident through a positive correlation between state reinvestment and the 
VVQ scale in the pre trials. The researchers acknowledge that this was not 
the case in this study. 
The CSAI-2R intensity scales indicated that the study successfully created 
the desired anxiety manipulation, although, performance did not drop off with 
the rise in anxiety. This result is in line with the ‘direction perception’ 
approach to anxiety (Mellalieu et al., 2006, Mellalieu et al., 2003, Robazza et 
al., 2008) which suggests that the player’s level of self-confidence can cause 
symptoms of anxiety to be perceived as being facilitative and lead to 
enhanced results under anxiety conditions. 
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As stated in the data analysis, the traditional methods of analysing CSAI-2R 
direction data have been found to be ineffective (Lundqvist et al., 2011) 
casting doubt over the direction perception approach. In all intensity/direction 
parings during this study, there was a positive correlation between intensity 
levels and a perceived debilitative effect of anxiety. Therefore, the direction 
scale analysis from this study supports the Lundqvist et al. (2011) position by 
showing increases in anxiety to be perceived as debilitative. This does raise 
questions as to why we do not see the expected performance drop off during 
anxiety trials. 
The same effect was evident in a recent study (Buszard, 2014) of a similar 
design. The authors noted that the anxiety trials always followed the baseline 
conditions and a lack of counterbalance was proposed as a potential limitation. 
We also consider the possibility that the baseline trials were perceived as 
unimportant and a lack of activation/motivation (Mellalieu et al., 2006, Swann 
et al., 2012) was a factor in ‘below par’ performance. Future studies may 
address this issue by replacing the baseline/anxiety set up with low 
anxiety/high anxiety conditions. This design limitation is discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 9 along with the potential non-linear relationship between 
pressure and reinvestment (Cooke et al., 2011). 
Conclusion 
The aim of the present study was to examine individualistic factors that may 
affect the reinvestment paradigm. It would appear from the results that further 
research is required for the application of the CPH to complex motor skills. 
Contrary to the reinvestment literature, our results indicate that conscious 
processing during task performance affects individuals differently. The high 
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verbaliser group got worse when working memory input was constrained 
pointing toward a positive role for conscious processing in the full golf swing. 
Visualisers improved during the post intervention anxiety trial, which has been 
attributed to a processing refinement, not a complete absence of working 
memory input.  
The effect and presence of automaticity is not a linear pattern and thus far, has 
been studied in an overly dichotic manner. Future research should consider 
further, the individual and qualitative factors of conscious processing. In 
particular, studies that evaluate ones capacity to hold and process information 
(Buszard, 2014, Winter et al., 2014) are much needed.
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CHAPTER 8 
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM MEMORY, 
WORKING MEMORY AND REINVESTMENT DURING THE GOLF 
SWING. 
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Abstract 
The dominant theories of motor learning view expert performance as largely 
automatic (Fitts and Posner, 1967, Luft and Buitrago, 2005). Moreover, 
‘reinvestment theory’ (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a) suggests that the 
conscious application of declarative knowledge leads to a breakdown in skill 
through a decoupling effect of the movement pattern. Recent studies (Nyberg, 
2014, Toner and Moran, 2014) have begun to dispute this position and its 
universal application, in search of a more flexible model that accounts for 
individual differences in cognitive traits (Winter et al., 2014) and a wider 
breadth of task constraints. By examining the relationship between cognitive 
resources and reinvestment this study is a substantial move away from the 
traditional ‘one size fits all’ approach to the subject.  
Working memory is central to the ability to retain and process information 
while performing a motor skill (Baddeley, 2010, Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995); 
therefore, we predicted that the capacity of one’s working memory would 
affect the optimum level of reinvestment during skill performance. This study 
tests for relationships between conscious processing during performance of a 
highly complex motor skill and individual resources of short-term memory and 
working memory capacity. Against these cognitive traits, performance is 
examined as accuracy of full swing shots in elite level golfers under baseline 
and anxiety conditions.  
The results showed a significant relationship between short-term memory 
and performance under pressure, rs = .62, p = .018, which was not 
replicated when reinvestment was limited. Working memory capacity 
(WMC) showed a significant relationship with performance under 
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pressure when reinvestment is limited rs = .54, p = .021. This effect was 
down to the low WMC group getting worse when under a limited 
reinvestment trail, F(1,16) = .382, p =.068. Pre-anxiety 6.44 yards off line 
SD = 4.43. Post-anxiety 13.63 yards offline SD = 10.18.  
There were also significant relationships between state reinvestment and 
short-term memory in trials 3anxI, rs = -.48 , p = .082  and 4anxI , rs = -.68 , 
p = .007. 
This study is one of the first of its kind to test the effect of cognitive sub-traits 
relative to reinvestment and automaticity constructs. The results lend support 
for the long-term working memory model (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995) and 
challenge the universal application of reinvestment theory. It is suggested that 
a more flexible model is required, that recognises the need for refined task 
focus and is flexible in respect to task and individual cognitive resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146 
Introduction  
Chapter 2 highlights a clear limitation within the automaticity literature as the 
lack of research into the inter-personal aspect of automaticity. Until recently 
(Buszard, 2014) there has been a ‘one size fits all’ approach (Peh et al., 2010) 
that would suggest that all performers are better off discarding conscious 
control of their movements (Beilock et al., 2004b, Beilock and Carr, 2001) or 
at the very least, adopting an external focus of attention during motor skill 
execution (Wulf, 2007, Wulf, 2013). This was addressed in Chapter 7 where 
learning styles (Antonietti and Giorgetti, 1998, Honey and Mumford, 1992) 
showed a clear differential in the effect of conscious movement control and 
pointed toward a more individualistic account of reinvestment.  
In this chapter we are considering the notion that if personality differences 
(Bell et al., 2013, Roberts et al., 2013) affect our level/type of conscious 
control during task execution then it could also be the case that the cognitive 
input during motor control is also dependent on individual cognitive trait 
factors. The previous experiment (Chapter 7) is repeated with the substituted 
measures of short-term memory and working memory capacity. 
The literature on reinvestment, choking under pressure and attentional focus 
are largely dominated by information processing theories (Hill et al., 2010, 
Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, Wulf, 2007). Masters (1993) brought many of 
these hypotheses together with the formation of his reinvestment theory. In 
this model Masters (2003) distinguishes between two different types of motor 
learning information that are stored in memory and contribute toward motor 
skill performance. Masters’ (1993) approach to learning describes the 
transformation of information from declarative memory to procedural memory 
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(Fitts and Posner, 1967). In the outset, the learner engages in a process of 
hypothesis testing (Neves and Anderson, 1981) which creates a mass of 
explicit rule based information that is held in declarative memory. Over time 
and repetition this declarative information is transformed into procedural 
knowledge which is characterised by a nonentity of rules and an inability to 
verbalize the information due to its abstract nature (Beilock, 2011). At this 
advanced stage of learning, according to reinvestment theory, the action is 
best performed in the absence of declarative knowledge and conscious input. 
In fact, undesired conscious input will cause the movement pattern to break 
down due to the uncoupling of coded information back into its step by step 
form of earlier hypothesis testing. Both declarative and procedural knowledge 
are held in long term memory but in distinct parts of the brain (Beilock, 2011) 
and are accessed differently. Procedural information is applied automatically 
and in the absence of conscious control while declarative information is a 
more conscious process. 
All the information processing models have at their core, the control of 
attention and the capacity to hold and process information. Stemming from 
early work by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) this role is attributed to working 
memory (WM, Baddeley, 1992, Baddeley, 2007, Baddeley and Hitch, 1994) 
which is a prerequisite utility in the application of decelerate knowledge.  
The biological components of WM are not thought to be located in absolute 
proximity to each other but are rooted in the prefrontal cortex (Beilock, 2011, 
Knudsen, 2007, Miller and Cohen, 2001). The system is comprised of four 
constructs: the central executive, which has control over the system as a 
whole; the phonological loop and visio-spatial sketchpad, which deal with 
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verbal and visual information respectively. More (Baddeley, 2000) recently, 
came the addition of the episodic buffer, which is tasked with directing 
attention and focus as well as provided further storage. There is a consistency 
in the literature that WM is of fixed capacity, therefore limiting the information 
that can be held and processed at any one time (Alloway et al., 2008, Conway 
et al., 2003).  
Opposing the limited capacity view, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) introduced a 
revised version of WM that takes into account individual capacity differences 
as a function of skill. In the long term working memory (LT-WM) model the 
skilled performer can gain access to information stored in long-term memory 
(LTM). This can only be accessed via retrieval cues in what they term short-
term working memory (ST-WM). This significant change to the capacity 
models allows for domain specific retrieval of information from LTM and thus 
extends the capacity of WM considerably. The amount of retrievable 
information is not fixed but a more transient concept based on one’s skill in 
efficiently accessing task relevant information in LTM (Sohn and Doane, 
2003). In the capacity model, individual performance differences are limited by 
the amount of ‘domain general information’ that can be held in an active state 
in Short-term memory (STM, Sohn and Doane, 2003). The LT-WM hypothesis 
views individual performance difference as a matter of retrieval skill of domain 
specific information from LTM. This makes WM capacity more dynamic and 
skill based. 
Despite WMC and LT-WM being opposing theories, there is evidence (Sohn 
and Doane, 2003) of their co-existence based on the requirement for trait and 
domain based working memory constructs. The interaction between the two 
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would be skill dependent with the less developed skills requiring more input 
from WM, the reliance of which diminishes with skill development. 
Given the centrality of WM in high level cognitive skills relating to 
concentration and ‘cognitive power’ (Beilock, 2011), the relevance of WMC 
could be considerable in explaining individual performance differences in a 
wide number of sporting demands. Any domain that requires a refined 
allocation of attention (Capizzi et al., 2013) and a level of mindfulness (Birrer 
et al., 2012) could be influenced by WMC. There are a growing number of 
studies of the effect of WMC in academic tasks (Beilock, 2011, Beilock and 
Carr, 2005, Beilock and DeCaro, 2007, Conway et al., 2003, DeCaro et al., 
2009, DeCaro et al., 2011) but as highlighted by Furley and Memmert (2010), 
there are very limited studies (Buszard et al., 2013) of the individual difference 
in WMC within the sports psychology literature. This is despite recognizing 
WMC plays a key role in attention focus, performance under pressure, 
reinvestment theory, imagery, skill acquisition and concentration in general 
(Mayers et al., 2011, Moreau, 2013, Unsworth and Spillers, 2010, Voss et al., 
2010).  
Since the processing of declarative knowledge occurs in WM then WMC 
would appear to be a key differential in understanding the inter-personal 
factors in the reinvestment paradigm. This relationship was recently examined 
in a study of motor performance, reinvestment and WMC (Buszard et al., 
2013, study 1). As with the academic value of high WMC reported above, 
WMC was found to have a positive relationship with motor performance. To 
this point, the authors cited ‘superior hypothesis testing and problem solving 
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abilities’ (Buszard et al., 2013, pg.82) of high WMC individuals as a possible 
factor. 
It was also shown that for children, a positive correlation exists between WMC 
and both movement self-consciousness (MS-C) and conscious motor 
processing (CMP) forms of reinvestment. In a follow up study of adults 
(Buszard et al., 2013, study 2) only MS-C correlated with WMC but notably, 
there was also a performance differential which indicated a negative 
relationship between WMC and performance under pressure. A growing 
hypothesis (Beilock and Carr, 2005, DeCaro et al., 2009) is that those with 
high WMC would be heavily reliant on conscious processing which in turn 
would lead them to be high reinvestors, ultimately leading to performance 
decrements under pressure. This was the explanation favoured by Buszard et 
al. (2013). Other studies (Laborde et al., 2015, Wood et al., 2015) provide a 
positive link between WMC and performance under pressure conditions, citing 
the ‘controlled attention perspective’ of WMC. In this account of WMC it is not 
the qualities of WM to hold information that is most relevant but it’s function of 
maintaining top-down attentional control, suppressing interference (Engle, 
2002, Engle and Kane, 2004) and directing task focus (Wood et al., 2015).   
This is somewhat in line with the more simplistic capacity concept to be trialed 
in this study; that high WMC affords more scope for reinvestment before any 
choking effect is apparent. In this paradigm the amount of reinvestment that is 
optimal may be directly proportionate to the capacity of WM.  
High WMC individuals may perform at their best with a low level of well-
allocated swing thoughts. These could range from temporal cues 
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(MacPherson et al., 2009), a holistic focus (MacPherson et al., 2008), key 
effecters to other ‘high order’ elements of the skill (Toner et al., 2015).  
The quantity of swing thoughts and level of cognitive load would be relative to 
WMC so there would still be a need to keep this regulated so as not to solely 
rely on WM control of movement. This would overload WM and lead back to 
the reinvestment effect. In this capacity related model, low WMC golfers may 
perform at their best when keeping reinvestment to a minimum and thus stay 
within their more inhibited WM threshold. 
There is little known about the direct role of STM in the online conscious 
control of complex skills. In its traditionally understood role (Atkinson and 
Shiffrin, 1968), STM acts only as a temporary storage mechanism that would 
play a very limited role in the online monitoring or control on motor skills. If 
this is the case, then we wouldn’t expect to see any meaningful relationship 
between STM and performance. Any significant relationship between these 
two factors would be more consistent with the LT-WM model where ST-WM 
generates retrieval cues that access context based information in LT-WM.  
It is our initial hypothesis that both STM and WM will have a positive 
correlation with reinvestment propensity. This is based on the notion that 
these individuals will be accustomed to explicit information processing 
(Beilock, 2011) and will have engaged in higher levels of hypothesis testing 
during learning (Buszard et al., 2013). Secondly, we hypothesize that 
consistent with the LT-WM model, STM and WMC will have a positive 
relationship with performance. 
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Methods  
During this study the general procedure outlined in Chapter 3 was followed, 
with the additional measures of verbal short-term memory and verbal working 
memory.  
Participants 
24 elite level golfers (handicap ≤ 5) participated in the study. Recruitment was 
from golfers studying at two universities in the United Kingdom.  
Additional Instruments  
The Automated Working Memory Assessment (AWMA) (Alloway, 2007) is a 
monitored computer assessment that measures the separate components of 
STM and WM. The AWMA was chosen on the basis of its widespread use 
and validity (Alloway et al., 2008, Buszard et al., 2013).  
Using dual tasks of simultaneous storage and processing, the assessment 
includes 2 measures each of the visio-spacial and verbal aspects of WM. An 
example of this is the listening recall task where a sequence of sentences is 
read out via the computer program. After each sentence the participant is 
required to say if the statement is true or false. Meanwhile they must 
remember the last word of all the sentences to be recalled in the correct order 
at the end of the task. As with all the AWMC items, the task starts off with only 
one sentence and progresses through multiple sentences until a 
predetermined failure rate is reached. 
Verbal and visio-spacial short term memory is also measured by using only 
storage tasks such as a simple digit span tasks where the participant simply 
needs to remember as many numbers as possible from a spoken list. The 
participants were first offered a 4 digit task which progressed to 9 digits on 
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successful completion of each level. Based on the movement encoding 
literature (Helstrup, 2000, Moreau, 2013) and the verbal nature of 
reinvestment (Buszard et al., 2013, Masters and Maxwell, 2008a), only the 
verbal subscales were used. 
Data Analysis 
All data was analysed as per the general procedure in Chapter 3. The results 
of the AWMC test were correlated against performance and state 
reinvestment data using Spearman’s Rho correlation analysis for non-
parametric data. The subscales of the AWMC were split into high and low 
groups by taking 1 standard deviation spread across the mean (Masters et al., 
1993b). Any score that was ≤ 0.5 SD below the mean was appointed to the 
low group. Scores that were ≥ 0.5 SD above the mean appointed to the high 
group. 
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Results 
Internal Reliability 
Calculated Cronbach’s alphas showed that all subscales of the CASI-2R; 
somatic anxiety (α = 0.76), cognitive anxiety (α = 0.76) and self-confidence (α 
= 0.82) and the aMSRS (α = 0.88) were internally reliable. 
 
 
Block  1  2 3 4 Overall 
Cognitive 
Anxiety 
.61 .86 .72 .85 .76 
Somatic 
Anxiety 
.79 .78 .72 .74 .76 
Self 
Confidence 
.78 .84 .85 .84 .82 
Reinvestment .82 .87 .91 .91 .88 
 
Table 8.1. Cronbach’s alpha scores for the CSAI-2R and aMSRS across the 4 trials. 
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CSAI-2R Scores 
There was a significant main effect across the 4 trials, of the CSAI-2R 
cognitive anxiety subscale scores of F(3,72) = 6.29, p<.001. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Error Bars: 95% CI. Cognitive anxiety scores across all 4 trials. Shows 
a desired and significant increase during both pre and post anxiety trials. 
 
CSAI-2R Subscales 
In line with the performance data, the CSAI-2R scores were analyzed in 2 
baseline/anxiety pairs. There was a significant effect of the cognitive anxiety 
subscale on test for both pairs of trails. Pair 1 F(1, 24) = 4.95, p = .036), pair 2  
F(1, 24) = 12.69, p=.002). There was also a significant effect of the somatic 
anxiety subscale on test for both pair 1 F(1, 24) = 5.35, p = .03) and pair 2 
F(1, 24) = 12.3, p= <.002) but was no significant effect was reported on the 
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self confidence subscale for either pair 1 F(1, 24) = 3.19, p = 0.87) or pair 2 
F(1, 24) = 0, p = 1). 
 
CSAI-2R Direction 
Table 4 shows all high intensity scores reported as debilitative and all low 
intensity scores as facilitative. The difference between high and low 
intensity was significant on 3 trials of the cognitive scale. This validates 
the effect of the intensity scores. 
  
  
Pre Post 
                        
 
Condition Base Anx Base Anx 
High Intensity -.30 ± .21* -1.23 ± .94* -1.35 ± .66* -.57 ± .98 
Cognitive  
Low Intensity .716 ± 1.09S .19 ± 1.33S .38 ± 1.44S .23 ± 1.5 
High Intensity -.07 ± 1.31 -.46 ± .61 -.71 N/A -.55 ± .55 
Somatic 
Low Intensity .64 ±  1.09 .59 ± 1.21 .32 ±.1.34 .56 ± 1.79 
 
Table 8.2. CSAI-2R direction scale mean scores in the pre and post intervention trials. 
*,$ indicates significant difference between pairs. Data are mean ± standard deviation. 
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Reinvestment  
There was a significant main effect of trial on reinvestment F(3,72) =  
11.5, p <.001. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant effect of 
intervention between pre and post conditions. This was evident on both 
baseline, (p< .001) and anxiety (p = .004) trials. There was no effect of 
anxiety reported between trial 1base and 2anx (p = .84) or 3baseI and 4anxI (p 
=.17)        
 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Error Bars: 95% CI. Reinvestment scores by condition. Shows significant 
reduction in reinvestment during post intervention trial. 
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Overall Performance  
No main effect on performance was found for the repeated factor 
condition F(2.1, 45.3) = 1.6, p =.210. Performance during the anxiety 
trials was calculated by comparing the differences between anxiety trials 
in pre and post. No main effect was found for the repeated factor 
condition F(1,22) = .392, p =.538. In testing the effect of the intervention 
on performance under pressure, the change between (∆) trial 1base and 
trial 2anx was compared with the same ∆ for the post trials 3baseI and 4anxI. 
No main effect was found F(1,22) = 1.48, p =.236 
 
 
Figure 8.3. Error Bars: 95% CI. Accuracy means across the four trials. No significant 
changes are reported. 
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Correlations  
Short-Term Memory - Reinvestment 
There were negative relationships between STM and levels of 
reinvestment in trials 3anxI, r = -.48, p = .082 and 4anxI, r = -.68, p = .007. 
Follow up analysis revealed a significant overall effect of group, F(3, 36) 
= 5.53, p = .003 on reinvestment across the 4 trials.  
 
 
Figure 8.4. Error Bars: 95% CI. Reinvestment means across the four trials for high and low 
short term memory groups. 
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There was also a significant effect of group on reinvestment between pre 
and post anxiety trial state reinvestment, F(1,12) = 10.44, p =.007 and a 
meaningful effect between pre and post baseline trials, F(1, 12) = .953 p 
= .063. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5. Error Bars: 95% CI. Reinvestment means across the pre and post anxiety trials 
for high and low verbal short-term memory groups. The pattern shows a significant effect of 
the intervention between groups.   
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Short-Term Memory – Performance 
There was a significant relationship between STM and performance in 
trial 2anx r = .62, p = .018. Figure 5 below shows this being the result of 
only the high STM group improving under the trial 2anx while the low STM 
group remains stable. It is worth noting that although not significant, we 
see a similar effect in trial 4anxI r = .44, p = .12.  
Follow up analysis reported no significant between groups results F(13, 36) = 
.846, p = .478. 
 
Figure 8.6. Error Bars: 95% CI. Performance across all 4 trials by high and low short-term 
memory groups. The high STM group improved under pressure while the low group did not. 
 
 162 
Working Memory - Reinvestment 
Through the use of the AWMC test working memory was split into recall 
(WMrecall) and processing (WMprocess) subscales. Neither scale showed 
any relationship with the propensity for state reinvestment in any of the 4 
trials.  
Working Memory - Performance 
Both scales showed a significant relationship with post ∆ scores and a 
high correlation coefficient with the anxiety ∆ value. This suggests that 
the higher your WM capacity, the better you perform under pressure 
when reinvestment is limited. It also points toward a positive effect for 
high WM groups and the intervention. 
 
 
 
 WMrecall WMprocess 
Correlation coefficient .53* .49* Post ∆ Score 
Sig. (2 tailed .02 .037 
Correlation coefficient .43 .54* Anxiety ∆ Score 
Sig. (2 tailed .075 .021 
 
Table 8.3. * = Significant (p < .05). Coefficients between working memory and  
performance. 
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Follow up analysis showed a noteworthy effect of WMprocess group on 
performance between pre and post anxiety trials F(1,16) = .382, p =.068. 
 
 
Figure 8.7. Error Bars: 95% CI. Performance by high and low WMprocess groups in pre and 
post anxiety trials. The graph shows the low WMprocess group having a negative reaction to the 
intervention while the high WMprocess group improve in shot accuracy. 
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Working Memory – Reinvestment 
There were no significant relationships between the working memory 
scales and trait reinvestment. 
 
Reinvestment - Performance 
There was a negative relationship between reinvestment and 
performance in trial 2anx , r = 40 , p = .056. This was notably, not the case 
in trial 4anx,  r =  .18 , p = .42.  
There was also a negative relationship between reinvestment levels in 
both pre trails and the performance difference between baseline and 
anxiety trials in the pre conditions, trial 1base, r = -.40, p = .059, trial 2anx, r 
= -.49 , p = .018.  
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between the cognitive 
traits of short-term memory and working memory capacity with conscious 
processing and full golf swing performance. Taking such an individualistic 
approach to automaticity is unique in itself but the introduction of short-term 
and working memory measures, as a possible factor in conscious processing, 
is a novel and long overdue angle. As with Chapters 4-7 the complex nature 
of the golf swing also presents new territory for studies in reinvestment and 
automaticity. 
The main findings indicate that neither STM nor WM showed any relationship 
with the propensity for reinvestment in baseline conditions. However, true to 
our initial hypothesis, there is an effect differential of reinvestment that is 
dependent upon an individual’s short-term memory and working memory 
capacity.  
A positive correlation was reported between short-term memory and 
performance during in trial 2anx, where overall state reinvestment was raised. 
However, this was not repeated in the post-intervention anxiety trial  
(trial 4 anxI) due to the reduction in conscious processing. This leads us to 
suggest that STM plays a role in conscious processing and that, counter to   
reinvestment theory, some conscious processing is helpful in coping with 
anxiety within the limitation of STM capacity.  
Meanwhile working memory seems to be a dividing factor when reinvestment 
is limited as in the post intervention trials. The difference between anxiety 
trials for WMC indicated that performance in low WMC group declined when 
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reinvestment was limited. We interpret from this that conscious control has a 
major contribution from STM. When this is limited via a temporal restriction, 
working memory takes a more prominent role. In essence, the temporal 
restriction devolves control from STM to WM. 
 
Short-Term Memory  
There was a positive relationship reported between STM and performance 
under pressure. It is noteworthy that this is due to an improvement in shot 
accuracy of the high STM group in the anxiety trials. Critically, this effect was 
less so when reinvestment was limited in trial 4. This points towards a 
positive role of STM in movement production under pressure. The role of 
STM in the capacity models of WM (Baddeley, 2007) is as a temporary 
storage mechanism only and therefore should not affect conscious 
processing during the golf swing. We predicted that any reported relationship 
between STM and performance would point more toward the LT-WM theory 
where STM also functions in accessing information from LT-WM.  
This is further corroborated by the negative relationship reported between 
reinvestment and STM in post trials. This indicates that the temporal 
restriction has more impact on high STM individuals than the low STM group, 
implying a difference in processing type between the two groups. 
An alternative hypothesis is that STM plays an active part of reinvestment. In 
which case, these results also could shed a new light on the reinvestment 
theory. According to which, during pressure conditions, conscious processing 
is typically increased to a detrimental effect on performance. This is based on 
the conscious control of movement causing a breakdown in the previously 
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higher level processing of movement stored in proceduralized memory. 
However, the correlation between STM and performance reported in this 
study, could point towards a positive effect of conscious processing with 
capacity being a contributing factor. This is more in line with Attentional 
Threshold Hypothesis (Gucciardi and Dimmock, 2008, Mullen and Hardy, 
2000b) and Attentional Control Theory (ACT, Eysenck et al., 2007a) 
explanations for performance effects under pressure (discussed in chapter 9). 
In these models, conscious processing is a capacity issue that leaves a 
degraded attention on task relevant stimuli. In which case, the high STM 
group will simply have more available capacity to deal with the extra cognitive 
load created in the anxiety condition. 
Working Memory 
In keeping with the findings of Buszard et al. (2013, Study 2), no correlation 
between WMC and propensity for reinvestment (CMP) was reported. The 
positive relationship between WM and performance changes between pre 
and post-intervention anxiety trials could be explained as the effect of the 
high working memory capacity group becoming too reliant on declarative 
knowledge processing and being prone to reinvestment (Beilock, 2011, 
Beilock and Carr, 2005). In this model, the improvement in trial 4anxI would be 
explained by the restriction of such processing to a more workable level. This 
however, cannot be the case in the current study, as the high WM group did 
not actually improve in trial 4anxI. It was the low WM group that got worse in 
this condition that led to the positive correlation. This would imply a more 
positive role for WM that is supportive of the attention perspective account of 
WMC (Engle, 2002, Wood et al., 2015). Since reinvestment across the 
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sample was limited post intervention, we have to surmise that WM is 
potentially less affected by the temporal restriction and therefore still able to 
play a role in consciously controlling the movement. This hypothesis is 
consistent with a study by Laborde et al. (2015) that showed a debilitative 
effect of pressure on WM processes linked to performance. Another 
possibility is that when reinvestment is limited in the post trials, conscious 
control of the movement is reduced but working memory still plays a role in 
movement production. Access to domain specific information in LTM or motor 
regions of the brain could be mediated through WM. This would be somewhat 
consistent with LT-WM theory where a distinction between LT-WM and ST-
WM is made. A third explanation, as put forward by Buszard et al. (2013), is 
that WM is linked to the ability to inhibit conscious control during shot 
execution. Related to this study, the low WMC group are still ineffectively 
trying to consciously control their actions during the temporal restriction. The 
high WMC group are able to inhibit conscious control and allow a more 
implicit mode of movement control.  
Overall Reinvestment - Performance 
The overall effect of reinvestment was consistent with the CPH. We observed 
a negative relationship between reinvestment and performance under 
pressure in the pre trials. This however, wasn’t alleviated by simply reducing 
reinvestment, as evidenced in the post trials. There were no overall 
intervention effects on performance. The implications of these results could 
be viewed that in general, reinvestment is debilitating but simply limiting it is 
not an effective solution.  
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It is notable that, had we viewed reinvestment across the group then we 
would have seen results that support the CPH. However, when more 
individual factors were measured, conscious processing appeared to affect 
people in different ways.   
Task focus needs to be refined in a way that is harmonious with the 
individual’s cognitive make up.  
We recognise two main limitations of this study. Firstly, the WM capacity 
model views WM as a domain general construct that can be measured 
accurately with instruments such as the AWMC. However, LT-WM 
explains WM as domain specific, in which case, the accuracy of the 
AWMC would be affected by reading and numeracy skills. Future 
research needs to take into account the application of domain general 
instruments and aim to measure the more domain specific sub-skills. 
Secondly, there is some doubt in the absolute distinction between 
measures of STM and WMC. Previous studies (Colom et al., 2008, 
Unsworth and Engle, 2007, Unsworth and Spillers, 2010) have 
highlighted the difficulty distinguishing accurately between STM (as 
measured by simple spans) and WMC (as measured by complex spans). 
Unsworth and Spillers (2010) state that the two tests essentially measure 
the same thing. Future work needs to be careful in making clear 
definitions based on these tests and could consider using only the WMC 
sub-scale. In this study we recognize this limitation and offer an 
alternative hypothesis based on the two sub-scales being a broad 
measure of WMC only. In which case, we see WMC having a positive 
effect on performance under anxiety trials and during post trials. This 
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suggests a positive role of WMC during the golf swing. This role is either 
in aiding conscious control, which would be consistent with the literature 
but create a problem for the reinvestment theory.  Alternatively, the role 
of WM could be to access procedural memory out of our awareness. This 
is linked to LT-WM theory with the ability to inhibit conscious control as a 
function of WM (Buszard et al., 2013). Thirdly, the positive effects of 
WMC are consistent with the controlled attention perspective where WM 
is attributed to maintaining task focus and suppressing interference. This 
account is in-line with the ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007b) where effects of 
pressure are related to attentional resources. 
Although the alternatives are not to be ruled out and may not be entirely 
exclusive to each other, we favour our first interpretation. WMC facilitates 
conscious control of movement via well-allocated attentional cues, as per 
our second hypothesis earlier in this chapter. This is represented in our 
results where high WMC correlated with performance in both anxiety 
trials. Under these conditions, attentional resources would have been 
challenged (Eysenck et al., 2007a) placing a premium on high WMC. 
During the temporal restriction, the performance of the low WMC group 
deteriorated through the dual effect of anxiety, consuming attentional 
resources, and the intervention not affording enough time to focus on 
conscious control strategies.  
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Conclusion 
This study looked for correlation factors of performance, state reinvestment 
and the cognitive sub-skills of STM and WMC. The combined STM and WMC 
results point towards the co-existence of WMC and LT-WM. Under pressure, 
when reinvestment is most likely, ST-WM plays a key role in motor control by 
affording access to procedural memory and motor systems. When this 
function of ST-WM is limited then access to LT-WM is also interrupted, thus a 
heightened importance is placed on WMC. 
This study also provides additional evidence of individual differences in 
cognitive processes and strategies underlying working memory and motor 
performance. This is likely to be heavily influenced by brain plasticity (Boyden 
et al., 2004, Dayan and Cohen, 2011, Walker and Stickgold, 2006) and is in 
line with the Embodied Approach of Cognition (Moreau, 2012, 2013) where 
an interrelated dependence exists between conceptual and sensorimotor 
processes. 
While this study has provided new insights into the role of STM and WM in 
skilled performance, we recognize that this is only the second study of its 
type (Buszard et al., 2013) and that future research is required to better 
understand the cognitive processes underlying movement production. Further 
research is also required in relating the reinvestment theory to complex skills. 
We note that a negative relationship between reinvestment and performance 
was reported when a direct correlation was taken between the two factors 
across the whole group. However, when a more individualistic approach was 
taken, the utility of conscious control was not so clear-cut. It would seem that 
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a multifarious account of reinvestment would be more appropriate if it is to be 
applied to complex skill.
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CHAPTER 9 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Aims 
The fundamental aim of this work was to add insight into the effect of 
reinvestment by elite level golfers executing the full swing. To this end, 3 key 
areas were explored: Firstly, the effect of limiting reinvestment on 
performance. Secondly, the performance effect of practice under reduced 
reinvestment conditions and finally, the individual trait factors that may interact 
with the propensity to and the value of conscious control during the golf swing. 
 
The Experimental Progression 
Phase 1: The effect of limiting reinvestment on full golf swing 
performance.  
The experiments carried out in Chapters 4-6 examined the effect that limiting 
reinvestment has on full golf swing performance. Conscious control of 
movement was restricted in both baseline and anxiety conditions via the use 
of a temporal restriction (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5 we further investigated the 
effect that time taken in the execution stage has on reinvestment levels; and 
Chapter 6 looked at the reinvestment and performance effects of a learning 
period of practice under a reduced reinvestment condition. 
In all 3 of these experiments, the effect of a temporal restriction on full golf 
swing performance was unclear as neither shot distance nor accuracy were 
affected in either baseline or anxiety conditions. We suggest that the null 
result was due to high individual variance in reaction to the intervention. 
Before looking deeper at other factors that may have interacted with our 
intervention, it was of key importance to investigate any relationship between 
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time taken in shot execution and levels of reinvestment. Chapter 5 explored 3 
different temporal restrictions in line with this aim and also examined any 
performance effect. The results showed a relationship between the time taken 
in shot execution and the amount of reinvestment reported. This pattern was 
non-linear with the shortest time corridor showing significantly less conscious 
input than the middle or long time conditions. It was extrapolated from these 
results that reinvestment is limited under a certain time threshold but above 
this threshold (5 seconds), additional time taken does not necessarily mean 
more reinvestment. Given that reinvestment was successfully restricted in the 
short time condition, in accordance with the CPH, we would have expected 
some level of performance enhancement in these trials. This proved not to be 
the case with no performance effect being reported on either a straight trial-
wise comparison or the difference between baseline and anxiety conditions. 
Having now shown that the temporal restriction effectively limits reinvestment, 
the performance results of this study cast doubt over the efficacy of the CPH 
in relation to complex motor skills and begged the question; do complex skills 
require some level of executive control? 
Chapter 6 explored the reinvestment and performance effects of practicing 
under a temporal restriction. This design also aimed to equalize any possible 
interference in the previous studies, caused by the harsh nature of being 
forced into a temporal restriction. To this end, the general procedure (Chapter 
3) was repeated twice over with a 6-week learning period between testing. 
Once again, reinvestment was significantly limited during all temporally 
restricted trials. No performance results were shown either within testing 
blocks or across the 6-week intervention. This suggests that practicing under 
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restricted conscious control conditions does not necessarily lead to increased 
automaticity.   
The implication from chapters 1-3 is that a temporal restriction is effective in 
limiting reinvestment but that performance is not affected, somewhat 
contradicting the CPH and making this an ineffective intervention for resilience 
under pressure.  
We further questioned the automaticity of complex skills and suggested that 
for some people, a certain level of conscious control is required. Therefore, 
we utilized a more individualistic approach going forward.  
 
Phase 2: The relationship between individual trait factors and the 
propensity to, and the effect of, conscious control during the golf swing. 
Chapters 7 and 8 examined the relationship between the trait factors of 
general learning style, verbaliser-visualiser learning style, (Chapter 7) and the 
capacity of short-term memory and working memory (Chapter 8) on the 
propensity for reinvestment and the performance effect of conscious control. 
In Chapter 7 the Learning Style Questionnaire showed a negative relationship 
between theorists and performance in the anxiety trial but no other 
correlations were reported. 
The Verbaliser-Visualiser scale showed superior performance under pressure 
for high verbalisers, which was then negated when conscious control was 
restricted. Visualisers reported improved results in the post anxiety condition 
in comparison to the pre anxiety trail, indicating a positive reaction to the 
intervention.  
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This was a key differential in the effect of the temporal restriction. From this, 
we suggested that verbalisers require some level of executive control while 
visualisers benefitted from a reduced amount of verbal processing, allowing 
them a more fluid visual processing type. Notably, in this model the modality 
of processing is a key differential and thus moves us away from a blanket 
approach to whether one should or should not think about technique during 
execution. 
In Chapter 8 additional trait factors that may influence reinvestment and task 
performance were examined with further measures of short-term memory 
(STM) and working memory (WM). There was a significant positive 
relationship reported between STM and performance during the pre-anxiety 
condition but significantly, this was negated in the post trials. The WM results 
showed a positive correlation with shot accuracy in the post versus pre 
anxiety trial comparison. This was interpreted to imply that the intervention 
was more suited to the high WM group who remained stable in the post trials 
while the low WM group deteriorated. From these results, we deduced that 
STM and WM may play a key role in movement production. This may be to 
facilitate conscious processing via information storage and processing or 
possibly as part of an underlying process such as the allocation of attention 
(Engle, 2002)  or retrieval of information from LTM (Ericsson and Kintsch, 
1995). Together, the findings of chapters 7 and 8 point toward individual trait 
factors that influence the role of reinvestment in relation to a complex motor 
skill. We surmise from this that it is of limited use to approach the subject of 
automaticity as a ‘one size fits all’ construct. The evidence from experimental 
chapters 4-8 implies that a more fluid account of attentional focus is required. 
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Theoretical Implications 
Three key theoretical positions were evident through this thesis; (1) the utility 
of conscious control in complex motor skills, (2) related individual trait factors 
and (3) the efficacy of temporal restriction as an optimal performance 
intervention. These three concepts are discussed separately in the following 
section. 
 
The Utility of Conscious Control in Complex Motor Skills 
 
The prevalent body of research into conscious processing during motor skills 
has come from the ‘self-focus’ theories (L. Beilock, 2002, Masters, 1992) 
which were brought together by Masters (1992) under the umbrella term 
‘reinvestment’. Consistent with Master’s (1992) conscious processing 
hypothesis, reinvestment states that the conscious control of a movement 
causes a breakdown in the procedural/unconscious processes that better 
serve movement production. Prior to this dissertation, reinvestment research 
has been criticized for being limited to simple or contrived tasks (Winter et al., 
2014) and has rarely been carried out on a skill as complex as the full golf 
swing. Throughout this thesis we have viewed our results against the 
theoretical position of reinvestment and have found little evidence to suggest 
its universal relevance to a task as complex and varied as the golf swing. All 5 
experiments (Chapters 4-8) involved the testing of elite golfers under baseline 
and pressure conditions and with a temporal restriction that successfully 
reduced reinvestment. Within the whole thesis there was little evidence of a 
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negative reinvestment effect on performance or that reducing reinvestment 
would aid performance. This leads us to propose alternative hypotheses. 
Firstly, we take into account the potential effect differential between 
individuals (discussed later in this chapter) In addition, we consider the notion 
that for skills which are self paced and as complex as the golf swing, a certain 
level of executive control is required for optimal performance. This is disparate 
to reinvestment theory that states that “reinvestment is more disruptive to 
complex tasks with many components that must be coordinated, than simple 
tasks that are easily proceduralised” (Masters and Maxwell, 2008a, p.164).  
Our explanation has backing from a number of recent studies (Ericsson et al., 
2007, Geeves et al., 2013, Jenkins, 2007, Mullen and Hardy, 2010, Sutton et 
al., 2011, Winter et al., 2014) that support some level of ‘facilitative 
reinvestment’. This progression of thought has gained enough support to 
inspire an ‘emerging inter-disciplinary movement known as ‘somaesthetics’ 
(Toner and Moran, 2015, p.111) which is ‘to investigate the role of 
consciousness in body awareness and skill learning’ (Shusterman, 2009, 
2011). 
Within this field, Toner and Moran (2015) see a transient yet positive role for 
conscious control and like Ericsson’s model of experience and deliberate 
practice (Ericsson, 2006a, Williams and Ericsson, 2005), advocate that 
somatic awareness is required in the process of technical refinement. 
Moreover, Toner and Moran (2015) also highlight the potential fragility of 
habits and offer conscious control as an effective means to control a 
movement when the habitual pattern is somewhat dysfunctional. The 
challenge being to appropriately switch between reflective (internal foci) and 
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unreflective (external foci) in such a way as to refine and best perform our 
procedural movement patterns. This stems from work by Shusterman (2009, 
2011) in which the concept of someasthetic reflection is introduced as being 
‘conscious of our own (body) consciousness’ (Shusterman, 2009, p.134) 
More directly relating to golf, the concept of useful reinvestment or 
‘mindedness’ (Sutton et al., 2011) is lent further support by studies of elite 
golfers that found evidence of conscious control (Bernier et al., 2011, Jenkins, 
2007, Toner and Moran, 2011). Toner and Moran (2011) found elite level 
golfers to have between 1 and 2 technique related thoughts during the stroke. 
Furthermore, they also reported no detrimental performance effects when the 
putting stroke was consciously altered during execution. In naturalistic studies 
of elite golfers, Jenkins (2007) interviewed professionals playing on the 
European Tour (1989-1991) and found that all 113 golfers that were 
interviewed, reported using swing keys on the course and in practice. 
Meanwhile, Bernier et al. (2011) showed elite level golfer’s focus to be 
transient in nature and adapted to the task and context.  
The naturalistic studies are not, in themselves definitive evidence of the 
efficacy of conscious control over automatic processing, not least since we 
don’t know the qualitative nature of the ‘swing keys’, but for such large 
numbers of elite golfers to report the use of conscious control, something is 
drawing them to reinvest. Add this to the results of recent experimental 
research (Carson et al., 2013, MacPherson et al., 2008, Toner and Moran, 
2011) and the efficacy of the reinvestment theory becomes less convincing. 
In summary of our position on constructive reinvestment, we fully recognize 
the debilitating effects of ‘over reinvestment’ but are less dichotic in our 
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stance, especially when it refers to skills with the complexity of the full golf 
swing. Our position is more in line with that of Toner and Moran (2011, 2014, 
2015) in recognizing the central challenge of knowing when and what to focus 
our conscious attention on. In view of the body of evidence above we align 
our thinking with Ericsson (2007) who claims complete automaticity is only 
likely for simple and ‘everyday’ actions where the refinement of which serves 
no greater purpose. For competitive and complex skills such as the golf 
swing, where continued improvement is of a premium, the current conception 
of automaticity may be misleading. In a recent paper (Toner et al., 2015) a 
model of skill development is presented that doesn’t ever realize complete 
automaticity but a switch of attention occurs from lower order (mechanics of 
movement) to higher order (strategic) elements. When this model is viewed 
alongside the notion that expert performers benefit from focusing on key 
‘effectors’ of the movement (Carson and Collins, 2015) a more hierarchical 
(Schack and Mechsner, 2006) account of automaticity seems appropriate. 
This would certainly best serve practitioners in selecting the most appropriate 
interventions where, currently, the prevailing advice from the literature  (don’t 
think about your movement) is too simplistic to serve performance as a whole. 
 
Individual Trait Factors  
In accordance with this position, we also advocate that the utility of 
reinvestment is a much more individualistic concept than has previously been 
proposed. A key feature of reinvestment theory is that the propensity to 
consciously control movement is personality related, as predicated with the 
use of the reinvestment scale (Masters et al., 1993a). The results from 
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Chapter 7 showed no correlation between the subscales of the LSQ and VVQ 
questionnaires with the propensity to reinvest.  
A recent study Buszard (2014) did add to the personality dependent position 
by indicating a positive relationship between WM in children and the 
propensity for conscious control during task execution. This result was not 
repeated in our study of elite golfers, as there was no relationship between 
WM and levels of reinvestment. STM however, did correlate with reinvestment 
propensity. There was no relationship between STM and reinvestment in the 
pre trials but we did observe a negative relationship in the temporally 
restricted trials. This led us to surmise that the propensity to reinvest 
procedural knowledge is not necessarily influenced by verbal short-term 
memory capacity but the qualitative make up of reinvestment is affected by 
this trait; as indicated by the difference in the effect of the temporal restriction 
on the high and low STM groups.  
While reinvestment theory describes a trait based propensity for conscious 
control, the effect of reinvestment described within the CPH is invariable. The 
results from this thesis would indicate that the utility of conscious control may 
also be trait dependent. The traits of verbal/visual processing preference 
(Chapter 7), STM and WMC (Chapter 8) all reported significant performance 
differentials that may indicate a trait based effect of conscious control. In 
Chapter 7 high verbaliser’s performance deteriorated when reinvestment was 
limited, while visualisers performed better in the post trials. As this is the first 
study of its kind with a number of unique aspects, I am cautious about 
extrapolating too much from these results. It is however, tentatively 
hypothesized that given that reinvestment is verbal in nature (Buszard, 2014), 
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the verbalisers require some level of conscious control but the visualisers, that 
performed better when reinvestment was limited, did so due to a lack of verbal 
interference to their more fluid visual processes. 
In the cognitive science field there is yet a framework that would comfortably 
describe the findings of this thesis but a more philosophical approach does 
have an accord. In the theory of Applying Intelligence to Reflexes (AIR, Sutton 
et al., 2011) there is room for individual differences in motor control. AIR 
recognizes that some people will adopt a more ‘top down’ (cognitive 
processing) method, whilst others may utilize a ‘bottom up’ (embodied 
control). There is also a less dichotic view on conscious control that better 
allows for task perturbations. To this end, experts ‘counteract automaticity’ 
(Ericsson, 2003, 2007) (cited in Toner and Moran, 2011) that would otherwise 
limit the capability to make situational adjustments.  
Whilst more research is required of an individualistic nature, we can draw 
from this study that it is not only the propensity to reinvest that is personality 
related but the utility of reinvestment is also affected by trait characteristics.  
 
3. The Efficacy of Temporal Restriction as an Optimal Performance 
Intervention 
 
Throughout all 5 experimental chapters (Chapters 4-8), there was no 
collective improvement in performance when reinvestment was limited. Most 
notably, chapter 3 featured a 6-week practice interval for the accustomisation 
to low reinvestment and the nuances of a temporal restriction. Even so, no 
performance effects were observed. This leads us to believe that some 
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individuals require a level conscious control to perform optimally. Alternatively, 
if reinvestment is indeed universally debilitating then simply restricting working 
memory input in this manner is not the answer. Although temporal restrictions 
have shown to be effective in putting (Beilock et al., 2004a, Bell et al., 2013), 
the complexities of the full swing require a more subtle intervention to focus 
the mind. We suggest that future work in this area incorporates the ‘expert-
performance approach’ (Ericsson et al., 2007) that recognizes the explicit 
nature of golf’s pedagogy (Kelly, 1969) and an expert’s on-going quest for 
refinement (Carson et al., 2013). Intervention based approaches to 
automaticity and debilitating effects of conscious control should look toward 
attentional focus strategies (McKay and Wulf, 2012, Wulf, 2007) and 
mindfulness based approaches to the subject (Gardner and Moore, 2004, 
2012). 
That said, we did see a favorable reaction to the intervention from high 
visualisers, indicating the temporal restriction was successful at reducing 
interference from verbal cognitive input. It seems that the efficacy of the 
intervention will be affected by a number of key factors, notably, the stage of 
learning/refinement that the player is presently at and their personal cognitive 
control architecture. Once again, a multitude of factors must mean that one 
size dos not fit all. 
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Methodological implications 
 
It is common in reinvestment research to utilize either a dual task scenario or 
use false explicit focus conditions (Lam et al., 2010a, Maddox et al., 1999b, 
Masters, 1992, McKay and Wulf, 2012, Mullen and Hardy, 2010, Mullen et al., 
2007). The dual task procedure (see Chapter 2) forcibly overloads working 
memory and has been criticized for its lack of ‘real world’ application (Winter 
et al., 2014). The false explicit condition involves a prescribed mechanical 
thought being imposed for the purpose of attaining an overly dichotic (Peh et 
al., 2010) comparison to the implicit conditions that these designs test against. 
Both of these prevalent methods are misrepresentative of the performer’s 
organic cognitive strategy. The current study has overcome this gap in the 
research-performance spectrum by allowing the performers to control 
movement in their normal manner before a measure of state reinvestment 
was taken after each trial (Chapters 5-8). While this method is less invasive 
and has afforded us a more ecological measure of conscious control, it 
doesn’t provide any qualitative data. Future research is needed to understand 
the qualitative nature of conscious control.  
It is also noted that the state reinvestment instrument used was adapted from 
the movement specific reinvestment scale and only represents what Masters 
termed ‘conscious motor processing’ (CMP). This form of reinvestment is 
characterized by the conscious monitoring of mechanical movements. The full 
MSRS also includes a separate measure of ‘movement self-consciousness’ 
(M-SC), which relates to self-referential thinking around one’s movement. Had 
we used both measures of the MSRS, we may have seen some results that 
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were more in-line with reinvestment theory. Furthermore, administering the 
MSRS before trials may have given us further insights into trait reinvestment 
and the possibly of supporting the MSRS as a predictor of choking under 
pressure.   
In Chapter 7, the VVQ was used as a measure of visual or verbal trait 
disposition. Like any ‘trait’ measure, the scale is criticized for its permanence 
(Antonietti and Giorgetti, 1998). It has also been highlighted that the VVQ is a 
very broad measure that lacks internal validly and that the results of the scale 
do not differentiate between different types of visual processing (Blazhenkova 
and Kozhevnikov, 2009, Kollöffel, 2012, Kozhevnikov et al., 2002, 
Kozhevnikov et al., 2005) or the further diversification of cognitive ability, style 
and preference (Mayer and Massa, 2003).  
 
Since it is a bipolar scale, we were unable to show internal reliability in 
Chapter 7. The VVQ has previously been reported as having very high test re-
test reliability, r = 0.91 (Richardson, 1977), and has been shown to be an 
accurate measure of verbal processing (Green and Schroeder, 1990). Given 
that CMP reinvestment is regarded as a verbal process (Buszard, 2014) and 
that the VVQ is considered to be the primary instrument used (Kozhevnikov et 
al., 2002, Kozhevnikov et al., 2005, Mayer and Massa, 2003) for testing the 
verbaliser/visualiser dimension, we are confident that the VVQ fits the 
requirements of this study. It is however, recommended that future research in 
this area use the revised version of the VVQ (Kirby et al., 1988) which no 
longer uses a uni-dimension of verbalizer-visualizer but recognizes three 
separate dimensions of verbal, visual and dream cognition. For research in 
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this domain, it is recommended that as with other studies (Mendelson and 
Thorson, 2004), the dream scale is omitted leaving the separate measures of 
verbal and visual learning styles.  
 
In Chapter 8 the Automated Working Memory Assessment (AWMA, Alloway, 
2007) was used to measure verbal short-term memory and working memory. 
We are confident in our choice of instrument, as used in similar studies 
(Buszard et al., 2013) but recognize the difficulty in distinguishing between 
short-term memory and working memory. The AWMA uses simple span tasks 
to measure STM and complex span tasks for WM. The tasks are 
distinguishable by the additional processing requirements present in the 
complex span test. Unsworth and Spillers (2010) contest that the simple span 
task is not effective at measuring STM exclusively. If this is indeed the case 
then the STM scale used in Chapter 8 actually provides a further measure of 
WM. This is recognized in the chapter and an alternative hypothesis is given. 
A pertinent feature of this thesis is the mixed levels of somatic anxiety 
reported throughout. In interpretation of this facet we conclude that to 
consistently induce significant levels of somatic anxiety would require a 
greater degree of mediators than the combination of social evaluation, 
competition and rewards (Baumeister and Showers, 1986, cited in Cooke et 
al, 2014) used in this study. That said, on the basis that this is a study of 
cognitive effects (conscious processing) we are satisfied that the anxiety 
manipulation was sufficient. This is evidenced by the presence of significant 
levels of cognitive anxiety throughout the experimental chapters.  
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This did not however, lead to performance decrements. In fact, we observed 
improved shot accuracy during some of the anxiety trials (Chapters 7 and 8). 
This could be attributed to a number of factors, not least that elite level golfers 
are frequently exposed to pressure, which may lead to a level of resilience. 
We must also consider that the antecedents of pressure are likely to be very 
individualistic with the effects of audience, significant other, consequence and 
monetary rewards creating an effect differential within a group (Markman et 
al., 2006, Tanaka and Sekiya, 2010, Tanaka and Sekiya, 2011).  
Performance gains under pressure were also reported in a similar design by 
Buszard (2014) who questioned the efficacy of a monetary incentive. We 
know from the CSAI-2R directional scale that all anxiety was perceived to be 
debilitative and previous studies have shown monetary incentive to be 
effective (Gucciardi and Dimmock, 2008, Mullen et al., 2005) so we therefore, 
remain confident in this aspect of the design. Buszard (2014) also cited a ‘lack 
of counterbalancing’ in the way the anxiety condition always followed the 
baseline trials, to be a possible design flaw. We view this to be a likely cause 
of the null performance results due to a disparity in activation and motivation 
(Mellalieu et al., 2006, Swann et al., 2012). If this were to be the case then 
participants would have been less than optimally aroused (Jackson et al., 
2001) in the baseline trials and only concentrated fully during anxiety 
conditions. We propose that future designs involve low and high anxiety 
conditions and avoid the obvious ‘no consequence’ baseline condition.  
In the light of a recent study of the performance effects of pressure (Cooke et 
al., 2011),  the null effect witnessed throughout this study should not be 
entirely unexpected. In a study of elite golfers the authors found a quadratic 
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effect of pressure on performance whereby putting accuracy improved on the 
baseline measure during a moderate pressure condition and only declined in 
the high pressure trials. Cooke et al. (2011) cited the processing efficiency 
theory (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992) to describe the non-linear effects of 
pressure on performance but notably, called for studies that measure 
attentional resources to be able to corroborate this position. The PET 
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992) views the effects of pressure as potentially 
facilitative through the process of recruiting further attentional resources. The 
Cooke et al. (2011) study was the first to demonstrate this effect by showing 
increased effort and anxiety to be in-line with positive performance effects. 
Only when attentional resources reach threshold in the high anxiety trials did 
the pressure prove to be debilitative on performance. In addition to anxiety, 
effort and performance, the Cooke et al. (2011) study also measured 
conscious motor processing with an adapted subscale taken from the MSRS. 
This too formed a quadratic relationship with pressure. Contrary to 
reinvestment theory, conscious processing decreased under moderate 
pressure and only retuned to baseline levels during high pressure trials. 
The findings from the Cooke et al. (2011) study show a level of consistency 
with the anxiety, state reinvestment and performance results witnessed 
throughout the experimental chapters (Chapters 4-8).  
Although this thesis is not specifically aimed at comparing the ‘choking’ 
accounts of the PET and reinvestment theory, the results do clearly favour the 
PET and related Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007b). 
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Finally, it is important that we acknowledge the difficulty in showing 
meaningful performance results from full golf swing data. The inherent 
variance of full 5 iron shots, even with elite level golfers, makes for an 
imperfect and noisy environment to collect data. Future research utilizing a full 
swing should consider using a pitching wedge in the aim of reducing shot 
variance from the well-struck shots. Separately, substantial miss-hits are 
uncommon with highly skilled golfers but they do happen and the effect of 
such outliers would negate any overall patterns that may otherwise emerge. 
For this reason, in this study mis-hit shots were controlled by discounting any 
ball that did not carry 120 yards for men and 90 yards for women. The authors 
concede that this is not an ideal experimental design and that mis-hits are a 
part of the game. Moreover, the qualifying distance controlled for is fairly 
arbitrary and leads to an undesirably dichotic condition.  
 
Practical Applications 
 
Coaching practice takes a lead from empirical research (Carson and Collins, 
2011) and as such, the standard advice from psychologists working in the 
game is that golfers should ‘not think about their swing’ during game play 
(Gallwey, 1979, Rotella, 1995). From the evidence in this thesis and 
concurrent with AIR (Sutton et al., 2011) and MESH (Christensen et al., 2015) 
theories , it seems likely that people control movement production in different 
ways and that forcibly restricting reinvestment is too blunt an approach when 
viewed against more organic interventions (Aherne et al., 2011, Gardner and 
Moore, 2004, 2012).  
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Firstly, we recognize the special demands of individual skills. For example, 
putting studies for skilled golfers have repeatedly shown optimal performance 
to occur in the absence of conscious control (Beilock et al., 2004a). While we 
would hesitate to label putting as ‘simple’, the mechanical demands are 
outweighed by perceptual/cognitive skills. As such, lower order elements of 
stroke control need to take a lesser priority of focus than the higher order 
elements of environment and strategy (Toner et al., 2015). In this instance, we 
are in accordance with the extant literature. However, more complex skills 
such as the full swing may require a level of cognitive control that guides 
other, more automatic elements of the movement (Sutton, 2015). It should be 
noted at this stage that not all types of conscious processing have been 
shown to lead to the de-automization of skill. Somatic awareness has been 
viewed as facilitative to performance (Nyberg, 2014) and coaches should be 
encouraged to develop the phenomenon through constraints led approaches 
and parameterization (Davids et al., 2008). With regard to other forms of 
facilitative conscious processing, Carson and Collins (2015) question the 
literature for not portraying a movement that is being effectively and explicitly 
controlled in practice. The rationale being that if an ‘internal’ focus of attention 
is familiar then it will not necessarily lead to the breakdown of a 
proceduralized skill back into smaller units (Maurer and Munzert, 2013). The 
message for practitioners in this instance would seem to be that it if a 
movement is effectively being controlled via conscious processing then there 
may not be any benefit in forcing a change to more a more automatic process. 
This is corroborated by the results of our intervention throughout this thesis. 
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That said, in a sport that has a high reliance on explicit coaching methods 
(Carson et al., 2013) there remains a premium on avoiding cognitive overload 
during performance and enhancing the automization of skill through practice.  
The most direct approach to this objective, is to completely restrict the explicit 
rules built up during acquisition (Rendell et al., 2011). Although implicit 
learning has been shown to have benefits in empirical testing (Mullen et al., 
2007), the application of such an approach in a coaching setting is almost 
impossible over the long-term development of a golfer (Carson and Collins, 
2014, 2015, Winter et al., 2014). That leaves the question of best practice for 
coaches with regard to skill refinement and automaticity (Rendell et al., 2011).  
Analogy learning has been recommended (Lam et al., 2009) as an effective  
approach in which the intervention conveys a rich volume of task related 
information while avoiding cognitive overload. I recognize that analogy 
learning may not contain enough depth of information to facilitate all facets of 
long term refinement (Koedijker et al., 2007, Lam et al., 2009), and thus would 
never rule out a more explicit approach if required. That said, efforts need to 
be made to reduce cognitive load and organize movement so that there are 
less individual procedural parts (Masters et al., 1993b) to the encoding of the 
pattern. 
The mechanisms underlying analogy learning are firstly, the relatedness of 
the new intended movement to an already learned and familiar pattern (Liao 
and Masters, 2001), and secondly, the holistic nature of the instruction that 
avoids focus on ‘skill parts’. This second mechanism does not necessarily 
need to form an analogy but it should be the intention of the coach to, where 
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possible, keep instruction away from ‘skill parts’ and have the performer focus 
on holistic cues (MacPherson et al., 2008).  
In the event of technique change requiring explicit instruction (Carson et al., 
2013) then the practitioner needs to first of all understand the relatedness of 
this change to the system as a whole (Kelso, 1997), and make such long-term 
interventions during ‘off season’ periods. Through a competitive season, skill 
refinement should be crafted via holistic and temporal cues (MacPherson et 
al., 2009), key movement effectors (Carson and Collins, 2015) and higher 
order elements of movement control (Toner et al., 2015). The latter two of 
which, are likely to induce an external focus of attention (Wulf, 2013). 
Where there has been a build up of explicit information and performance 
decrements are observed, the temporal restriction could prove to be a useful 
intervention as a coaching tool to moderate conscious control. Used on a 
regular basis, the temporal restriction would deepen the players’ awareness of 
their own parameters for executive control and improve their somatic 
awareness (Toner and Moran, 2015). In this manner, the effects of explicit 
learning could be moderated. The intervention could also be effective in aiding 
extreme reinvestors that show obvious negative performance effects from 
over thinking. In this scenario, the intervention would be the first step before 
more subtle adjustments/discoveries are made to bring the level of conscious 
control to an optimal level (Toner and Moran, 2011). 
 
 194 
Future Directions 
It is clear that the dichotic approach to automaticity that has dominated the 
literature thus far is not robust enough to describe the results found in this 
thesis. We propose several key aspects to be considered in future study. 
Further research into automaticity should distinguish between simple and 
complex tasks on the basis that the results from previous putting studies 
(Beilock and Gray, 2012, Mullen and Hardy, 2010, Toner and Moran, 2011), 
that support the reinvestment theory, were not replicated in these studies. We 
also contend that future research into automaticity needs to be less dichotic. 
To this end, more qualitative and individualistic designs are required. Previous 
studies (Bell and Hardy, 2009a, MacPherson et al., 2008, Wulf, 2007) provide 
strong evidence that reinvestment effects differ across an array of attentional 
foci. Factors of cognitive load (de Jong, 2010, Paas et al., 2004, Van 
Merrienboer and Ayres, 2005) and processing type (Bernier et al., 2011) may 
lead to new understandings.  
The use of ‘think aloud’ (Schack, 2012, Toner and Moran, 2011) protocols 
would give a more phenomenological account of task focus and a potentially, 
deeper understanding of the effects of attention loci. In addition to this, the 
use of this methodology would also provide a more detailed quantitative 
measure of swing thoughts and the relationship between them. i.e the level of 
congruency and hierarchy of representations (Schack, 2004, Schack and 
Mechsner, 2006). 
Just as recent studies have shown WM to be a factor in the way motor skills 
are learned (Buszard, 2014), the results of this thesis have indicated that 
people also control motor sequences differently. More studies that measure 
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cognitive traits of personality, STM and WM are called for. It is likely that an 
interaction between qualitative trait factors will be observed and lead to a 
deeper understanding of conscious processing. 
It has been highlighted that a key facet of expert performance is the process 
of constant refinement (Sutton et al., 2011). Furthermore, true automaticity 
leads to a state of ‘arrested development’ (Ericsson, 2007, Ericsson et al., 
1993b, Ericsson et al., 2007). To this end, we recommend that future research 
into conscious control, differentiate the stage of the performer in relation to the 
learning cycle (Carson and Collins, 2015, Ericsson, 2006b, Fitts and Posner, 
1967).  
  
General Discussion/Concluding Remarks 
 
The fundamental aims of this thesis were to examine the effect of conscious 
processing during full golf swing performance and in particular, the 
performance effects of reducing working memory input. 
 
Over the course of the 5 experiments (Chapters 4-8) we have demonstrated 
mixed effects in relation to reinvestment theory. From this we deduce that the 
reinvestment effect for highly skilled golfers is based on a number of factors 
that make up an individual’s cognitive composition while executing the full 
swing. The performance area of automaticity needs further research based on 
a broader outlook. To this end, we point toward the conceptual positions of 
the ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007b), Mesh approach (Christensen et al., 2015)  
and LT-WM (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995). 
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It would seem that a multifarious account of reinvestment would be more 
appropriate if it is to be applied to complex skills. Such a model would need to 
take into consideration the transient developmental phase of the skill (Carson 
and Collins, 2015, Fitts and Posner, 1967). A golfer undergoing swing 
enhancements will need to consciously control the pattern until such a time 
the new movement has been proceduralised. For such a diverse model to be 
accurate, a multitude of individual cognitive factors also needs to be taken 
into account. These would include neuro-plasticity, WMC, LT-WM, and 
various learning styles. Since this would seemingly create a convoluted and 
problematical approach to the problem, a more fluid account of task focus 
needs to be applied to complex motor skill performance.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: INFORMATION STATEMENT FOR GENERAL METHOD 
(CHAPTERS 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
This is a PGR student project, being carried out as part of Noel Rousseau’s 
PhD studies at the University of Birmingham. The study will enable us to gain 
further information into optimum concentration levels and have a better 
understanding of performance under pressure. We are confident that you will 
find the session helpful for your coaching and playing alike. We request that 
you read this document providing you with information that will help you to 
decide upon your participation. 
 
Task 
Thank you for considering to take part in this study. This is a 2 part study 
comprising of an online questionnaire and a performance data session. 
 
 
Should you agree to participate you will be required to attend a data collection 
session for approximately two hours. During this time you will be required to 
hit a set number of 5 iron shots into the screen in a swing room and fill out 
questionnaires.  
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Competition  
A further requirement for participation is that you contribute £6 as a stake in a 
competitive set up. This is payable on the day in cash as are any winnings. 
Dependant on your performance on a target based game, you will be able to 
win back this money and win additional funds. 
 
De-Brief 
The design of the study is non-invasive and is conducted in a safe 
environment. When you have completed the performance data phase you will 
be de-briefed and given time with the researchers to discuss the purpose of 
the intervention and the implications within your own game and coaching. If 
you choose to take part, please sign the consent form and bring your 5 iron to 
each data collection session. 
 
 
Should you have any further queries then please contact: 
 
Noel Rousseau 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM FOR GENERAL METHOD  
(CHAPTERS 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8) 
 
Birmingham University  
Consent Form 
 
INVESTIGATION: CONCENTRATION IN ELITE GOLFERS. 
 
Investigators:  Noel Rousseau  
Dr Matt Bridge 
Dr Ian Boardley 
  
Participant Name (please print): 
 
I have read the attached information sheet and have had the opportunity to 
discuss the investigation with Noel Rousseau who has answered any 
questions I had and explained the procedures to my satisfaction. I understand 
that the results of my shots will be coded as to be made anonymous and may 
be used in the on going study.  
 
I am willing to participate in the investigation but understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up to the completion of my shots without having to give 
an explanation. Any withdrawal up to this point will not effect either my 
previously amassed winnings or entitle me to a refund of my allotted stake.  
After the completion of my trials withdrawal is no longer permitted.  
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I fully understand the procedures and accept that the chances of winning my 
£6.00 stake back are around 50% and are based on my ability to hit a target 
repeatedly with a 5 iron. The target is equivalent in size to a small green in 
width and very generous on depth. I forego any responsibility of the 
researchers in relation to my form after this experiment. 
 
 
Signed               ……………………………………… 
 
Witnessed  ……………………………………… 
 
Date   ……………………………………… 
 
Email Address   ……………………………………….   
 
Telephone         ………………………………………. 
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APPENDIX B: INFORMATION STATEMENT (CHAPTER 6) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
This is a PGR student project, being carried out as part of Noel Rousseau’s 
PhD studies at the University of Birmingham. The study will enable us to gain 
further information into optimum concentration levels and have a better 
understanding of performance under pressure. We are confident that you will 
find the session helpful for your coaching and playing alike. We request that 
you read this document providing you with information that will help you to 
decide upon your participation. 
 
Task 
Thank you for considering to take part in this study. This is a 3 part study 
spread over a 6 week period. Should you agree to participate you will be 
required to attend a data collection session for approximately two hours on 
day one of the study and again 6 weeks later. During this time you will be 
required to hit a set number of 5 iron shots at a target on the driving range 
and fill out questionnaires. In the 6 weeks between the test phases you will be 
required to practice a particular pre shot routine twice a week over a 6 week 
period for 10 minutes each time in duration. During this phase you will also be 
required to complete a brief online questionnaire that will be sent to you after 
the 1st day’s testing. 
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Experimental Groups 
You will be randomly assigned to the ‘control’ or ‘test’ group. The control 
group will be required to perform all shots in the test phases and practice in 
between using their normal pre-shot routine. The test group will hit their shots 
within a set time restraint. All participants will be scored based on your 
performance. At no point will you be given coaching advice or be required to 
make any changes to your swing.  
 
Competition  
A further requirement for participation is that you contribute £6 as a stake in a 
competitive set up. This is payable on the day in cash as are any winnings. 
Dependant on your performance on a target based game, you will be able to 
win back this money and win additional funds. 
 
De-Brief 
The design of the study is non-invasive and is conducted in a safe 
environment. When you have completed the second of the test phases you 
will be de-briefed and given time with the researchers to discuss the purpose 
of the intervention and the implications within your own game and coaching. If 
you choose to take part, please sign the consent form and bring your 5 iron to 
each data collection session. 
Should you have any further queries then please contact: 
 
Noel Rousseau 
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APPENDIX	  C:	  CONSENT	  FORM	  (CHAPTER	  6)	  
 
Birmingham University 
Consent Form 
 
INVESTIGATION: CONCENTRATION IN ELITE GOLFERS. 
 
Investigators:  Noel Rousseau  
Dr Matt Bridge 
Dr Ian Boardley 
  
Participant Name (please print): 
 
I have read the attached information sheet and have had the opportunity to 
discuss the investigation with Noel Rousseau who has answered any 
questions I had and explained the procedures to my satisfaction. I understand 
that the results of my shots will be coded as to be made anonymous and may 
be used in the on going study.  
 
I am willing to participate in the investigation but understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up to the completion of my shots without having to give 
an explanation. Any withdrawal up to this point will not effect either my 
previously amassed winnings or entitle me to a refund of my allotted stake.  
After the completion of my trials withdrawal is no longer permitted.  
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I understand the requirements of the study and am willing to carry out the 
required practice sessions in the 6 weeks between testing.  
 
I fully understand the procedures and accept that the chances of winning my 
£6.00 stake back are around 50% and are based on my ability to hit a target 
repeatedly with a 5 iron. The target is equivalent in size to a small green in 
width and very generous on depth. I forego any responsibility of the 
researchers in relation to my form after this experiment. 
 
 
Signed               ……………………………………… 
 
Witnessed  ……………………………………… 
 
Date   ……………………………………… 
 
Email Address   ……………………………………….   
 
Telephone         ………………………………………. 
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APPENDIX	  E:	  adjusted	  MOVEMENT	  SPECIFIC	  REINVESTMENT	  FORM	  
© Masters et al. (2005) 
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APPENDIX F: VISUALISER-VERBILISER QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX G: LEARNING STYLES QUESTIONNAIRE (GOLF SPECIFIC) 
 
© Honey and Mumford (1996) 
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